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 V 
Abstract 
The dissertation presents an approach to decreasing the risk of 
transportation of hazardous materials (hazmat transportation) by applying 
construction-related solutions. They consist in deploying safety barriers between 
transportation routes and vulnerable property built in the roadside territory. The 
attention is focussed on the hazmat transportation accidents known as boiling 
liquid expanding vapour explosions (BLEVEs). It is considered how to predict 
thermal and mechanical effects of BLEVEs on potential barriers or roadside 
property. It is suggested to interlink results of this prediction with the 
conventional structural response techniques used for estimating the susceptibility 
of safety barriers to the effects of BLEVEs. The dissertation consists of 
introduction, three chapters, conclusions, list of references and papers published 
by the author as well as four annexes. 
The first chapter presents a review and evaluation of the published work on 
the risk posed by the hazmat transportation. In addition, existing approaches to 
the design of safety barriers suitable to protect roadside property against fires 
and explosions on road and rail are discussed. 
In the second chapter, BLEVEs are recognised as relatively frequent and 
highly damaging accidents on road and rail. The attention is focussed on 
predicting two main effects by BLEVE: thermal radiation and projectile impact. 
Three computational procedures are proposed for assessing thermal and 
mechanical effects generated of BLEVEs. The first procedure was developed to 
predict the position of road tanker vessel sustaining a BLEVE with respect to a 
potential target. The second procedure deals with assessing the thermal radiation 
of a BLEVE fireball. The third procedure was developed for forecasting the 
impact of road tanker vessel fragments on roadside object or possible safety 
barrier. 
The third chapter formulates a series of proposals to the design of safety 
barriers aimed at protection of roadside objects against thermal and mechanical 
effects of BLEVEs on road and rail. The first proposal considers the sitting of 
barriers in the area of potential deployment. The second proposal deals with a 
design of a steel barrier intended for a protection of blast loading from a railway 
tanker BLEVE. The third proposal consists in recommendations of how to 
design a reinforced concrete barrier capable to sustain impact by fragments from 
a tanker vessel. All proposals have the form of preliminary, conceptual designs. 
The main statements of the dissertation were published in twelve scientific 
articles: four articles – in the Thomson ISI Web of Science register. 
 VI 
Reziumė 
Disertacijoje pateikiamas originalus būdas mažinti pavojingųjų medžiagų 
vežimo riziką taikant statybinio pobūdžio priemones. Tos priemonės – saugos 
barjerai, kurie yra statomi tarp transporto linijų ir pažeidžiamų pakelės objektų. 
Didžiausias dėmesys telkiamas į transporto avarijas, kurios vadinamos 
besiplečiančių verdančio skysčio garų sprogimais (BLEVE) (angl. boiling liquid 
expanding vapour explosions). Nagrinėjama, kaip prognozuoti šiluminius ir 
mechaninius tokių sprogimų poveikius. Jie gali pažeisti pakelėse esančius 
statinius ir juos turi sumažinti saugos barjerai. BLEVE poveikių prognozavimą 
siūloma susieti su konstrukcijų skaičiavimo metodais, kuriais vertinama barjerų 
reakcija į šiuos poveikius. Disertaciją sudaro įvadas, trys skyriai, išvados, 
literatūros šaltiniai, autorės publikacijų sąrašas ir keturi priedai. 
Pirmajame skyriuje apžvelgiama mokslinė literatūra, kurioje nagrinėjama, 
kaip vertinti pavojingųjų medžiagų vežimo riziką. Tai pat nagrinėjami iki šiol 
sukurti saugos barjerų projektavimo metodai. Vertinamas tų barjerų tinkamumas 
apsaugoti pažeidžiamus pakelės objektus. 
Antrajame disertacijos skyriuje sprendžiama BLEVE poveikių 
prognozavimo problema. Nustatyta, kad BLEVE sprogimai yra santykinai 
dažnos avarijos, vykstančios transportuojant pavojingąsias medžiagas. Dėmesys 
telkiamas į tokių sprogimų sukeliamų cisternos skeveldrų smūgių ir šiluminės 
spinduliuotės vertinimą. Siūloma procedūra, skirta prognozuoti sprogimą 
patiriančios cisternos padėtį pažeidžiamo pakelės objekto atžvilgiu. Taip pat 
siūlomos procedūros, kurių pagalba galima vertinti pakelės objektą ir (arba) 
saugos barjerą veiksiančius cisternos skeveldrų smūgius ir šiluminę 
spinduliuotę. 
Trečiajame skyriuje pateikiami siūlymai, kaip projektuoti barjerus, kurie 
gali apsaugoti pakelės objektus nuo terminio ir mechaninio BLEVE sprogimų 
poveikio. Siūloma, kaip išdėstyti barjerus galimoje jų statybos vietoje. Taip pat 
siūloma, kaip projektuoti plieninį barjerą, galintį apsaugoti nuo sprogimo 
bangos, sukeliamos BLEVE būdu sprogstančios geležinkelio cisternos. Pateiktos 
rekomendacijos, kaip projektuoti gelžbetoninį barjerą, kuris turėtų atlaikyti 
cisternos skeveldrų smūgius. Barjerų projektavimo siūlymai turi išankstinių, 
techninių projektų pavidalą. 
Darbo rezultatai publikuoti dvylikoje mokslo straipsnių, iš kurių keturi 
išspausdinti mokslo žurnaluose, įtrauktuose į Thomson ISI Web of Science 
duomenų bazę. 
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Notations 
Symbols 
Latin 
 A − random event of a road accident; 
 B − random event of BLEVE; 
 D − specific random damage event; 
 DM – mechanical damage; 
 DT – thermal damage; 
 Ek − kinetic energy of generated fragment; 
 E(x) – emissive power of a fireball surface; 
 f(.) − probability density function; 
 fNU(.) – non-uniform density probability density function; 
 fUk(.)  uniform density probability density function; 
 F(.) − distribution function; 
 F–1(.) – inverse distribution function; 
 Fr(.) − frequency; 
 harv – height of an impact point; 
 I − impact point;  
 lcyl – length of the undamaged cylindrical part of the vessel; 
 lk – length of the zone k; 
 me-c − mass of end-cap; 
 mcyl, 1 − linear mass of the cylinder; 
O – the origin point position; 
 P(A | T) − the conditional probability of traffic accident (event A); 
 P(D | B) − the conditional damage probability; 
 P(D | B, ∆) − the damage probability for different values of ∆; 
 Pmax − peak overpressure; 
 pk − probability weights; 
 R − the radius of fireball; 
 varv – arrival (impact) velocity; 
 vdep – departure velocity; 
 x − vector characteristic of BLEVE accident;  
 x1 − coordinate of tank centre across the road; 
 x2 − coordinate of tank centre along the road; 
 x3 − angle of the tank axis in relation to the road axis;  
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 y1 − transverse rest position of the tank centre; 
 y2 − departure angle; 
 y3 − longitudinal rest position;  
Greek   
 ∆ − the distance from the explosion to a target; safety distance; 
 ξcyl – the length of the cylindrical part between the end-cap and circumferen-
tial crack; 
 ξcyl, j – value of the cylindrical part between the end-cap and circumferential 
crack sampled from a uniform distribution over the interval ]0, ξcyl[; 
 ξfrg – the random mass of fragment; 
 ξfront – the length of the cylindrical part of the oblong end-cap; 
 ξfront,j – the value of length of the oblong end-cap which will be ejected to-
wards the line b1–b5; 
 ξuni – the uniformly distributed random crack position; 
 pi − traveling frequency; 
 ςground – the inclination angle; 
 ςinc – incidence angle; 
 ς1 – horizontal departure angle; 
 ς2 – vertical departure angle; 
 τa(x) – the atmospheric transitivity; 
 ψ(.) − vector-function; 
 φ(.) − the probability density function of the transverse rest position; 
 φ − ricochet angle; 
 Ω – unsafe distance around the target object. 
Abbreviations 
BLEVE − boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion; 
CL – centreline; 
FE – finite element; 
hazmat – hazardous material; 
HMIRS – hazardous materials incident reporting system; 
LG – liquefied gas; 
LNG  – liquefied natural gas; 
LPG  – liquefied petroleum gas; 
p.d.f. − probability density function; 
QRA − quantitative risk assessment; 
SC – sacrificial cladding; 
SRA – structural reliability analysis; 
TNO – the abbreviated name of a Dutch organisation for applied scientific 
research, in Dutch ”Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek“; 
TRA – transportation risk assessment; 
VCE – vapour cloud explosion; 
VRS – vehicle restraint system. 
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Introduction 
Problem formulation 
 
The work considers in the broad sense the phenomenon of accidents during the 
transportation of hazardous materials or, in brief, hazmat transportation. These 
accidents are toxic releases from and explosions and fires of goods shipped by 
trucks and trains. Such accidents are well known for their severity and major 
losses which sometimes involve the loss of human lives. Losses caused by acci-
dents during hazmat transportation on road and rail involve also thermal and/or 
mechanical damage to the property built in the vicinity of transportation routes. 
The present work is devoted to protection of the built roadside property 
against fires and explosions on road and rail. The protection is achieved by a 
deployment of safety barriers between transportation routes and vulnerable road-
side property. The key problems of design of such barriers are uncertainties re-
lated to thermal and mechanical effects induced by fires and explosions on road 
and rail and configuration of safety barriers by taking into account these uncer-
tainties. 
 
Relevance of the thesis 
 
The relevance of this work consists in the burning actuality of severe accidents 
which occur during the hazmat transportation. Despite the progress in the field 
of transportation safety, accidents involving fires and explosions of goods 
shipped by trucks and trains are still everyday phenomenon on the world-wide 
scale and almost monthly phenomenon on the nationwide scale of large coun-
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tries. Some accidents occurred in congested urban and industrial areas and were 
particularly severe. They are known even to the general public. History of severe 
hazmat transportation accidents includes, among others, explosions of railway 
tankers in Vioreggio (Italy, 2009) and Bialystok (Poland, 2010), explosions of 
road tankers in Spain in 1978, 2002, 2011. A protection of people, property and 
environment against such accidents remains the problem of great concern. 
 
Research object 
 
The object of research is assessment and minimisation of the risk posed by fires 
and explosions on road and rail to built roadside property. The research is fo-
cused on a minimisation of this risk by deploying safety barriers between trans-
portation routes and vulnerable roadside property. 
 
Aim of the thesis 
 
The aim of this work is to prepare proposals for sitting and design of barriers 
aimed at protection of built roadside property against fires and explosions on 
road and rail. These proposals include recommendations for predicting effects of 
fires and explosions as well as recommendations for preliminary, conceptual 
design of safety barriers. 
 
Objectives of the thesis  
1. To determine hazmat transportation accidents which can cause the 
greatest damage to built roadside objects.  
2. To investigate road traffic accidents with the aim of predicting potential 
positions of road tanker explosions and effects of these explosions on 
roadside objects. 
3. To investigate, how to estimate thermal effect of road tanker explosions 
on roadside objects with respect to uncertainties related to this effect. 
4. To develop a procedure suitable to a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) 
and allowing to predict impacts of fragments resulting from bursting of a 
road tanker vessel on a potential safety barrier. 
5. To explore sitting and layout of safety barriers to be deployed alongside 
traffic routes. 
6. To give provisions for the design of a safety barrier with sacrificial clad-
ding (SC) used to resist blast loading generated by an explosion of a 
railway tanker vessel. 
7. To give provisions for the design of a safety barrier made of reinforced 
concrete segments. The barrier must be aimed at protecting vulnerable 
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roadside property against an impact of fragments generated by an explo-
sion of a tanker vessel. 
 
Research methodology  
 
The research methodology was formed by a combination of methods developed 
and widely used in the fields of QRA, statistics and data processing, stochastic 
simulation and structural reliability analysis (SRA). The methodological core of 
the research was quantification and propagation of uncertainties related to ef-
fects of fires and explosions in transportation and applying this uncertainty mod-
elling to the design of safety barriers. Stochastic (Monte Carlo) simulation was 
applied to the propagation of uncertainties. The uncertainty modelling was com-
bined with deterministic models of design of barrier structures. 
 
Scientific novelty of the thesis 
 
The main scientific novelty consists in the idea to apply principles of QRA to a 
design of safety barriers capable to protect built roadside property against fires 
and explosions on roads and railways used for transportation of hazardous mate-
rials. Until now similar barriers were deployed only by military for security rea-
sons. Another novel elements are the following: 
1. An application of probabilistic methods to modelling uncertainties relat-
ed to effects of fires and explosions on road and rail. 
2. A simulation-based propagation of uncertainties related to the effects of 
fires and explosions through mathematical models of these physical 
phenomena and mechanical models of barrier structures. 
3. A utilisation of a small-size sample of effects of an explosion to the reli-
ability-based design of a barrier. 
4. Proposals for the design of a sacrificial steel barrier aimed at reduction 
of blast loading from an explosion and reinforced concrete barrier capa-
ble to stop fragments of a road or railway tanker vessel sustaining an ex-
plosion. 
 
Practical value of research findings 
 
The practical significance of the results achieved in this work is a possibility to 
design and deploy protective structures which will reduce the risk of hazmat 
transportation. A relatively small investment in the safety barriers will allow to 
avoid potentially huge losses in case of a major accident on road and rail. Meth-
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odological procedures developed in this work will help in designing safety barri-
ers which will adequately protect roadside objects. The practical importance of 
these procedures consists in the possibility to design safety barriers by taking 
into account considerable uncertainties related to the effects induced by fires and 
explosions on road and rail. Uncertainties related to the response of roadside 
objects to the effects generated by the fires and explosions can also be taken into 
consideration by means of the computational procedures proposed in the present 
work. The research findings presented in this dissertation can be applied by 
structural and safety engineers who want to reduce the risk to built property 
posed by transportation of hazardous materials. 
 
Defended statements 
1. The main hazards posed by the hazmat transportation to the roadside 
property are explosions known as BLEVEs and VCEs. A rough assess-
ment of post-mortem accidents implies that BLEVEs are more likely to 
occur than VCEs. BLEVEs can be considered as the hazmat transporta-
tion accidents which pose the greatest hazard to the built roadside ob-
jects. 
2. A prediction of thermal and mechanical effects of BLEVEs on the road-
side objects will face considerable uncertainties. These uncertainties can 
be quantified and propagated by a combined application of probabilistic 
modelling and stochastic simulation. An application of these methods 
will yield simulated statistical samples which can be applied to the de-
sign of safety barriers capable to protect roadside property against fires 
and explosions on road and rail. 
3. The safety barrier can be designed by applying a small-size statistical 
sample containing values of effects induced by fires and explosions. 
This sample can be obtained by experiment or from post-mortem inves-
tigation of accidents. The barrier can be designed by combining methods 
of SRA and statistical resampling procedure (bootstrap). An application 
of these approaches will yield an estimate of a barrier failure probability. 
This probability can be used for making design decisions. 
4. The design of safety barriers provides a variety of structural solutions. 
Steel, reinforced concrete and soil can be applied to the design and con-
struction of barriers. However, this design should be based on an appli-
cation of QRA and SRA methods. They will allow to take proper ac-
count of uncertainties related to the effects generated by fires and 
explosions on road and rail.  
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Approval of research results 
 
The main statements of the thesis were published in seven scientific articles: 
four articles – in the Thomson ISI Web of Science register (Vaidogas et al. 
2012ab, Vaidogas and Linkutė 2012, Linkutė et al. 2013), three articles in other 
journals (Vaidogas and Kisežauskienė 2012, Vaidogas et al. 2013ab). 
The main statements of the thesis were discussed during three national scientific 
conferences: 
− in the 16th International Conference "Mechanika 2011", held in Kaunas, 
2011; 
− in the 11th International Conference " International Conference "Envi-
ronmental Engineering", held in Vilnius, 2011; 
− in the 8th International Conference "Transbaltica 2013", held in Vilnius, 
2013. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis consists of introduction, 3 chapters, conclusions, list of references and 
the author's publications, six annexes. The structure of the thesis is presented in 
Figure 1. 
The volume of the thesis is 169 pages, excluding annexes, 49 numbered 
formulas are used, 62 pictures and 20 tables. The list of references consist of 170 
items. 
6 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Fig. 1. The structure of the dissertation 
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1 
1. Risk posed by hazmat 
transportation: a review from the 
standpoint of structural engineering 
The first chapter presents a review and evaluation of the published work on risk 
posed by transportation of hazardous materials (hazmat transportation). In addi-
tion, existing approaches to the design of safety barriers suitable to protect road-
side property against fires and explosions on road and rail are discussed. The 
review covers general aspects of a transportation risk analysis (TRA), possible 
damaging events, structural aspects of TRA, consideration on the design of safe-
ty barriers. In particular, design of sacrificial and non-sacrificial blast walls. The 
review was partially presented in the papers published by Vaidogas et al. 
(2012ab) and Linkutė et al. (2013). 
 
1.1. A review of approaches to transportation risk 
assessment 
 
Every day large amounts of hazardous materials are transported by trucks and 
railway cars. Accidents of these vehicles pose serious risk to traffic and roadside 
territory (Planas-Cuchi et al. 2004; Oggero et al. 2006). Such accidents can es-
calate into toxic releases, major fires and explosions. In an extreme case a road 
or railway tanker accident can end up in severe explosions known as BLEVE 
and VCE (T. Abassi and S. A. Abassi 2007; Taveau 2010). BLEVE or VCE on 
road or rail can be a stand-alone accidents or, alternatively, cause secondary or 
8 1. RISK POSED BY HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION: A REVIEW ... 
 
“knock-on” accidents in the roadside territory (Abdolhamidzadeh et al. 2010, 
2011). 
Predicting effects of such phenomena as BLEVE on roadside property is 
possible by means of mathematical modelling. The models of BLEVE effects 
cover blast, fireballs and projection of fragments (projectiles) (e.g., CCPS 1994; 
Casal 2008). Most of these models are strictly deterministic; some models in-
clude probabilistic elements (Hauptmanns 2001; Vaidogas 2006a; Mébarki et al. 
2009; Nguyen et al. 2009). The key input information of them is of geometric 
nature. The prediction of BLEVE effects requires to know distance and orienta-
tion of the tanker in relation to potential targets (e.g., Birk 1996; Casal 2008). 
The identification of the position and orientation is particularly important when 
the potential distance between tank and target is relatively small. 
As BLEVEs road tankers are relatively rare and unexpected events influ-
enced by many random factors, the prediction of the tank position and orienta-
tion at the instant of BLEVE will have to deal with considerable uncertainties. 
Methods of QRA are naturally suited to quantify and propagate such uncertain-
ties. Quantitative measures of uncertainties in position and orientation of explod-
ing tank can serve as input into a QRA problem which will relate BLEVE to its 
risk profile. 
There is a history of applications of QRA to transportation of hazardous 
materials or TRA (CCPS 1995; CPD 1999; Fabiano et al. 2002; Bubbico et al. 
2004ab; Gheorghe et al. 2005; Grislis 2010). The common features of these ap-
plications are as follows: 
1. Large traffic fragments are considered and divided into smaller route 
segments, for which risk is estimated. Methods of route disaggregation 
vary in different applications. 
2. Methods used for the estimation of risk related to individual route seg-
ments are in most cases suitable for fixed installations. 
3. Most applications deal with individual and societal risk to exposed 
population. Risk to built roadside property (buildings, objects of traffic 
infrastructure, industrial installations) is mentioned but not considered in 
detail. 
4. The accident scenario prevailing in the applications of TRA is release of 
toxic materials and subsequent intoxication of population. Fires and ex-
plosions are not considered in detail, especially in the context of risk to 
fixed roadside objects. 
5. When it comes to a fire and/or explosion accident on road and rail, au-
thors often simply refer to models proposed in the literature for the pre-
diction of effects of these phenomena, for instance, to the “coloured” 
books issued by the Dutch organisation TNO (CPD 1992, 2005). At-
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tempts to relate in detail characteristics of traffic accidents to fires and 
explosions on road and rail are not known to us. 
6. Methodological aspects of QRA applications to TRA look “suspiciously 
flat”. Applications of TRA have few if any considerations on the uncer-
tainty of risk assessments, quality and relevance of data, formal separa-
tion of experts’ opinions and hard historical data. 
In summary one can say that TRA is a widely developed extension of QRA; 
however, applications of TRA lack “attention to detail”, where fires and explo-
sions on road and rail are of concern. A BLEVE-related example of this state of 
investigations is the assessment of individual and societal risk due to LPG trans-
portation done by Paltrinieri et al. (2009). 
The idea that explosions and fires on road and rail may require an in-depth 
consideration of the risk to a specific object built in the vicinity of the route with 
the hazard of fire and explosion accidents is not new. Gheorghe et al. (2005) and 
Vaidogas (2007b) considered specific situation of exposure of roadside objects 
to fires and explosions on road and rail. The present study can be viewed as a 
refining of these approaches. 
We think that the assessment of risk to specific roadside property posed by 
road tanker explosions requires a detailed simulation of the road accident pre-
ceding the BLEVE event. Results of such simulation will yield input information 
for the simulation-based prediction of BLEVE effects and eventually potential 
damage to roadside objects. The simulation results can be useful for a risk-based 
design of barriers which could provide protection against BLEVEs. The present 
study focuses on a stochastic (Monte Carlo) simulation of position and orienta-
tion of road tankers before they sustain an explosion. 
This study comprised of two parts. The first part contains a description of a 
data on the rest position of road tankers involved in traffic accidents. Probabilis-
tic models fitted to this data are presented as well. Finally, the first part presents 
considerations on the stochastic simulation of the accident position. The second 
part describes a case study used to illustrate the simulation procedure (Vaidogas 
et al. 2012b). 
 
1.2. Approaches to design of safety barriers able to 
protect roadside property 
 
The transport of flammable and explosive materials by road and rail has an in-
creasing trend. The quantities of hazardous materials shipped by rail are larger 
than ones routed by road. Therefore the railway transportation has a higher po-
tential of fires and explosions (e.g., Pontigia et al. 2011). However, the damage 
caused by fires and explosions on road can be larger, because roads often pass 
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populated areas or run in dangerous vicinity of or even inside industrial facilities 
(e.g., Lozano et al. 2010). Fires are the most often accidents suffered during the 
transportation of hazardous materials, followed by explosions and gas releases 
(Darbra et al. 2010). 
The risk posed by potential fires and explosions on road can be controlled 
by providing adequate separation distances between road and facility site or in-
dividual roadside objects (process units, say). An employment of separation dis-
tances is a part of wider safety strategies known as facility sitting and land use 
planning (CCPS 2005; Cahen 2006; Cozzani et al. 2006; Taveau 2010, Na-
gashima et al. 2011). However, the cost of land acquisition for a provision of 
future road-to-facility separation distances can be unacceptably high. An em-
ployment of adequate separation distances can be impossible where existing 
roads adjoin existing facilities or where the space available for constructing a 
future road (facility) near an existing facility (road) is limited. 
A compensation for less than desired separation distances includes options 
available on both transportation side and endangered facility side. Safeguards 
can be built into truck vehicles and safer routing applied (Paltrinieri et al. 2009; 
Förster and Günther 2009). However, the owner (designer) of the endangered 
facility may have little influence, if any, on the routing of flammable and explo-
sive materials over an adjacent public road. The transportation of such materials 
over access and on-site roads can be vital to running the facility. The presence of 
congested vulnerable areas adjoined by on-site roads can make the on-site trans-
portation more hazardous than the transportation over off-site, public roads (e.g., 
Bakke et al. 2010; Johnson 2010; Boudet et al. 2011). 
Safety barriers built alongside on-site and off-site roads can compensate for 
separation distances. If designed properly, the safety barriers will provide pro-
tection allowing not to modify roadside objects or to reduce the costs of their 
strengthening (shielding). Safety barriers are similar to structures known as blast 
or barrier walls and used to protect against military weapons and improvised 
explosive devises (e.g., Smith 2010). A design of safety barriers and blast walls 
will have much in common; however, they will not be identical. Wilful military 
and terrorist explosions are generally less predictable than unintentional explo-
sions of civilian vehicles carrying hazardous goods by road. Blast walls are 
normally not designed to resist effects of fireballs and large projectiles from road 
tanker explosions or to influence, in a way, a spread of flammable gases and 
liquids accidentally released from tank vehicles. The disadvantage of blast walls 
in terms of assuring security is that they prohibit observation of activities occur-
ring on other side (Krauthammer 2008). A reduction of visibility by safety barri-
ers should not be a problem as long as it does not impair road safety or prohibit a 
warning to personnel about an imminent fire or explosion on road. 
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A design of safety barriers will be governed by the specific effects of an ac-
cidental fire and/or explosion on road. A comprehensive review of such acci-
dents is not known to us, although data on some specific accidents was exam-
ined (Ronza et al. 2007). It is reasonably safe to suggest that the largest potential 
of major fires and explosions on road has an intense transportation of flammable 
liquids, particularly, liquefied gases. Road accidents of tank vehicles carrying 
liquefied gases can escalate into BLEVEs (Planas-Cuchi et al. 2004; Tauseef 
et al. 2010). 
The design of a safety barrier aimed at protecting against such explosions as 
BLEVE will include estimation of thermal and mechanical effects to be resisted 
or attenuated as well as determination of an optimal barrier structure. The barrier 
can be optimised by means of conventional deterministic or reliability-based 
methods as well as methods of multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) 
(Vaidogas 2007b; Zavadskas and Vaidogas 2009; Vaidogas and Šakėnaitė 2010, 
2011). However, the optimal design of the barrier should be preceded by making 
several decisions concerning sitting the barrier: determination of the area availa-
ble for its construction; positioning the barrier between road and roadside ob-
ject(s); and configuring the barrier in plan. Making such decisions can be seen as 
a pre-optimisation stage of the barrier design. The present study seeks to high-
light several problems which may arise in this design stage. The further text re-
fers mainly to explosions on road, whereas fires are mentioned where necessary. 
 
1.3. Some structural considerations related to the 
design of safety barriers 
 
1.3.1. Sacrificial and non-sacrificial blast walls 
 
A blast wall is a physical barrier separating a vulnerable object from a potential 
explosion which produces a blast loading capable to damage the object (Smith 
2010). Blast walls are normally deployed to provide structural protection against 
military weapons or improvised explosive devices. However, blast walls are in 
principle suitable to mitigate the level of blast loading generated by accidental 
explosions occurring in industrial facilities and during a transportation of haz-
ardous goods. Such blast loading is sometimes accompanied by impact of pro-
jectiles and spread thermal radiation. A typical example of such an explosion is 
BLEVE (e.g., Vaidogas and Juocevičius 2007). 
A rigid, non-deforming blast wall will reflect blast energy back towards the 
explosive source and this energy will not be available to damage the protected 
object. However, the blast energy can be additionally absorbed by the wall when 
it undergoes permanent, damaging deformation. Blast wall can be relatively 
lightweight and weak and still offer some degree of protection because a high 
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level of deformation can absorb a significant amount of the blast wave energy. 
The cost of rigid, non-destructible walls is often prohibitive and a significant 
mitigation of blast can be achieved using relatively lightweight frangible or sac-
rificial walls (Smith 2010; Bogosian and Piepenburg 2002). The energy of blast 
loading can be absorbed by lightweight systems used as sacrificial cladding or, 
in brief, SC. They can be mounted on the front of a non-sacrificial structure to 
be protected or serve as a component of a blast wall (Guruprasad and Mukherjee 
2000ab; Hanssen et al. 2002; Su et al. 2008). 
Studies concerned with the performance of blast walls in providing protec-
tion against the damaging effect of blast loading deal, almost exceptionally, with 
two problems: (i) developing deterministic models of blast-wall interaction and 
wall behaviour under the blast loading; and (ii) verification of blast wall designs 
in highly specific experimental set-ups. In either case, characteristics of blast 
loading and structure subjected to it are (assumed to be) known in advance. It is 
a paradox that in fact no attention was paid to uncertainties related to this type of 
loading and structures exposed to it. In other words, the field remains almost 
fully deterministic. 
It is obvious that blast loading generated by attack weapons, terrorist devic-
es and industrial accidents is uncertain to a large measure. Uncertainties of cer-
tain degree will be always inherent in mechanical models describing behaviour 
of blast walls. A consistent quantification of the uncertainties related to blast 
loading and protective structures subjected to it is possible by a combined appli-
cation of SRA and methodological tools developed in the field of QRA 
(Vaidogas 2003, 2006a, 2007a). 
The problem of uncertainty quantification in the case of blast loading gen-
erated during industrial accidents is that such accidents are unique and unex-
pected events, to a large margin. Post mortem statistical data on blast loading 
characteristics can be either unavailable or not representative. However, a design 
of a blast wall can be based on an experimental simulation of an accident, in 
which blast loading to be mitigated by the wall will be imitated either physically 
or numerically. A series of such experiments may yield a statistical sample of 
blast loading characteristics. This sample will contain information on the varia-
bility of these characteristics and, indirectly, variability of potential damage to 
the wall and effects on the object to be protected. With such a sample, a design 
of blast wall will be possible even in the case when the size of the sample will be 
small from the standpoint of the classical statistics (Vaidogas 2009; Vaidogas 
and Juocevičius 2009; Juocevičius 2011). In addition, elements of this sample 
can be the so-called uncertain data, that is, data represented by probability distri-
butions and not fixed, crisp values. 
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1.3.2. Amenability of sacrificial cladding of blast walls to 
mathematical modelling 
 
SC is generally designed as a multi-layered structure attached to a non-sacrificial 
frame (Guruprasad and Mukherjee 2000ab; Hanssen et al. 2002; Su et al. 2008; 
Ma and Ye 2007). A building wall to be protected by SC serves as a typical sup-
port. A certain degree of energy absorption and dissipation can be achieved also 
by cladding built as a part of blast walls and supported along some contours, 
where cladding is attached to the frame of a blast wall (Karagiozova et al. 2010; 
Pellissetti and Schueller 2006). The frame can provide support over most of the 
cladding area or, alternatively, the support can be reduced to the minimum and 
be provided by vertical non-sacrificial or less frangible posts (Fig. 1.1). The con-
figuration of a non-continuous support may influence a production projectiles 
which after an SC failure may damage the object protected by the wall. 
 
Fig. 1.1. Non-sacrificial frames supporting sacrificial cladding: a) densely distributed 
support; b) cladding supported by cantilever posts 
The possibility to predict the behaviour of SC subjected to blast loading 
will depend on the presence of mathematical models which allow to obtain a 
deformation-time relationship and formally express a criterion for SC failure 
(cessation to accomplish the protective function in the course of blast loading). 
Studies of SCs and their components published in the recent two decades pro-
vide different possibilities of a mathematical modelling of SC behaviour. These 
studies can be subdivided into four groups: 
1. Experimental measurements of SC deformations which do not contain 
any attempts to carry out a parallel analytical or numerical modelling 
(Straub and Der Kiureghian 2008; Vaidogas and Juocevičius 2008a). 
2. Experimental studies with a parallel numerical, finite element (FE) mod-
elling (e.g., Kelly and Smith 2009). 
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3. Studies containing an FE analysis only (Pellissetti and Schueller 2006; 
Lemaire 2009). 
4. Studies which develop analytical models only or in addition to experi-
mental measurements and/or FE computations (Guruprasad and 
Mukherjee 2000ab; Hanssen et al. 2002; Karagiozova et al. 2010; Ma 
and Ye 2007; Aven and Zio 2011; Vaidogas et al. 2012ab). 
Most studies deal with the sandwich cladding which responds to blast load-
ing by a compaction perpendicularly to the continuous base (Fig. 1.2a). A closer 
look at the analytical models allows to conclude that the most of them are based 
on a single-degree of freedom (SDOF) elastic or elastic-plastic idealisation of an 
SC fragment which deforms axially along the blast action (Ma and Ye 2007; 
Pellissetti and Schueller 2006; Lemaire 2009; Aven and Zio 2011; Vaidogas 
et al. 2012a). Louca et al. (2004) apply an SDOF idealisation to a blast wall 
cladding consisting of profiled steel sections which act as one-way slabs 
(Fig. 1.2b). Bahei-El-Din et al. (2006) used an FE analysis to study blast-tolerant 
sandwich plates which are also idealised as beam elements (Fig. 1.2c). Both 
claddings have some energy dissipation capability; however, their studies do not 
reveal how to assess the alleviation of blast action transmitted to the supporting 
frame. 
 
Fig. 1.2. Types of sacrificial cladding: a) sandwich cladding attached to a continuous 
base; b) profiled section wall supported by posts; c) sandwich cladding 
All analytical SC models known to us attempt to predict deformations of 
individual cladding layers. An interaction between SC and supporting frame is 
not considered, and so criteria for cladding failure to accomplish the protective 
function are not expressed formally. However, some authors state that such a 
criterion should be based on a difference between the energy SC is capable to 
absorb, Eabsorb, and the total energy imparted by the blast impulse, Eblast. Corre-
spondingly, the failure criterion expressed through a safety margin m (a concept 
widely used in SRA) may have the form 
 m =  Eabsorb – Eblast ≤ 0 (1.1) 
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Attempts to compute Eabsorb and Eblast were made by Hansen et al. (2002) 
and Ma and Ye (2007). 
A failure criterion derived from a dynamic modelling of the sandwich clad-
ding shown in Fig. 1.2a is presented by Theobald and Nurrick (2010). They re-
late the failure criterion to a maximum crush distance of the sandwich core, δmax 
(Fig. 1.2a). This distance is used to obtain the time at which compaction of the 
core occurs, tc, and compare it to the total cladding response duration tm. If tc ≥ 
tm, the cladding will be able to absorb a prescribed blast load. The failure criteri-
on can be expressed through a safety margin m as follows: 
 m =  tc – tm ≤ 0 (1.2) 
Louca et al. (2004) proposed two safety margins based on a maximum dy-
namic response of the profiled section cladding shown in Fig. 1.2b: 
 m1 =  pR – y1 ≤ 0 (1.3a) 
 m2 =  upl,max – upl,dyn ≤ 0 (1.3b) 
where pR is the resistance (dynamic pressure capacity) of the profiled section; y1 
is the reflected peak overpressure of uniformly distributed blast loading; and 
upl,max and upl,dyn are the maximum dynamic plastic deflection and the dynamic 
plastic deflection due to the blast load, respectively. The above safety margins mi 
(i = 1, 2) were derived by considering plastic deflection limit, that is, a limit 
point where all the reserve strength of the profiled section have been utilised. 
Consequently, the negative values of mi mean that the profiled section is “sacri-
ficed” and this involves large plastic deformation, possible tearing of welds at 
supports and potential formation of a projectile. 
Analytical and numerical models of SC behaviour cited above are purely 
deterministic on both loading and structural side. The problem of model accura-
cy (uncertainty) is not considered formally in the aforementioned studies. From 
an SRA viewpoint, the deterministic analytical and numerical models of SC be-
haviour, mi, may serve as a basis for a probabilistic analysis of this protective 
structure. The need for such an analysis will arise in the case where blast loading 
can vary to a large degree and is difficult to predict it with fair degree accuracy. 
Uncertainties can be inherent not only in the loading but also the response of SC 
to it. A consistent quantification of these uncertainties will generally require to 
apply methods developed in the field of QRA. By the way, an assessment of 
potential consequences caused by an accidental explosion is in essence a prob-
lem of QRA. 
The standard QRA approach to uncertainty modelling is a separate treat-
ment of stochastic and epistemic uncertainties, usually by applying a nested-loop 
stochastic simulation (e.g., Vaidogas 2009). This simulation will require to eval-
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uate the SC models mi a large number of times and so the complexity of mi will 
be an important factor influencing the computational time. 
Attempts to “marry” deterministic FE analysis and uncertainty quantifica-
tion are well-known in SRA (e.g., Lemaire, M. 2009). Even though blast wall 
cladding is a relatively simple mechanical object, FE models expressing the 
safety margins mi can be too cumbersome to incorporate them into a nested loop 
simulation procedure used in QRA for uncertainty propagation. Therefore, the 
further probabilistic analysis of blast wall cladding will be based on analytical 
and not numerical FE models, however accurate the latter might be. The objec-
tive to be pursued by this analysis will be an estimation of an SC failure proba-
bility which can be used as a measure of explosive damage to SC. 
 
1.3.3. Safety barriers and elements of vehicle restraint sytems 
 
A safety barrier deployed to resist effects of BLEVE may be exposed to a severe 
impact by fragments of road or railway tanker vessel. Fragments projected into 
the roadside territory are the furthers reaching hazard from BLEVE (T. Abassi 
and S. A. Abassi 2007). The launch velocity of these fragments can reach 200–
400 km/h (Birk 1996). A cylindrical vessel of road or railway tanker can gener-
ate several major fragments. The largest range will have end-caps and oblong 
end-caps of the vessel (e. g., Mebarki et al. 2009a). Masses of typical road tank-
er vessels used in Lithuania are in the region of 10-14 tons, whereas masses of 
typical 4-wheel railway tanker vessels can range between 20 and 30 tons. Con-
sequently, maximal masses of oblong end-caps generated by a BLEVE of a road 
or railway tanker can range roughly between 8 and 28 tons. 
An impact of a cylindrical vessel fragment on a safety barrier resembles to 
some degree a collision of a road vehicle with elements a vehicle restraint sys-
tem (VRS). The main elements of VRS, which are similar to the safety barriers 
considered in the present work, are guardrails along the edge of the road and 
median barriers (e. g., Čygas et al. 2009; Jasiūnienė et al. 2009). 
VRSs have the aim to prevent vehicles from leaving the road. The Europe-
an standard EN 1317 classifies VRSs into different containment levels and re-
quires carrying out standardized full-scale impact tests of any newly developed 
VRS (EN 1317 2010). However, the full-scale impact tests require substantial 
expenses (e.g., Atahan et al. 2014). Therefore EN 1317 explicitly allows replac-
ing those full-scale impact tests by computational simulations under certain limi-
tations, in particular if a VRS is only subject to modifications (see Part 5 of 
EN 1317). At the moment FE models are the preferred choice for such simula-
tions. While the use of FE modelling systems has been established for the appli-
cation in structural engineering not only for static but also dynamic analysis 
(with both elastic and large plastic deformations), it can be observed that in par-
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ticular on the US American market there is a strong party to favour the FE code 
LS-DYNA to simulate vehicle impacts to VRSs (Neuenhaus et al. 2013). This 
trend is followed also on the European market (e.g., Ren and Vesenjak 2005; 
Borovinšek et al. 2007; Reid et al. 2009; Prentkovskis et al. 2010, 2012). 
In principle, FE modelling implemented in such codes as LS-DYNA could 
be applied to a simulation of a safely barrier collision with a large chunk of a 
tanker vessel. It could be particularly suitable to predict behaviour of highly de-
formable steel barriers, especially, barriers equipped with SC. However, there 
the subtlety of FE modelling of guardrail and safety barriers can be different. 
Guardrails must meet contradicting goals: on the one hand to keep vehicles on 
track, and on the other hand to keep the impact severity on the passengers sitting 
inside a car hitting the barrier at a minimum. Safety barriers will have to meet 
simpler goal: to stop the vessel fragment or to cause it to rebound off its surface. 
The barrier can sustain, in principle, any degree of damage including large plas-
tic deformations or complete collapse (sacrificing). Thus FE modelling of safety 
barriers can be less accurate than simulation of vehicular impact on a guardrail. 
Both guardrail and safety barrier can be designed as linear sacrificial struc-
tures and both will have to resist the action of an oblique impact. A normal im-
pact will be less likely. These are the main similarities between guardrails and 
safety barriers. Differences between these two structures are more numerous 
than similarities. Table 1.1 lists some of the differences. In certain respects 
guardrails and safety barriers differ substantially. Therefore the experience 
gained in the development of guardrails can be only of limited use for the design 
of safety barriers. However, a guardrail can be deployed to protect a safety bar-
rier against a vehicle impact if this barrier will be positioned in the immediate 
vicinity of the road. Such a barrier position will be the most effective if it has to 
serve as a blast wall (Smith 2010). 
Table 1.1. Differences between elements of a VRS (guardrails and median barriers) and 
safety barriers 
Guardrail Safety barrier 
The function 
Prevents vehicles from leaving the road 
and protects passengers inside vehicles 
Protects objects in the territory behind 
the barrier 
Actions to be resisted 
Impact by vehicle at a low altitude Impact by vessel fragment and/or blast 
loading from such events as BLEVE and 
VCE; the impact point can be at a rela-
tively high altitude 
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Table 1.1. Continued 
Structural nature and behaviour 
Usually a long, continuous, horizontally 
oriented structure of relatively small 
height 
Fence-shaped structure, not necessarily 
continuous in the longitudinal direction; 
can be relatively tall if necessary; seg-
ments can be idealised as cantilevers 
projecting from the ground; 
soil embankment providing an obstacle 
for vessel fragments projected by 
BLEVE 
Uncertainties related to the actions to be resisted 
Relatively small Large 
Kinetic energy of impact 
Moderate as compared to the energy of 
the vessel fragments to be stopped by the 
safety barrier 
Large due to high velocity of fragments 
generated by a BLEVE and relatively 
large mass of these fragments 
Sitting 
Along the edge of the road or in the me-
dian; the horizontal layout is determined 
by the road geometry 
In the available territory between the 
road and roadside objects to be protect-
ed; can be not necessarily a linear struc-
ture and have the horizontal layout 
providing maximum protection 
Further functions 
Usually are not provided A safety barrier can provide protection 
against the spread of hazardous material 
released from a road tanker and thermal 
radiation from a fire on road; the barrier 
can also serve as a part of a perimeter 
fence and/or reduce traffic noise 
Acceptance test 
The European standard EN 1317 requires 
carrying out standardized full-scale im-
pact tests of newly developed systems; 
the tests can cause substantial expenses 
An acceptance test was not required until 
now by any normative document 
 
The main methodological difference between the computer-aided modelling 
of guardrails and safety barriers will consist, in our opinion, in the prediction of 
impact actions on these structures. Masses, velocities and impact angles of vehi-
cles colliding with guardrails can be assessed on the basis of large amount of 
data on past traffic accidents. In addition, masses and velocities of typical vehi-
cles involved in collisions with the elements of VRS will vary within a relatively 
narrow range. The variation of masses and velocities of fragments generated by 
a bursting of a road or railway tanker vessel will be much larger, to say nothing 
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about the angle of oblique impact. In addition, the impact will occur at much 
higher speed. Therefore, the simulation will face the problem of assessing the 
dynamic enhancement of mechanical properties of steel and concrete (Linkutė 
et al. 2013). 
 
1.4. First chapter conclusions and formulation of the 
dissertation tasks 
 
This chapter presented a review of the published work on TRA and design of 
safety barriers. The review allows to make several conclusions about the state of 
dealing with risks posed by transportation of hazardous materials from the posi-
tion of civil engineering: 
1. A transportation of hazardous materials by road and rail poses serious 
risk to roadside population and built roadside property. Events which 
can cause damage to population are releases of toxic materials, fires and 
explosions of trucks and trains. Build property can be damaged by fires 
and explosions, the effects of which will spread into the roadside territo-
ry. 
2. TRA is a scientific methodology developed for dealing with potential 
accidents during the shipment of hazardous materials. It is closely relat-
ed to the general methodology of QRA. Both QRA and TRA methods of 
probability calculus and statistics to obtaining risk estimates. 
3. Most applications of TRA deal with individual and societal risk to ex-
posed population. The accident scenario prevailing in the applications of 
TRA is release of toxic materials and subsequent intoxication of popula-
tion. Risk to built roadside property (buildings, objects of traffic infra-
structure, industrial installations) is mentioned in the literature, but is not 
considered in detail. 
4. The risk posed by potential fires and explosions on road and rail can be 
controlled by providing adequate separation distances between road and 
fixed roadside objects. A compensation for less than desired separation 
distances includes a construction of safety barriers between road (rail-
way tracks) and vulnerable roadside object(s). Such barriers can mini-
mise effects of blast and thermal radiation and stop projectiles ejected 
towards the vulnerable objects. 
5. Safety barriers designed and built until now were mainly blast walls. 
They were used by the military to separate vulnerable objects from po-
tential explosion which produces a blast loading capable to damage the 
object. A combined action of blast and projectiles on blast walls was not 
considered in detail in the open literature. 
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6. Blast walls can be built as sacrificial and non-sacrificial structures. Sac-
rificial blast walls are the better solution, because a part of blast energy 
can be absorbed by the wall when it sustains permanent, damaging de-
formation. 
7. Studies of sacrificial blast walls published in the recent two decades 
provide different deterministic mathematical models allowing to predict 
modelling of blast wall behaviour. These models can be applied in com-
bination with QRA methods and techniques of SRA. The latter two sci-
entific fields provide systematic tools for an uncertainty quantification. 
A proper modelling of uncertainties allow to design better safety barri-
ers. 
Results of the literature review and the just listed conclusions of the first 
chapter allow to formulate the following tasks for this dissertation: 
1. To analyse hazmat transportation accidents which can cause the greatest 
damage to built roadside objects. 
2. To collect and process data on road traffic accidents, which could allow 
to predict the potential positions of road tanker explosions. 
3. To develop a procedure suitable to predicting thermal effects of road 
tanker explosions on roadside objects. 
4. To develop a QRA-friendly procedure allowing to predict impacts of a 
road tanker vessel fragments on a potential safety barrier. 
5. To give provisions for sitting and layout of safety barriers to be built 
alongside traffic routes. 
6. To give provisions for the design of a safety barrier with sacrificial clad-
ding used to resist blast loading generated by an explosion of a railway 
tanker vessel. 
7. To give provisions for the design of a safety barrier aimed at protecting 
roadside property against an impact of a fragment of a road tanker ves-
sel. 
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2. Predicting the effects from hazmat 
transportation accidents capable to 
damage roadside property 
 
 
The second chapter includes an identification of most hazardous accidents which 
can occur on road and rail and proposes three computational procedures for 
identifying thermal and mechanical effects generated by such accidents. BLEVE 
is recognised as a relatively frequent and highly damaging accident on road and 
rail. The second chapter is focused on predicting the two main effects of 
BLEVE: thermal radiation and projectile impact. The first procedure was devel-
oped to predict the position of road tanker vessel sustaining a BLEVE with re-
spect to a potential target. The second procedure deals with assessing the ther-
mal radiation of a BLEVE fireball which can impinge on roadside objects. The 
third procedure was developed for forecasting the impact of road tanker vessel 
fragments on roadside object or possible safety barrier. All three procedures are 
based on probabilistic modelling and can be incorporated into a transportation 
risk analysis. The present chapter summarises results of investigation published 
by Vaidogas et al. (2012ab), Vaidogas and Kisežauskienė (2012), Kisežauskienė 
and Vaidogas (2013). 
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2.1. Identification of the main hazards to roadside 
property posed by road and rail transportation 
 
Safe transportation of hazardous materials is an important national issue in each 
country. The great majority of these materials move by either rail or truck. With 
an ever increasing number of trucks moving on highways, there is cause for con-
cern not only over safety issues, but the impact on highway gridlock, environ-
mental implications, and infrastructure deterioration. 
The transportation of hazmats is an important problem due to their 
pervasiveness. Hazardous materials, or dangerous goods, include explosives, 
gases, flammable liquids and solids, oxidizing substances, poisonous and 
infectious substances, radioactive materials, corrosive substances, and hazardous 
wastes. Due to the nature of most chemicals, they can pose hazards of toxic 
release, fire and explosion. 
Releases of toxic liquids and atmospheric dispersions of toxic clouds can 
cause damaging effects to environment and population located working in the 
vicinity of roads and rails. Fires and explosions pose the hazard of thermal and 
mechanical actions which can severely damage built property in the roadside 
territory. The frequency of fires and explosions and so the likelihood of these 
events in the future can be assessed by applying such databases as the Hazardous 
Materials Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) run by the US Department of 
Transportation (PHMSA 2014; Ronza et al. 2007). The HMIRS database is 
public and available online. 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 contain counts of hazmat transportation accidents and 
incidents in the 10-year period 2003–2012 on US roads and rails, respectively. 
The numbers of fires and explosions among these events are presented in 
separate columns. These numbers are relatively small as compared to the total 
number of events reported to HMIRS. However, HMIRS contains a very large 
number of incidents which caused little of no damage. Such incidents are mainly 
small spills and evaporations. Another obvious conclusion which follows from 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 is that hazmat transportation by rail causes a substantially 
smaller number of accidents and incidents than shipping of such materials by 
trucks. This conclusion is confirmed also by other authors (e.g., Spraggings 
2010). 
The HMIRS database was searched for hazardous materials which most 
often are involved in transportation accidents. These materials are commercial 
energetic hydrocarbons (LNG; LPG; light fractions including petrol and 
naphtha, crude oil; kerosene and jet fuel; diesel fuel; gas oil and No. 1 and 2 fuel 
oil; No. 4, 5, 6 fuel oils) (Ronza et al. 2007). 
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Table 2.1. Numbers of fires and explosions in hazmat transportation accidents on US 
roads in the 11-year period 2003 to 2013 (extracted from the HMIRS database, PHMSA 
(2014)) 
Year Total number of reported acci-
dents 
Number of fires Number of 
explosions 
2003 13 594 40 26 
2004 13 068 49 24 
2005 13 460 29 56 
2006 17 159 30 49 
2007 16 932 43 60 
2008 14 802 48 46 
2009 12 730 46 24 
2010 12 652 49 47 
2011 13 237 32 16 
2012 13 249 63 13 
2013 13 728 49 14 
Total: 154 611 478 375 
 
Table 2.2. Numbers of fires and explosions in hazmat transportation accidents on US 
railways in the 11-year period 2003 to 2013 (extracted from the HMIRS database, 
PHMSA (2014)) 
Year Total number of reported acci-
dents 
Number of fires Number of 
explosions 
2003 802 4 1 
2004 765 3 0 
2005 745 2 1 
2006 703 2 0 
2007 753 6 2 
2008 748 4 0 
2009 642 2 0 
2010 749 3 0 
2011 745 2 2 
2012 662 6 1 
2013 665 2 2 
Total: 7979 36 9 
 
Every day large amounts of commercial hydrocarbons are shipped by road 
and rail to ensure a distribution to end-consumers in Lithuania. These materials 
are the main type of hazmats in the network Lithuanian land transportation 
(Batarlienė 2008). The increasing consumption of hydrocarbons in Europe and 
construction of new gas terminals along the eastern shores of Baltic sea may 
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drive up transportation of gases by road and rail in the Baltic states (Kavalov 
et al. 2009). 
Traffic accidents of trucks and trains shipping commercial hydrocarbons 
pose serious risk to built infrastructure located in the vicinity of roads and 
railways (e. g., Oggero et al. 2006). These accidents can escalate into fires and 
explosions which are able to cause thermal and/or mechanical damage to 
roadside objects. The main types of fires and explosions on road and rail are 
common to similar transportation, fuelling, loading and unloading activities 
worldwide (e.g., Casal 2008; Quest Consultants 2009): 
1. Pool fire (fire of a pool of combustible liquid resulting from a leak from 
a tank vessel); 
2. Jet fire (combustion of flammable gas or vapour released at a certain ve-
locity through a hole in a pressurised tank vessel); 
3. Flash fire (a quick combustion of a cloud formed by a flash vaporisation 
of a flammable liquid or by evaporation of a pool of such liquid); 
4. VCE (release of a flammable vapour from a tank vessel followed by 
formation, ignition and high-speed combustion of a flammable cloud; 
such combustion can produce a significant blast overpressure); 
5. BLEVE (a blast of a tank vessel with flammable or non-flammable ma-
terial caused by external heating). 
Thermal effects of pool fire, jet fires and flash fires will be limited by a 
relatively small amount of flammable liquids and gases which are typically 
carried by road and railway tankers. The well-documented flash fire due to 
release of LNG from a railway tanker in Viareggio (Italy, in 2009) caused 
substantially smaller damage than the VCE triggered off by a release of 
caprolactanum in a fixed installation of Flixborough factory (UK, 1974). 
However, the fires mentioned above can cause secondary, “knock-on” accidents, 
such as a BLEVE (T. Abassi and S. A. Abassi 2007). 
VCEs have a large potential of widespread mechanical damage to roadside 
property. However, most VCEs occurred in fixed industrial facilities. Lenoir and 
Davenport (1993) listed 103 suspected VCE accidents that produced observable 
overpressures during the period 1921–1991. Of these events, only 10 % were rail 
car and road tanker accidents and 7 % waterway vessel accidents. Consequently, 
one can state that land transportation of commercial hydrocarbons is not too 
much prone to VCE accidents. However, some VCE accidents in transportation 
caused major damage to built property. An often cited example was a VCE in 
East St. Louis (USE) on January 22, 1972 (Eichler and Napadentsky 1977). A 
railcar full of LPG rolled into another railcar during rail yard switching 
operations and was punctured. Approximately 54 tons LPG were released into 
the rail yard. The vapour cloud covered an area of more than 20 000 m2 and 
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reportedly ignited in two different locations. The explosion was enhanced by the 
tightly congested arrangement of railcars throughout the large rail yard. An 
estimated 1000 buildings were damaged to various degrees. The property 
damage was estimated at US$45 million (FM Global 2013). 
Another accidental phenomenon which can be extremely hazardous to 
roadside territory is BLEVE. The immediate effects of BLEVE are blast and 
projectiles. If the commodity in a tank vessel sustaining BLEVE is flammable 
and is ignited immediately then a fireball is possible with the associated hazards 
of fire engulfment and thermal radiation. If the flammable commodity is not 
ignited immediately, then delayed ignition may lead to widespread fires or, in 
some cases, explosions (Birk 1996).  
Short reviews of accidents involving BLEVEs in transportation are 
presented by T. Abassi and S. A. Abassi (2007) and Tauseef et al. (2010). 
Planas-Cuchi et al. (2004) and Bonilla Marinez et al. (2012) described in detail 
two BLEVEs of road tankers which occurred in Spain in 2002 and 2011. 
However, neither of these publications attempted to systematise information on 
a greater or lesser number of BLEVEs in transportation in terms of, say, types 
commodities involved in accidents or damage to roadside property. 
A relatively informative source of world-wide data on BLEVEs in 
transportation is the “hazardous materials knowledge base” known also as 
“failure and accidents technical information system” or, in brief, FACTS 
(FACTS 2014). It allows to identify hazmats involved in BLEVE accidents on 
road and rail. Tables A2 and A3 present information extracted from FACTS on 
43 BLEVE accidents, which occurred on road, and 38 BLEVEs, in which 
railway cars were involved. Although these accidents present only a relatively 
small fraction of reported and unreported BLEVEs in transportation, information 
given in Tables A2 and A3 allows to make three obvious conclusions: 
1. The hazmat, which was most frequently involved in BLEVEs on road 
and rail, is LPG (Figs. 2.1 and 2.2). 
2. Most BLEVEs of road tankers occurred on roads and not inside or in the 
vicinity of build-up and industrialised areas. One can expect that the ex-
posure of roadside objects to BLEVE effects and so the likelihood of 
domino accidents is lower on roads than in the aforementioned areas. 
3. The prevailing locations of BLEVE in the railway transportation net-
work were railways (21 case) and low-speed motion areas (rail yards 
and railway stations, 7 cases). The exposure of built objects to BLEVE 
effects is higher in the latter areas and in sparsely built areas along rail-
ways. 
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Fig. 2.1. Hazardous materials shipped by road tankers and involved in 43 BLEVE    
accidents 
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Fig. 2.2. Hazardous materials involved in 38 BLEVE accidents on rail 
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Occurrence of devastating VCEs in transportation is less probable than oc-
currence of BLEVEs. A formation of a vapour cloud with flammable concentra-
tion and movement of this cloud towards a potential target in the roadside terri-
tory requires an existence of specific meteorological conditions (e.g., CCPS 
1994). In addition, the cloud must meet an ignition source. Such source will not 
necessarily be present and the cloud can simply disperse in the air. A supersonic 
propagation of the flame in the cloud (a detonation) will be possible if the con-
centration of the cloud will be fairly uniform throughout its volume. Otherwise, 
the flame will propagate at subsonic speed (VCE will occur as a deflagration) 
and overpressure will be modest as compared to devastating overpressures gen-
erated by detonation. Finally, the combustion of the cloud can occur as a flash 
fire with negligible overpressure. Consequently, the chance that a flammable 
spill from a road or railway tanker will escalate into a VCE, which occurs as a 
detonation, is relatively small (Ronza et al. 2007). 
A BLEVE of a road or railway tanker can be induced by external heating of 
the tank vessel followed by catastrophic failure of the tank and explosive release 
of boiling liquid and expanding vapour. Such an event is called a “hot” BLEVE. 
However, a BLEVE of a road or railway tanker can occur without external fire, 
namely, due to an instantaneous rupture of the tank with immediate release of its 
contents. BLEVEs of this type are caused by impact in a collision or derailment 
or material defects. They are called “cold” BLEVEs. The situation, leading to a 
“cold” BLEVE can be aggravated by cold temperature, corrosion, brittleness of 
tank vessel material. In road transport, 50 % of the cases are “cold” BLEVEs 
and 50 % of the cases are “hot” BLEVEs. As regards the rail transport, roughly 
70–80 % of BLEVEs are “hot” ones (TNO 2005). Thus the number of 
possibilities for BLEVE to occur on road or rail is larger than the number of 
possibilities of a detonation of a vapour cloud formed by a flammable release 
from a road or railway tanker. 
The question, which of the two phenomena, VCE or BLEVE, 
“outperforms” the other in terms of fire engulfment, has not a clear answer. The 
fireball generated by a BLEVE will emit a thermal radiation which may cover 
the area comparable to the area of burning vapour cloud. 
Any study which compares in detail the risks posed by VCEs and BLEVEs 
on road and rail is not known to us. We were able to find only a relatively small 
number of transportation-related publications which consider occurrences of 
VCEs and BLEVEs independently of one another. However, we feel intuitively 
that the land transportation network is more prone to BLEVEs than to VCEs 
occurring as detonations. In addition, the effects of BLEVEs are ternary (a rela-
tively moderate blast, thermal radiation and projectile impact), whereas VCEs 
will generate only blast which is more likely to occur as a deflagration than as a 
detonation. In order to limit the amount of our study, we decided to deal with the 
28 2. PREDICTING THE EFFECTS FROM HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION... 
 
BLEVEs only. This phenomenon can be considered to be the main hazard in the 
areas where roads and railway tracks used to ship commercial hydrocarbons and 
other flammable or explosive materials come into the vicinity of vulnerable 
roadside property. An example of such property is tank farms of oil tranship-
ment facilities in the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda (Fig. 2.3). Currently, the tank 
farms stay unprotected against effects of a potential BLEVE. Such an event can 
trigger off a domino sequence in the transhipment facilities which could lead to 
a major disaster in the port area. 
 
Fig. 2.3. An example of exposure of an industrial facility to the hazard of a railway   
tanker BLEVE: railway tracks coming along tank farms in the port of Klaipėda (obtained 
with maps.lt software) 
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2.2. Risk related to road tanker explosions 
 
In terms of QRA, a BLEVE accident of a road tanker is a low-probability initiat-
ing event. It can be internal or external event with respect to exposed installation 
(e.g., Kumamoto 2007; Garrick 2008). QRA can be focused on a specific ran-
dom damage event D, for instance, loss of containment of a tank or rupture of a 
pipeline due to mechanical and thermal actions of BLEVE. In this case the fre-
quency of D can be expressed as a product of frequency of transportation (mis-
sion frequency) Fr(M) and three conditional probabilities which relate M to D: 
 Fr(D) = Fr(M) P(A | M) P(B | A) P(D | B) (2.1) 
where A is the random event of a road accident, in which the road tanker will be 
involved, and B is the random event of BLEVE. 
The estimation of the conditional damage probability P(D | B) requires to 
assess mechanical and thermal effects of BLEVE. If these effects are grouped 
into a vector y, the damage probability can be expressed as follows (Vaidogas 
and Juocevičius 2009): 
 ∫= y yyyall )d()|()|( fDPBDP ∫= x xxxall )d())(|( fDP ψ  (2.2) 
where P(D | y) is the fragility function relating the probability of D to y; x is the 
vector of characteristics of BLEVE accident; ψ(x) is the vector-function which 
relates x to y (i.e., y = ψ(x)); and f(x) and f(y) are the joint probability density 
functions of x and y, respectively. 
The development of the fragility function P(D | y) is a highly case-specific 
task of reliability-based structural analysis. It must be solved for individual 
components of installation subjected to the hazard of BLEVE (e.g., Vaidogas 
2003, 2007ab). The development of P(D | y) will not be considered here. We can 
only say that a BLEVE accident may require to develop P(D | y) for a combined 
action of three effects (components of y): blast wave, thermal radiation and mis-
sile impact. Any attempts to do this are not known to us. The closest result was 
obtained by Lee Fig 2.1 and Rosowski (2006) who developed a fragility function 
for a combined action of earthquake and snow. 
Fitting the density f(y) to the direct data on BLEVE effects is impracticable. 
BLEVE accidents on road are unique, short-lasting and unexpected events and 
the post mortem data on them is too sparse for fitting f(y). However, the density 
f(y) and so the probability P(D | B) can be estimated by propagating uncertainties 
expressed by the lower-level density f(x) through the model ψ(x) (Vaidogas 
2007ab, 2009; Vaidogas and Juocevičius 2008ab, 2009; Juocevičius and 
Vaidogas 2010). The function ψ(x) can be composed of a relatively large num-
ber of models available currently for the prediction of individual effects of 
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BLEVE. Most of these models are deterministic, some are in competition in 
modelling individual effects. Table 2.3 contains a selection of literature on mod-
elling the effects of BLEVE. 
Table 2.3. A selection of literature on models used to predict BLEVE effects 
(components of the vector-function ψ(x)) 
BLEVE 
effect 
References 
Blast Prugh (1991); CCPS (1994); Planas-Chuci et al. (2004); CPD (2005); 
T. Abbasi and S. A. Abbasi (2007); Casal and Salla (2006); Casal 
(2008); Genova et al. (2008) 
Fireball CCPS (1994); Prugh (1994); Robets et al. (2000); CPD (2005); T. Ab-
basi and S. A. Abbasi (2007); Casal (2008)  
Projectiles Hauptmanns (2001); Gubinelli et al. (2004); CPD (2005); Vaidogas 
(2006a); T. Abbasi and S. A. Abbasi (2007) ; Casal (2008); Genova 
et al. (2008); Gubinelli and Cozzani (2009); Mébarki et al. (2009); 
Nguyen et al. (2009) 
 
The density f(x) expresses uncertainties in those characteristics of BLEVE 
accident which serve as input in the model ψ(x). This density can be specified 
by means of two basic approaches to QRA known as classical Bayesian ap-
proach and predictive Bayesian approach (e.g., Aven 2003). We think that the 
latter approach is better suited to the assessment of risk posed by BLEVEs on 
road. However, an extensive discussion on the choice among the classical and 
predictive approaches will not be presented here. Such a discussion can be found 
in publications dedicated to methodological issues of QRA (e.g., Aven 2009; 
Aven and Zio 2011). All probabilistic models presented in the subsequent text 
will be interpreted in line with the predictive Bayesian approach. 
The vector x must contain physical characteristics of the tank sustaining 
BLEVE. The effects of BLEVE will also depend on the position and orientation 
of the tank in relation to the target. A scattering of projectiles from a cylindrical 
vessel BLEVE is significantly directional; some studies indicate that the blast 
from BLEVEs can also be directional (Birk 1996; Casal 2008). The position and 
orientation are key input information for the models described in the references 
cited in Table 2.3. In what follows, the position and orientation of the tank will 
be expressed by the first three components of x: 
1. The coordinates of explosion (tank) centre, x1 and x2, specified in a co-
ordinate system which includes the target and the section of the road in 
which the explosion can happen (Fig. 2.4); and 
2. The angle of the tank axis in relation to the road axis, x3 (Fig. 2.4). 
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Fig. 2.4. Exposure of a roadside object (target) to the BLEVE hazard in the earth-fixed 
coordinate system {0; x1, x2, x3} 
The further consideration is about the prediction of x1, x2, and x3 for a spe-
cific situation of exposure to BLEVE hazard, and thus the prediction of the dis-
tance from the explosion to a target under analysis. This distance will be denoted 
by ∆ (Fig. 2.4). Despite the fact that the dimensions x1, x2 and x3 are not among 
physical characteristics of exploding tank, the proper choice of range and proba-
bility distribution of x1, x2 and x3 can substantially influence results of further 
risk assessment. 
 
2.2.1. Geometric information on road tanker accidents 
 
The position and orientation of the tank after a road accident which escalates 
into BLEVE is growing in importance when the distance between tank and tar-
get decreases. Two coordinate systems can be used for the prediction of tank 
position and orientation (Franck and Franck 2010). The assessment of the risk to 
a fixed target requires to consider the position and orientation in the earth-fixed 
coordinate system {0; x1, x2, x3} (Fig. 2.4). However, the data on road tanker 
accidents can be collected and processed using a coordinate system based on 
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vehicle and travel lane, {0; y1, y2, y3} (Fig. 2.5). The data recorded in the latter 
system can be transformed into data related to the former one with relative ease. 
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Fig. 2.5. Vehicle-based coordinate system {0; y1, y2, y3} used for collecting and pro-
cessing data on road tanker accidents 
 
2.2.1.1. Transverse rest position and departure angle 
 
The prediction of the tank position and orientation after it comes to a complete 
stop and can explode consists in the choice of either joint probability density 
function f(y1, y2) or marginal densities f(y1) and f(y2) for the transverse rest posi-
tion of the tank centre, y1, and the angle of rest departure of the tank relative to 
the travel lane centreline, y2 (Fig. 2.5). For brevity, we will call y1 and y2 the 
transverse rest position and departure angle, respectively. In line with the afore-
mentioned approaches to QRA, the densities f(y1, y2) or f(y1) and f(y2) can be 
chosen using data on past accidents or expert opinion or both. The data can pro-
vide answer to the question of a stochastic dependence of y1 and y2. 
We think that the statistical variability of transverse rest position y1 and de-
parture angle y2 can be assessed from data on road tanker accidents. The poten-
tial data on y1 and y2 are of three sorts: 
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1. Data on road tanker accidents which escalated into BLEVEs (A-data, for 
brevity). 
2. Data on accidents which did not escalated into BLEVEs but were capa-
ble to do so in consequence of spill of flammable liquid or fire imping-
ing the tank (“near misses” in terms of QRA) (B-data). 
3. Data on accidents of road tankers which transported liquids, but not nec-
essarily liquefied gases, and had dynamic characteristics similar to road 
tankers capable to cause BLEVE (C-data). 
The A- and B-data are likely to be more relevant to future BLEVE acci-
dents on road than C-data. However, the amount of C-data exceeds considerably 
the amount of A- and B-data because the number of road accidents which devel-
oped into BLEVEs or occurred as “near misses” is relatively small (see, e.g., 
Oggero et al. 2006). In addition, information on y1 and y2 available in the reports 
on BLEVE accidents can be vague because tanks are displaced and destroyed 
during these explosions (see, e.g., Planas-Cuchi et al. 2004). 
The potential sources of A-, B- and C-data are: hazmat transportation acci-
dent databases; accident databases of general nature; road accident databases 
collected and maintained usually by the police; and databases of occupational 
accidents including road transportation events in which workers were injured 
and killed on duty. These databases are maintained and updated by various offi-
cial and professional bodies and organisations in many countries. However, sev-
eral researchers have noticed the lack of statistical reliability of such databases 
due to the systematic underreporting of the circumstances of road accidents (see 
Trépanier et al. 2009 and the references cited therein). We think that a special 
study is necessary to determine whether these data sources contain such circum-
stantial data as rest position y1 and departure angle y2 of the tank. To our 
knowledge, none of Lithuanian organisations maintains a database which in-
cludes circumstantial information on y1 and y2. We also did not find any freely 
accessible database maintained outside Lithuania which would contain data on 
y1 and y2. 
Information on y1 and y2 can be elicited from the reports on road tanker ac-
cidents presented by the mass-media and in the internet. These reports should 
not be neglected because they often contain pictures of the accident site and de-
scription accident circumstances. Consequently, such reports can serve as a 
source of C-data. We found a series of the reports and collected a small road 
tanker accident database containing 151 event mainly for 2007–2011 period. 
Our database includes records of 65 accidents of the tank trucks and 86 acci-
dents of tank semi-trucks. In 120 cases the accidents took place in the area with 
flat or almost flat roadside territory and zero vertical grade (gradient). In 17 and 
5 cases accidents occurred on downhill and uphill road segments, respectively. 
The vertical grade was difficult to assess in 9 cases. Most accidents occurred in 
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the US and were reported by US media. An extraction from the database is pre-
sented in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4. An extraction from a database containing information on 151 road tanker 
accident 
Date Location Material Quantity, m3 y1, 
m 
y2, 
degs 
2007/12/06 Everett gasoline 35.58 0.0 0 
2009/07/25 Oak Park, Michi-
gan 
diesel 49.21 2.0 0 
2009/10/22 Indianapolis propane 20 8.5 85 
2009/10/23 Fayetteville fuel not reported 2.0 0 
2009/11/30 Kansas City hydrochloride 
acid  
20.41 2.0 340 
2010/01/23 Melville, New 
York 
fuel 45.42 6.5 340 
2010/01/25 Monperlier, 
France 
fuel not reported -6.5 270 
2010/04/01 Chicago, Illinois fuel not reported 2.0 0 
2010/04/02 Burverde, Texas fuel not reported -3.0 260 
2010/04/07 Wamsutter, Wy-
oming 
crude oil not reported 0.0 0 
2010/04/14 Roy, Utah diesel 28.39 9.0 270 
2010/05/16 Miami Gardens, 
Florida 
fuel oil not reported 2.0 0 
2010/05/28 Carona, Los An-
geles 
gasoline 33.31 3 0 
2010/05/29 Tynsborough, 
Massach. 
aerosol paint not reported 3 0 
2010/06/22 Foxboro, Mass. jet fuel 41.64 5.0 45 
2010/08/20 Coloma, Michi-
gan 
fuel not reported 8 340 
2010/08/20 Armold, Mary-
land 
fuel not reported 0 -5 
2010/08/21 Arizona diesel 18.9 15.0 50 
2010/08/28 Utah diesel 28.39 8.5 90 
2010/08/29 Hamshire, Texas isobutene 32.76 10.0 90 
2010/09/03 Dearborn County, 
Indiana 
ph. anhydride 
molten 
15.14 13.0 40 
2010/10/23 Fayetteville fuel not reported 2 0 
2010/10/29 Albuquerque, 
New Mexico 
fuel not reported -5.0 280 
2010/11/09 California tar not reported 5.0 15 
2010/12/20 Utah crude oil 40.33 -5.0 310 
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Table 2.5. Descriptive measures of the samples consisting of observations of transverse 
rest position y1i and departure angle y2i 
Measure Positions y1i Angles y2i 
Sample size 129 122 
Mean 2.02 m 2.83° 
Std. deviation 5.62 m 56.8° 
Minimum -12.25 m -170° 
Maximum 18 m 180° 
Skewness 0.0551 0.119 
Kurtosis -0.1059 1.679 
Standardised skewness 0.256 0.536 
Standardised kurtosis -0.246 3.79 
 
The values of the transverse rest position, y1i, were determined visually for 
129 events and the departure angle y2i was obtained also visually for 122 events. 
The data allowed to form 119 observation pairs (y1i, y2i) for the assessment of the 
stochastic dependence of y1 and y2. Table 2.5 contains descriptive measures of 
the samples {y1i, i = 1, 2 , … , 129} and {y2i, i = 1, 2 , … , 122}. Fig. 2.6 shows 
the histograms of these two samples. The scatter diagram of the pairs (y1i, y2i) is 
given in Fig. 2.7. The correlation coefficient computed for the pairs (y1i, y2i) was 
equal to 0.29. The p-value in Fig. 2.7 indicates a statistically significant relation-
ship between y1 and y2. 
Table 2.6. Goodness-of-fit tests for the sample of y1i values 
Measure Normal Logistic 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Dn 0.05755 0.05320 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov p 0.7863 0.8586 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.9851 — 
Shapiro-Wilk p 0.7542 — 
 
It was possible to fit two well-known probability distributions, normal and 
logistic, to the values y1i. Although neither of the distributions was rejected by 
standard goodness-of-fit tests, the logistic distribution Logistic(2.02 m, 3.10 m) 
fits the data better than the normal distribution N(2.02 m, 31.6 m2) (see Ta-
ble 2.6 and Fig. 2.6a). Thus the logistic distribution will be used for the purposes 
of the simulation described in Sec. 2.2.2. 
The values y2i do not seem to obey any standard probability distribution. An 
empirical distribution function of the sample of y2i can be used as a tentative 
model for the purposes of simulation (e.g., Evans et al. 2001). This function is 
represented by the histogram of the cumulative frequencies shown in Fig. 2.6b. 
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Fig. 2.6. Visualisation of data on road tanker accidents: a) histogram of the transverse 
rest position values y1i with superimposed normal and logistic densities; b) standard and 
cumulative histograms of the rest departure angle values y2i 
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Fig. 2.7. Scatter diagram of the 119 observation pairs (y1i, y2i) 
The reports of the 151 accident underlying our database provide at least 
minimum statistical information on the probability distribution of the transverse 
rest position y1 and the departure angle y2. However, these reports tell little about 
the influence of accident situation and configuration of accident site on the rest 
position of the tank along its intended route. We will call this position the longi-
tudinal rest position and denote it by y3 (Fig. 2.5). Unfortunately, the data from 
the 151 accident do not allow to draw any specific conclusions about a stochas-
tic relation between position y3 and other two circumstantial characteristics y1 
and y2. 
 
2.2.1.2. Longitudinal rest position 
 
A road tanker BLEVE will affect a relatively small territory within the transpor-
tation network. The road network fragment in this territory can be determined by 
introducing an unsafe distance around a vulnerable roadside object, for instance, 
the radius ∆max around the “target” shown in Fig. 2.4. The most general and con-
sistent criterion for the unsafe distance ∆max can be a not exceedance of a tolera-
ble value Pmax of the damage probability P(D | B) expressed as function of the 
explosion stand-off ∆: 
 ∆max = 
∆
argmax {P(D | B, ∆) | P(D | B, ∆) ≤ Pmax} (2.3) 
A solution of the above maximisation problem requires to predict uncertain 
BLEVE effects and to utilise methods of SRA for a repeated estimation of the 
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damage probability P(D | B, ∆) for different values of ∆ (see, e.g., Vaidogas and 
Juocevičius 2007). The determination of ∆max is beyond the scope of the present 
work. 
As the road network fragment defined by ∆max will be relatively small, any 
history of road tanker accidents in this area will almost certainly not be availa-
ble. Consequently, a prediction of the longitudinal rest position y3 will have to 
rely on either the knowledge about road tanker accidents in comparable situa-
tions or an educated guess. We think that the best way to deal with such a data 
situation is the predictive Bayesian approach to QRA (e.g., Aven 2003, 2009). 
Quantitative measures of uncertainty related to y3 expressed in line with this 
approach can be integrated into a simulation-based prediction of accident loca-
tions. 
 
2.2.2. Monte Carlo simulation of accident positions 
 
2.2.2.1. Disaggregation of road segment 
 
The prediction of the longitudinal rest position y3 can be simplified by dividing 
the road network fragment within ∆max into simpler shapes for which the density 
f(y3) can be assigned subjectively or on the basis of some prior knowledge. The 
roadway can be disaggregated into zones consisting of fixed length segments or 
homogenous segments in terms of roadway geometry, roadside features, traffic 
characteristics, etc. These zones should begin and end when their characteristics 
change. A disaggregation of road and rail network is basic to many applications 
of TRA, although the road network fragments considered in these applications 
are much larger than the area determined by the BLEVE-specific distance ∆max 
(e.g., CCPS 1995; Gheorghe et al. 2005; Samuel et al. 2009). The disaggretation 
of roadways is also used for an assessment of road accident likelihoods (e.g., 
Chang 2005). 
Fig. 2.4 shows a simple example of a disaggregation of the road segments 
within ∆max into five zones with simple shapes. The width of these zones exceeds 
the road width to indicate that the transverse rest position of the tank can leave 
the road surface. In the absence of any historic data on road accidents in such 
zones, a uniform probability distribution of y3 along the zone axes can be as-
sumed for the purpose of simulation. Then the uniform density fk(y3) will express 
maximum uncertainty related to the values of y3 in the zone k. 
The zones can be specified with relative ease for straight road segments and 
long horizontal curves. However, the specification can be conjectural and arbi-
trary to a degree in the road portions that have more complicated layout and/or 
indicate a higher proneness to road accidents. Such road portions are intersec-
tions and crossings, sharp curves, changes in the road width, wide variations in 
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traffic volume. Roadside features (e.g., numerous roadside objects) can also 
have influence on the specification of the zones. 
The simulation requires to introduce a discrete probability distribution with 
the weights pk (k = 1, 2, … , nk) assigned to individual zones, where nk is the 
number of zones within ∆max (e.g., nk = 5 in Fig. 2.4). The weight pk expresses 
the proneness of the zone k to a road accident involving tank vehicle. In line 
with the predictive Bayesian approach to QRA, the weights pk quantify the ana-
lyst’s degree of belief and can be a result of an educated guess or, alternatively, 
judgement based on some prior knowledge. In our opinion, there are at least four 
sources of such knowledge: 
1. Statistical data allowing to obtain the distribution of relative frequencies 
of vehicle accidents by location (intersections, non-intersections, circles, 
etc.) (e.g., Al-Ghamdi 2003). 
2. Mathematical models used to estimate the probabilities of vehicle acci-
dents in specific locations (Spek et al. 2006; Ye et al. 2009; Haleen 
et al. 2010). 
3. Models relating vehicle accidents to geometric design of roadway, road-
side features, traffic characteristics and environmental conditions (Ab-
del-Aty and Radwan 2000; Lee and Mannering 2002; Chang 2005; Elvik 
et al. 2009). 
4. Methods developed for an identification of crash hotspots (e.g., Cheng 
and Washington 2005; Huang and Abdel-Aty 2010; Montella 2010). 
The data and models just listed have potential to be used for the specifica-
tion of the weights pk. However, we think that this body of knowledge is too 
loose and a special study is necessary to develop more or less formal procedures 
which utilise the knowledge for the choice of pk. Practical procedures for rank-
ing and weighting the zones can be borrowed in the field of multiple criteria 
decision making (MCDM). For instance, the weights pk can be specified by or-
ganising an expert panel and utilising expert opinions by means of a well-known 
MCDM method called AHP (e.g., Luria and Aspinall 2003; Turskis and 
Zavadskas 2010; Vaidogas and Šakėnaitė 2010, 2011). 
 
2.2.2.2. Modelling the transverse rest position 
 
A further discrete probability distribution is necessary to choose a travel lane of 
the road tank. For brevity, we will consider a two-lane road only. Consequently, 
the distribution will have only two weights, say, pi1 and pi2. In the case where 
travelling frequencies of road tankers in both directions are equal, one can as-
sume that pi1 = pi2 = 0.5. If the tank vehicles travel only in one direction, pi1 = 0 
or pi2 = 0. With the weights pi1 and pi2
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transverse rest position y1 obtained in Sec. 2.2.1, the rest position of the tank 
centre with respect to the road centreline, y4, can be modelled by the mixed den-
sity 
 φ(y4| pi1, pi2) = pi1 f(y4| θ1) + pi2 f(y4| θ2) (2.4) 
where f(⋅) is the logistic density of the transverse rest position y1 with the param-
eter vectors θ1 and θ2 adjusted to the cross-sectional dimensions of the road. If, 
for instance, the lane width is equal to 3 m and y1 ~ Logistic(2.02 m, 3.10 m), 
the densities f(y4| θ1) and f(y4| θ2) will be logistic ones with the parameter vectors 
 θ1 = (–3.52 m, 3.10 m) and θ2 = (3.52 m, 3.10 m) (2.5) 
The logistic densities f(y4| θ1) and f(y4| θ2) with the above parameters are shown 
in Fig. 2.8a. This figure illustrates also the density φ(y4| pi1, pi2) with pi1 = 0.7 and 
pi2 = 0.3. 
The densities f(y4| θl) (l = 1 or 2) and φ(y4| pi1, pi2) in Eq. (4) are suited to the 
modelling of the transverse rest position y4 in the case where y4 is unbounded on 
both sides. However, the roadway and roadside territory can include natural and 
man-made obstacles which restrict the motion of vehicles after they leave the 
road surface or cross into opposite lanes of traffic. Examples of such obstacles 
are roadside barriers, medium barriers, backslopes, roadside structures. 
A collision of a tank vehicle with a roadside obstacle (medium barrier) and 
its post-collision travel until a complete stop is a fairly uncertain process. A pre-
diction of the transverse rest position y4 resulting from this process is far from 
being trivial. However, one can say with fair degree of certainty that the obsta-
cles, which are able to withstand an impact of a tank vehicle, determine the 
outermost values of y4. Let these values be y4L and y4R. Then for the purposes of 
simulation one can assume that y4∈[y4L, y4R] when obstacles are on both sides of 
the travel lane and y4∈[y4L, ∞[ or y4∈]–∞, y4R] when the obstacles are on the left 
or the right side, respectively. An illustration of y4L and y4R for a two lane road is 
shown in Fig. 2.8b, where y4L = 9 m and y4R = –12 m for the lane 1 and y4L = –
12 m and y4R = 9 m for the lane 2. 
Fitting a probability distribution of y4 over the two-sided or one-sided inter-
vals introduced above can be problematic. A relatively large amount of data re-
quired by standard fitting procedures will hardly be available for the reasons 
mentioned in Sec. 2.2.1. In addition, accident situations involving roadside ob-
stacles are unique and this raises the question, whether the data collected in one 
roadside situation is representative to another situations. 
2. PREDICTING THE EFFECTS FROM HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION... 41 
 
 
Fig. 2.8. An illustration of the densities expressing uncertainties in the transverse rest 
position y4 with respect to the centreline of a two-lane road: a) standard densities; b) 
truncated densities 
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However, the fact that values of y4 are bounded by the values y4L and y4R 
suggests that the probability distribution of y4 can be obtained by truncating the 
densities f(y4| θl). The truncated density )y(f lθ|4′  is obtained from )y(f lθ|4  
by means of the standard relations 
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In the above relations, F(y4) is the cumulative distribution function of y4 and 
the parameter vector θl is skipped for brevity. With the truncated densities 
related to opposite lanes, the truncated density related to the whole width of a 
two-lane road is obtained by 
 )()() ,( 242141214 θθ ||| yfyfy ′+′=′ pipipipiϕ  (2.7) 
The density ) ,y( 214| pipiϕ ′  is defined on the same interval as the constituent 
densities )( 4 lyf θ|′  (see Eq. (2.6)). 
Fig. 2.8b presents an illustration of the densities )( 14 θ|yf ′  and )( 24 θ|yf ′  
obtained by a truncation of a standard logistic density. The densities )( 14 θ|yf ′  
and )( 24 θ|yf ′  are defined on the intervals (y4L, y4R) = (9 m, –12 m) and (y4L, y4R) 
= (–12 m, 9 m), respectively. Fig. 2.8b shows also the density )0.3 0.7,( 4|yϕ ′  
calculated by means of Eq.(2.7). 
The outermost rest positions y4L and y4R may not necessarily be fixed val-
ues. Such obstacles as trees and bushes planted in the roadside territory with 
moderate density may stop the motion of a tank vehicle after its departure from 
the road. Obstacles of this type may have randomly distributed distances from 
the road edge. In addition, the depth of a vehicle encroachment into the area of 
such obstacles may be highly random. Consequently, the outermost rest posi-
tions y4L and y4R may be uncertain quantities. They can be modelled as random 
variables with respective densities f(y4L) and f(y4R). Fig. 2.9 shows an illustration 
of the density f(y4R) and the truncation point y4Rj sampled from a probability dis-
tribution represented by f(y4R). 
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Fig. 2.9. The case of the density of the transverse rest position y4 truncated at a random 
point 
 
2.2.2.3. Algorithm of the simulation 
 
With the models described in this section, the stochastic simulation of the tank 
rest position will consist in sampling values of the tank rest position and depar-
ture angle from underlying probability distributions. Each loop of the stochastic 
simulation of accident position, say, loop j should start from sampling of the 
zone number k from the discrete probability distribution defined by the weights 
pk (Fig. 2.10). Then the values of the longitudinal and transverse position, y3j and 
y4j, must be sampled from corresponding probability distributions. This opera-
tion will be straightforward in case where y3 and y4 are considered to be inde-
pendent. Finally the value of the departure angle y2j can be sampled. 
An application of the proposed simulation procedure with the flowchart 
shown in Fig. 2.10 is presented in the second part of this study (Vaidogas et al. 
2012).The case study described in Sec. 2.2.4 applies the procedure to an existing 
site of potential BLEVE accident located in the coastal region of Lithuania. 
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Fig. 2.10. A flowchart of the simulation step j 
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2.2.3. Prediction of fragment impact 
 
2.2.3.1. Potential number of fragments 
 
The potential number of fragments can be predicted by applying statistical data 
on previous BLEVEs of cylindrical vessels. Such data was presented by several 
authors and is systemized by Sun et. al (2012). The data covers BLEVEs which 
generated from one to nine fragments of cylindrical vessels. Such data is pre-
sented in the first two columns of Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7. Data on fragmentation of cylindrical vessels in the course of BLEVEs 
(partially from Sun et. al 2012) 
Number of 
fragments 
Number of 
BLEVEs 
Relative 
frequency  
Number of BLEVEs 
with at least two 
fragments 
Relative 
frequency 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 50 0.1931 — — 
2 98 0.3784 98 0.4689 
3 78 0.3012 78 0.3732 
4 24 0.0927 24 0.1148 
5 3 0.0116 3 0.0144 
6 2 0.0077 2 0.0096 
7 3 0.0116 3 0.0144 
8 0 0.0000 0 0.0000 
9 1 0.0039 1 0.0048 
Total: 259 1.0 209 1.0 
 
One fragment was generated in 50 of 259 accidents. The case of only one 
fragment is characteristic for constrained vessels which are rigidly connected to 
a supporting structure. Vessels of tank cars can be considered to be 
unconstrained. The proof for that are the accidents with road tankers reported by 
Planas-Cuchi et al. (2004) and Bonilla Marinez et al. (2012). A fragmentation of 
such vessels in the case of a BLEVE will generate at least two projectiles which 
will fly in approximately opposite directions. Therefore, an estimation of the 
probabilities of specific numbers of fragments should be based on 209 accidents 
in which at least two fragments were generated (Column 4 in Table 2.7). 
Relative frequencies of BLEVE accidents with two to nine fragments are 
presented in Column 5 of Table 2.7. The latter frequencies are visualized in 
Fig. 2.11. This figure indicates clearly than the dominant numbers of fragments 
were two and three (84.2 % of cases). Four fragments were generated only in 
11,5 % of cases. Five to nine fragments were encountered only in 4.3 % of 
cases. 
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A generation of two oblong end-caps must be considered the most hazard-
ous in terms of a potential damage to roadside objects. The accidents of Spanish 
road tankers near San Carlos de la Rapita in 1978 and Tivissa in 2002 as well as 
in Murcia in 2011 clearly show that such fragments can be projected to long 
distances (Planas-Cuchi et al. 2004; Mannan 2005; Bonilla Marinez et al. 2012). 
Consequently, they may have large kinetic energy and damaging potential. 
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Fig. 2.11. Relative frequencies of generating two to nine fragments in BLEVEs of 
cylindrical vessels 
The formation of two oblong end-caps can take place with and without a 
generation of further fragments (Gubinelli, Cozzani 2009; Mebarki et al. 2009). 
The tank vessel can burst simply into two fragments (Fig. 2.12ab). If the oblong 
end-caps will not involve the whole cylindrical part of the vessel, three or more 
fragments will be generated. The fragments other than end-caps will be parts of 
the cylindrical remainder (ring) (Fig. 2.12cd). These fragments are called 
“plates” (e.g., Nguyen et al. 2009). 
The formation of two oblong end-caps can take place with and without a 
generation of further fragments (Gubinelli, Cozzani 2009; Mebarki et al. 2009). 
The tank vessel can burst simply into two fragments (Fig. 2.12ab). If the oblong 
end-caps will not involve the whole cylindrical part of the vessel, three or more 
fragments will be generated. The fragments other than end-caps will be parts of 
the cylindrical remainder (ring) (Fig. 2.12cd). These fragments are called 
“plates” (e.g., Nguyen et al. 2009). 
The end-caps and oblong end-caps have a prevailing horizontal departure 
angles. Mebarki et al. (2009) notice that during the previous accidents: 
1. A large number of end-caps and oblong end-caps were projected along 
the principal (longitudinal) axis of the vessel, whereas the plates were 
ejected in the perpendicularly to the principal axis. 
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2. A small number of end-caps and oblong end-caps were directed in the 
perpendicular direction, whereas a small number of plates were thrown 
along the longitudinal direction. The latter distribution of projectiles 
may result from possible rotation of end-caps, oblong end-caps and 
plates when they are unfolded and cut. 
 
Fig. 2.12. Types of the tank car vessel fragmentation considered in the problem of 
projectile impact: a) and b) two fragments ejected in opposite directions; c) two oblong 
end-caps and unfolding cylindrical ring; d) the case of more than three fragments due to 
rupture of the cylindrical ring into several flattened fragments (plates) 
In general, the fragmentation process can be more uncertain and complex. 
Some BLEVEs do not generate any projectiles (Holden 1988). Some of the gen-
erated fragments may not be projected far away. These fragments remain around 
the explosion centre and so do not endanger roadside objects. Furthermore, the 
oblong end-caps can disintegrate into two or three pieces, the flight of which is 
heavy to predict (Gubinelli and Cozzani 2009; Tugnoli et al. 2014). A BLEVE 
of a road tanker can also generate relatively light projectiles, which are internal 
elements of a tank vessel (baffles) and secondary fragments (tanker fittings and 
truck parts) (Planas-Cuchi et al. 2004). 
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Mathematical models, which allow an accurate prediction of number, shape 
and departure characteristics of all fragments generated by a BLEVE of a cylin-
drical vessel are not known to us. To facilitate the assessment of a potential im-
pact of such fragments on safety barriers built in the roadside territory, the fol-
lowing simplifying assumptions were made: 
1. The barrier must provide protection mainly against simple end-caps and 
oblong end-caps projected along the principal axis of the vessel. A pos-
sible, but not very probable projection of such fragments perpendicularly 
to the principal axis is ignored. 
2. A safety barrier capable to protect against end-caps will provide protec-
tion against all other fragments of tanker vessel (mainly, flattened pieces 
of the cylindrical ring). Thus other fragmentations are less dangerous. 
3. The probability of a generation of only two fragments (end-caps shown 
in Fig. 2.12a,b) is taken to be equal to the historical relative frequency 
0.4689 given in Column 5 of Table 2.7. 
4. Fragmentation of the tanker vessel into more than two pieces will occur 
as generation of two end-caps and cylindrical ring, which can form one 
fragment or disintegrate into two to three plates (Fig. 2.12c,d). 
5. The probability of a generation of more than two fragments is equal to 
the relative frequency 0.5024. This number is a sum of the historical rel-
atives frequencies given in Column 5 of Table 2.7 and related to the case 
of 3 to 5 fragments. 
Consequently, the safety barriers were analysed not for all scenarios of 
BLEVE-induced vessel fragmentations. Only two fragmentations were consid-
ered. They are represented by the random events 
 B2 = ”Generation of only two end-caps (simple or oblong)“  
 B3–5 = ”Generation of two end-caps and up to three additional fragments“  
The conditional probabilities of these events given a BLEVE (random event 
B) are P(B2 | B) = 0.4689 and P(B3–5 | B) = 0.5024. As other possibilities of 
vessel fragmentation were considered to be less dangerous and were ignored, the 
probabilities P(B2 | B) and P(B3–5 | B) were adjusted to obtain their values which 
sum to unity. These probabilities were multiplied by the value 1/(0.4689 + 
0.5024). Consequently, the values of P(B2 | B) and P(B3–5 | B) used for the 
purposes of simulation are 0.4828 and 0.5172, respectively. 
 
2.2.3.2. Masses and shapes of fragments 
 
The masses of the fragments generated by a BLEVE of a tanker vessel can be 
modelled using two nominal masses: the mass of the end-cap, which will be 
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projected towards the target, me–c, front, and the linear mass of the cylinder, mcyl, 1 
(Fig. 2.13a,b). The latter quantity can be obtained by dividing the total mass of 
the cylindrical part of the vessel by its length. Both masses, me–c, front and mcyl, 1, 
can be calculated with sufficient accuracy from vessel specifications and may be 
treated as deterministic quantities. Geometry of opposite end-caps of some ves-
sels can be not identical. Therefore, the simulation of the vessel position de-
scribed in Secs. 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 must by used to determine which of the two non-
identical ends of the tank will be directed towards a potential target or safety 
barrier. 
 
Fig. 2.13. Deterministic and random quantities used to simulate masses of fragments:    
a) the case of two oblong end-caps; b) the case of two end-caps and one or several 
fragments generated by a disintegration of the cylindrical ring 
In case of a formation of two fragments (simple or oblong end-caps), the 
random mass of fragment, ξfrg, which is potentially directed towards the target, 
can be expressed by the simple formula 
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 cylcylfrontcefrg mm ξξ 1,, += −  (2.8) 
where ξcyl is the length of the cylindrical part between the end-cap and circum-
ferential crack, which will split the vessel into two fragments (Fig. 2.13a). Statis-
tical data allowing to fit reliably a probability distribution of ξcyl seems not to be 
available. The main suggestion concerning the probability distribution of ξcyl is 
that this length may be assumed to be distributed uniformly over the interval 
[0, lcyl], where lcyl is the length of the undamaged cylindrical part of the vessel 
(Mébarki et al. 2009; Nguyen et al. 2009). The uniform distribution will express 
maximum uncertainty in the position of the circumferential crack. In addition, an 
application of such distribution implies that the probability of a generation of 
simple, not oblong end-cups will be equal to zero, because P(ξcyl = 0) = 0 and 
P(ξcyl = 1) = 0. 
If the annalist will feel that the formation of the circumferential crack in 
some parts of the cylinder is more likely than in other, he/she can apply a non-
uniform distribution of the crack position ξcyl. For instance, the tendency of the 
circumferential crack to form closer to the cylinder ends can be expressed by a 
symmetrical or non-symmetrical U-shaped density. Fig. 2.13a shows an U-
shaped beta density of ξcyl with the either of its shape parameters equal to 0.5. 
This distribution implies that the length of the ring attached to an end-cap will 
tend to be small. This means that a generation of fragments with the masses 
close to the mass of simple, not oblong end-cap will be likely. 
Variety of simple and mixed univariate probability distributions potentially 
suitable to be fit to the interval [0, lcyl] is wide. Mixed univariate distributions 
can be applied to express subtleties of the crack position ξcyl. For instance, the 
cylindrical part may have two circumferential welds and the crack may tend to 
form in the vicinity of them. Then the position ξcyl can be expressed as a mixed 
random variable pi1ξu + pi2ξnorm,1 + pi3ξnorm,2, where pii (i = 1, 2, 3) are the weights, 
which sum to unity; ξuni is the uniformly distributed random crack position; 
ξnorm,1 and ξnorm,2 are two unimodal random variables (normal ones, say) with the 
mean values equal to positions of the welds. 
Unfortunately, the crack position will depend on random factors, such as 
the place of maximal external heating as well as the position of mechanical 
defects and corrosive damage. Data and mathematical models, which allow to 
account for such factors, are not known to us. Therefore, our simulation was 
based on an application of the uniform distribution of the length ξcyl. This 
distribution expresses maximum uncertainty related to the circumferential crack 
position. At the same time, it implies a conservatively large probability of 
”heavy“ oblong end-caps, that is, fragments with long portions of the cylindrical 
part. 
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Another case considered in our simulation was a formation of two simple or 
oblong end-caps and a cylindrical ring or several plates which can result from its 
disintegration (Figs 2.12c,d and 2.13b). The random mass of fragment, ξfrg, 
which is potentially directed towards the target, can be expressed by the simple 
formula 
 frontcylfrontcefrg mm ξξ 1,, += −  (2.9) 
where ξfront is the length of the cylindrical part of the oblong end-cap which will 
be ejected towards the potential target (Fig. 2.13b). 
The formation of two end-caps means that the simulation of fragment 
impact will have to take into account a formation of two circumferential cracks 
in the cylindrical part of the vessel. Positions of these cracks are random and can 
be expressed by two random variables ξfront and ξrear. In case that only one end-
cap will endanger a potential target, a specification of the probability distribution 
of only the front length ξfront will be necessary. However, to determine what are 
the largest possible values of ξfront and ξrear is very problematic. Therefore, the 
probability distributions of ξfront and ξrear must be specified in such a way that the 
values of ξfront and ξrear will not ”overlap“ and the length of the cylindrical 
fragment, lcyl – ξfront – ξrear, will be realistic. 
As in the case of two fragments, we must state that statistical data allowing 
to fit reliably a probability distribution of ξfront seems not to be available. As the 
first approximation, the crack positions ξfront and ξrear will be modelled by 
applying a beta distribution adjusted to the intervals [0, lcyl/2] and [lcyl/2, lcyl], 
respectively (Fig. 2.14). A beta distribution of this type with the shape 
parameters 0.41213 and 1.3926 is used to model fractional mass of a cylindrical 
tank vessel fragment (Mebarki et al. 2009; Nguyen et al. 2009). This distribution 
has a J-shaped density function. We modelled the random lengths ξfront and ξrear 
by the product 0.5×ζ×lcyl, where ζ is the random variable with a unimodal beta 
distribution Be(2.0, 4.0). The mode of this distribution is equal to 0.25. This 
means that the highest likelihood of formation of the circumferential cracks is at 
the distances 0.125 lcyl and 0.875 lcyl from the end of cylindrical part (Fig. 2.14). 
An application of a beta distributions to model ξfront and ξrear has two advantages: 
1. The values of ξfront and ξrear will not exceed the half-length lcyl/2 and so 
will not ”overlap“. 
2. The beta distribution is very flexible and can be updated in the Bayesian 
sense when experimental or post-mortem data on fragmentation of cy-
lindrical tanker vessels will become available. 
To a first approximation, the crack positions ξfront and ξrear may be modelled 
as two independent random variables. 
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With the random mass of the fragment directed towards a potential target 
and/or safety barrier, ξfrg, as well as the geometry this fragment, a further 
simulation of fragment departure, flight and collision with the target (barrier) 
becomes possible. 
 
Fig. 2.14. A simulation of the random positions of two circumferential cracks, ξfront and 
ξrear, in the case of the vessel fragmentation into two end-caps and a the cylindrical ring. 
The density functions shown in the figure are beta densities Be(2.0, 4.0) and Be(4.0, 2.0) 
adjusted to the half-length of the cylindrical part, lcyl/2 
 
2.2.3.3. Departure of characteristics and kinematics of fragments 
 
There is a number of departure characteristics of simple and oblong end-caps 
which can be generated by a vessel fragmentation. Apart from masses and 
shapes of such fragments, the departure characteristics include: 
1. The centre position of a vessel at the instant of a BLEVE. 
2. The direction of the principal axis of the vessel in the coordinate systems 
which include vessel, road, target and/or a safety barrier (see an example 
in Fig. 2.15).  
3. Horizontal and vertical departure angles (ς1 and ς2, say), within the 
aforementioned coordinate systems (see Figs. 2.15 and 2.16 as an exam-
ple). 
4. Departure velocity, say, vdep. 
The position and orientation of the vessel at the instance of fragmentation 
was considered in detail in Secs. 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. The departure velocity vdep can 
be expressed as a random variable using models summarised by Mébarki et al. 
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(2009) and Nguyen et al. (2009). These models are explained in Annex B of the 
present work. The horizontal departure angle ς1 can be assumed to be uniformly 
distributed over an angular sector of 60° around the principal axis shown in 
Fig. 2.15 (Holden 1988). Consequently, values of ς1 will belong to the interval 
[–30°, 30°] and the density of ς1 will be equal to 1/60 over this interval. 
The vertical departure angle ς2 is more difficult to predict than the 
horizontal one. Mébarki et al. (2009) stated that, from the existing literature, 
there is no reliable information about the vertical angle. They suggested to 
assume a uniform distribution of this angle over the interval [–90°, 90°]. 
 
Fig. 2.15. Coordinate systems used to predict the impact of a fragment on target or 
safety barrier: earth-fixed coordinate system {0; x1, x2} and road- and vehicle-fixed 
coordinate system {0; y1, y2, y3} 
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Fig. 2.16. Horizontal and vertical departure angles ς1 and ς2 in the road and          
vehicle-fixed coordinate system {0; y1, y2, y3} 
In our study of 151 road tanker accidents mentioned in Sec. 2.2.1, we de-
tected one specific feature of three dominant rest position of tanker vessels: 
1. In 70 cases, vessels were lying horizontally on carriageway or road 
shoulders (Fig. 2.17a). 
2. In 15 cases, the vessels tumbled into the drainage channels outside the 
shoulders (Fig. 2.17b). The principal axis of the vessels was approxi-
mately parallel to the longitudinal road axis. Vessels were lying more or 
less horizontally. Pictures of a road tanker accident with such a vessel 
position before BLEVE are provided by Bonilla Marinez et al. (2012). 
3. In 59 cases, the vessel came to the rest on side slopes. They were lying 
on the slopes and angles of inclination corresponded to those of the 
slopes (Fig. 2.17c). 
The range of the vertical departure angle ς2 can be assumed to vary within 
the range of 90° with respect to the principal and minor axes of the vessel 
(Fig. 2.17ac). However, the extreme values of ς2 must take into account the in-
clination of surface, on which the vessel will rest before the explosion. This in-
clination may be measured with respect to the horizontal plane crossing the in-
tersection of principal and minor axis of the vessel (Fig. 2.18). Let the 
inclination angle be ςground. Then the ranges of the vertical departure angle ς2 
with respect to this plane will be [ςground, 90°+ ςground] and [– ςground, 90°– ςground], 
as shown in Cases “a” and “b” of the Fig. 2.I, respectively. 
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Fig. 2.17. The prevailing rest positions of road tanker vessels with respect to a horizontal 
orientation of the principal vessel axis: a) resting on carriageway with slight inclination; 
b) resting in the drainage channel; c) resting on roadside slopes with a non-negligible 
inclination 
 
Fig. 2.18. The ranges of values of the vertical departure angle ς2 prevailing rest positions 
of road tanker vessels with respect to with respect to a horizontal orientation of the    
principal vessel axis 
The range of the vertical departure angle, [ς2,min, ς2,max], is highly case-
specific. In principle, it can be controlled and made less hazardous by changing 
the roadside relief in front of a target. For instance, Fig. 2.19b shows an upwards 
oriented slope which provokes a hazardous parabolic trajectory of a fragment. 
The roadside territory could be made less hazardous by flattering the area behind 
the drainage channel of the road. 
The probability distribution of the vertical departure angle ς2 must be ad-
justed to the interval [ς2,min, ς2,max]. A sufficient amount of data allowing to relia-
bly fit the distribution of ς2 is not available, to the best or our knowledge. A uni-
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form distribution of ς2 over [ς2,min, ς2,max] can be chosen, as suggested by Mébarki 
et al. (2009). However, this distribution seems to be too conservative in terms of 
the uncertainty related to the angle ς2. We know the fact that the vertical 
departure angle ς1 tends to be around the principal axis of the vessel. This allows 
to argue that vertical departure angle ς2 will also be relatively small with respect 
to this axis. Therefore the probability density of ς2 should be J-shaped and so 
exclude large values of ς2. As a first approximation, we have chosen a beta 
distribution Be(0.7, 7) adjusted to the interval [ς2,min, ς2,max] to model uncertainty 
related to values of ς2. The beta densities of ς2 are shown in Fig. 2.18. These 
densities imply that the probability of exceedance of the value ς2,min + 30° are 
approximately equal to 3 %. 
 
2.2.3.4. Kinematics of projected fragments 
 
The trajectory of fragments projected from the exploding vessel results from the 
combined effects of inertia, gravitation and aerodynamics (drag and lift). A 
complete, three-dimensional (3D) model of fragment movement consists of three 
coupled differential equations presented in Annex B of this work. However, this 
model is often simplified making two assumptions (Nguyen et al. 2009): 
1. The movement of the fragment can be described by the trajectory of its 
barycentre (Fig. 2.16). 
2. The movement of the fragment can be analysed by using a bi-
dimensional (2D) approach. The barycentre of the fragment will move in 
a plane which is perpendicular to a horizontal plane crossing the origin 
point ”O“. In Fig. 2.16 the latter plane is represented by the coordinate 
system {0; y1, y3} and the vertical plane of the barycentre movement is 
determined by the horizontal departure angle ς1. 
In their classical book, Baker et al. (1983) suggest one further simplifying 
assumption. They state that the fragment will tumble during the flight and so the 
lift effect can be neglected (the lift coefficient can be taken equal to zero). 
With the three simplifying assumptions listed above, the movement of 
fragment can be described by two coupled differential equations presented in 
Annex B. They can be solved numerically with the initial conditions given by 
vertical departure angle ς2 and departure velocity vdep. The solution of these 
equations will yield discrete points of trajectory. They can be used for estimating 
arrival (impact) velocity varv and the altitude of the impact point ”I“ on the 
surface of safety barrier or target (Figs. 2.16 and 2.18). The impact on barrier or 
target will be oblique. The ricochet angle of such an impact, φ, is shown in 
Fig. 2.15. This symbol and term is often used in the literature on the phenome-
non of the oblique impact (e.g., Johnson et al. 1982). The angle φ can be deter-
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mined by means of simple geometric calculations and will depend on the posi-
tion of the origin point ”O“. 
 
Fig. 2.19. The potential trajectories of projected fragments: a) parabolic trajectory; b) the 
possibility of a trajectory leading to a collision with ground; c) an approximately linear 
trajectory between vessel and target (barrier) located in close proximity 
The departure velocity vdep can be calculated by the formula suggested by 
many authors (e.g., Sun et. al. 2012): 
 frgkdep Ev ξ/2=  (2.10) 
where Ek is the kinetic energy of generated fragment and ξfrg is the mass of 
fragment given by Eqs. (2.8) or (2.9). The calculation of Ek is explained in An-
nex B. 
The vertical departure angle ς2, fragment trajectory will depend on the road-
side relief. Long parabolic trajectories can be caused by an upwards inclination 
of vessel with respect to a target which is located relatively far from the road 
(Fig. 2.19a). In the case of a less hazardous downward inclination, trajectories 
may cause a collision of fragment with the ground (Fig. 2.19b). If the exploding 
vessel and target (barrier) will be located in close proximity, the curvilinearity of 
trajectory will be small and can be ignored. The trajectory can be assumed to be 
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linear (Fig. 2.19c). If the distance of fragment flight will be small, it will not 
loose much of energy. Then the departure velocity vdep can be conservatively 
considered equal to the arrival velocity varv. 
 
2.2.3.5. The case of railway tankers 
 
The modelling of vessel fragmentation and projection of fragments outlined 
above is well-suited to the case of a road tanker BLEVE. In the past, accidents 
of this type involved only one tanker vessel. Although the number of well-
documented BLEVE accidents on road is not large, the available information 
allows at least a rough prediction of vessel position and fragmentation at the 
instant of BLEVE. Data on BLEVEs of constrained vessels in fixed installations 
and general data on traffic accidents, in which road tankers were involved, can 
reinforce this prediction.  
A prediction of position and spatial orientation of railway tanker vessels at 
the instance of a BLEVE is a more challenging problem. BLEVEs on railway 
occur in consequence of serious railroad accidents. They are caused by train 
derailments and impacts (Vaidogas et. al. 2012c). The cars are often chaotically 
scattered across tracks and the territory on either side of the tracks (e.g., TSB 
1999). The derailed cars sustain considerable damage, are punctured and catch 
fires. They provokes “ hot ” BLEVES (Sec. 2.1). 
The prediction of position and orientation of exploding vessel is 
complicated by the fact that the trains are often composed of several tank cars 
capable to sustain a BLEVE (BLEVE-prone cars). These cars are connected one 
after the other, that is, without intermediate cars which are BLEVE-proof (OTIF 
2010). Therefore, a railroad accident can escalate into BLEVEs of two or more 
vessels. A classical example of such a scenario is the train accident in Crescent 
City (1970, US) (CCPS 1994). Fig. 2.20 shows derailment configuration and 
trajectories of fragments generated in this accident. The accident caused BLEVE 
explosions of two car vessels.  
It is difficult to say in advance which of the BLEVE-prone cars will sustain 
the explosions as well as how many of these cars will explode. The considerable 
uncertainties related to railway tanker car explosions render a more or less 
accurate prediction of fragment projection a highly complicated task. Therefore, 
a safety barrier can be designed conservatively, namely, by applying two worst-
case assumptions: 
1. The exploding vessel will be at the closest possible distance from a po-
tential safety barrier. 
2. The safety barrier will have to resist a normal (not oblique) impact of a 
most hazardous fragment (heavy oblong end-cap).  
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The worst-case position of the exploding railway tanker vessel is illustrated 
in Fig. 2.20. The most conservative value of the vertical departure angle ς2 can 
be assumed in addition to the assumptions just listed. 
 
Fig. 2.20. The derailment configuration of Crescent City accident and the trajectories of 
major fragments shown by dotted lines. The figure shows also a worst-case position of a 
tanker car vessel with respect to a potential target (modified from CCPS 1994) 
 
2.2.4. A practical application 
 
2.2.4.1. The site of accident involving an explosion on road 
 
The proposed approach to the simulation of the position of a road tanker acci-
dent will be illustrated by considering an oil transhipment facility built in 
Klaidpėda, the main seaport of Lithuania. The “target” in this example is three 
cylindrical reservoirs which can be damaged by a tank explosion on a road with 
two 3 m lanes going along the perimeter of the facility (Fig. 2.21). The road has 
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no gradient and the roadside territory is flat. Road tankers travel along the road 
in opposite directions with the approximate relative frequencies 70% and 30% 
(Fig. 2.22). Consequently, it is assumed that the probabilistic weights related to 
opposite lanes are pi1 = 0.7 and pi2 = 0.3. 
 
 
Fig. 2.21. The three reservoirs exposed to the hazard of a road tanker BLEVE: a) view 
from the East side; b) view from the Northwest side (obtained by using the Google Earth 
software) 
A schematic plan of the site under consideration is shown in Fig. 2.23. The 
unsafe segment of the road is determined by the distance ∆max going from the 
centre of the 1st and 3rd reservoirs to the respective roadway edge. The distance 
∆max was assumed to be equal to 125 m. This is a tentative value serving as an 
illustration. The distance ∆max was not specified by solving the optimisation 
problem given by Eq. (2.4) or by means of some other reasoning. 
The road segment defined by ∆max was disaggregated into five zones with 
different roadside features. The 13 m and 2 m land strips bounding the edge of 
the travel lanes in the zones indicate that tank rest position may lie outside the 
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road surface. The distance of 13 m is approximately equal to the typical length 
of a tank semi-trailer. Information on Zones 1 to 5 is summarised in Tables 2.3 
and 2.4. 
N
70%
30%
 
Fig. 2.22. The site of potential accident of a road tanker in vicinity of reservoirs 
(obtained by using the Google Earth software) 
The roadside territory of Zones 2 to 5 is bounded by densely growing trees 
on one roadside and the fence marking the perimeter of the facility on the 
opposite roadside. It is assumed that the fence constitutes an unmovable obstacle 
to the tank vehicle and so the outermost rest positions y4L and y4R will be 
transverse distances from the road centreline to the fence minus half-width of the 
tank semi-trailer (1.25 m, say). It is also assumed that the tank vehicle can 
encroach into the forest territory on the opposite roadside and therefore the 
outermost rest positions y4L and y4R related to this side will be considered 
random quantities and modelled by the normal distribution N(5 m, 0.25 m2). 
Zone 1 is considered to have no obstacles on both sides of the road.  
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Fig. 2.23. The scheme of the accident site 
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Fig. 2.24. Scatter diagram of the simulated accident coordinates (x1j, x2j) (j = 1, 2, … , N; 
N = 10 000) 
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Table 2.8. Information on the zones of the road segment introduced in Figs. 2.22 and 
2.23 
Zone num-
ber k 
Length of zone, lk, 
m 
Road surface area 
Ak/Atot*, m2/m2 
Probabilistic weight 
pk 
1 27 162/1650 = 0.0982 0.25 
2 100 600/1650 = 0.3636 0.155 
3 50 300/1650 = 0.1818 0.287 
4 39 222/1650 = 0.1345 0.213 
5 61 366/1650 = 0.2218 0.095 
*Atot = 1650 m2; 
** fPF(·) and fT(·) denote the power function density and triangular density, respec-
tively (e.g., Evans et al. 2001) 
 
Table 2.9. Probabilistic models of the longitudinal rest position of the tank in the zones 
1 to 5 
Zone num-
ber k Probability density of the longitudinal rest position y3 
1 Uniform density: fU1(y3) = 1/l1 (y3∈[0, l1]) 
2 
Mixed power function** and uniform densities: 
f2(y3) = 0.5ωfPF(y3 | θ1) + 0.5ωfPF(l2 – y3 | θ2) +  (1–ω) fU2(y3) 
(y3∈[0, l2]), where ω = 0.5; θ1 = (12, l2); θ2 = (19, l2); fU2(y3) = 1/l2 
3 
Mixed triangular** and uniform densities: 
f3(y3) = ωfT(y3 | θ) + (1–ω)fU3(y3) (y3∈[0, l3]), where ω = 0.2; θ = (0, l3, 
l3); fU3(y3) = 1/l3 
4 
Mixed triangular and uniform densities: 
f4(y3) = ωfT(y3 | θ) + (1–ω)fU4(y3) (y3∈[0, l4]), where ω = 0.2; θ = (0, 0, 
l4); fU4(y3) = 1/l4 
5 
Mixed power function and uniform densities: 
f5(y3) = ωfPF(l5 – y3 | θ) + (1–ω)fU5(y3) (y3∈[0, l4]), where ω = 0.5; θ = 
(4, l5); fU5(y3) = 1/l5 
 
2.2.4.2. Simulation of the longitudinal rest position 
 
The probabilistic weights pk (k = 1, 2, … , 5) can be assigned to the zones in 
different ways. They include judgmental weighting often used for QRA (e.g., 
Aven 2003; Garrick 2008). However, as mentioned in Sec. 4.1, the weights pk 
can also be specified by applying methods developed outside QRA, for instance, 
MCDM methods. A number of formal methods are suggested in the literature 
related to MCDM literature for specifying such weights as pk in both crisp and 
fuzzy form (Hwang and Yoon 1981; Triantaphyllou 2000; Vaidogas and 
Šakėnaitė 2010 2011). These methods are used to elicit imprecise expert judg-
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ments and convert the judgments into the weighs. However, these methods do 
not fully eliminate the specifying of pk from subjectivity. 
In the absence of any prior information, the weights pk can be specified as 
the relative road surface areas of corresponding zones, Ak/Atot (Table 2.8). How-
ever, one can argue that Zones 1, 3 and 4 are more prone to a vehicle accident 
that Zones 2 and 5. Therefore the weights pk should reflect this increased prone-
ness and not only the size of the zones. 
Zone 1 includes a road intersection. Generally road intersections exhibit 
higher frequency of accidents as compared to other elements of roadway. For 
instance, Al-Ghamdi (2003) has found that the proportion of vehicle accidents at 
road intersections and non-intersections is approximately equal to 29% and 71%, 
respectively. As the stem of T-junction in Zone 1 is an access road to the facility 
and not a regular traffic artery, the proportion of 29% is too high for this inter-
section. We will use a somewhat reduced proportion expressed as the weight p1 
equal to 0.25 (Table 2.8). Consequently, the sum of the remaining four weights 
must be equal to 0.75. 
Zones 4 and 5 have unfavourable roadside features. It is well-known that 
characteristics of roadside features have a significant effect on frequency and 
severity of traffic accidents (e.g., Lee and Mannering 2002). The fence and trees 
standing close to the roadway edge in Zones 4 and 5 impair visibility and restrict 
avoidance manoeuvre, especially at the turn between the zones. The weights p3 
and p4 can be assigned to Zones 3 and 4 by comparing these zones to Zones 2 
and 5. The latter pair is less prone to vehicle accidents because there are no turns 
on the ends of Zones 2 and 5 and these zones have roadside obstacles only on 
one side. Consequently, the sum p3 + p4 should exceed the sum p2 + p5. The ab-
sence of the obstacles on one side of Zones 2 and 5 can be the reason for the 
choice (p3 + p4)/(p2 + p5) ≥ 2. A possible distribution of the pairs of weights can 
be p3 + p4 = 0.5 and p2 + p5 = 0.25. These aggregate weights can be distributed 
within the pairs p3 and p4 and p2 and p5 according to the relative road surface 
area Ak/Atot given in Table 2.8: 
 5)2,()/( 0.25 )()( ==+= lkAAAp lklklk  (2.11a) 
 4) 3,()/( 0.5 )()( ==+= lkAAAp lklklk  (2.11b) 
where the subscript k(l) indicates the weight pk or pl and the area Ak or Al de-
pending on which zone number is considered. The calculation with Eqs. (2.11) 
yielded the weights p2 to p5 given in Table 2.4. The distribution of the weights pk 
along the 280 m road segment is shown in Fig. 2.25a. 
The longitudinal rest position y3 related to Zones 1, 2 and 5 was modelled 
by the uniform densities fk(y3) defined in Table 1 and illustrated in Fig. 2.25b. 
The piece-wise uniform density shown in Fig. 2.25c is related to the entire 
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280 m road segment. This density was constructed from the products pk×fk(y3). It 
is the simplest model of the longitudinal rest position with respect to the 280 m 
road segment. Unfortunately, the density shown in Fig. 2.25c has unnatural 
jumps. Therefore, mixed densities were applied to Zones 2 to 5 to smooth out 
these jumps. The general expression of the mixed densities is given by 
 fk(y3) = ω fNU(y3) + (1–ω) fUk(y3) (2.12) 
where fNU(·) and fUk(·) are a non-uniform and uniform density, respectively. The 
non-uniform densities adapted to Zones 2 to 5 are explained in Table 2.5. 
A power function distribution was used for smoothing out. This distribution 
is defined on a limited interval adaptable to the zone lengths lk and allows a sim-
ple generation of random values by means of the inverse distribution function 
method (e.g., Evans et al. 2001). The triangular densities were applied to Zones 
3 and 4. They are used to express a potentially increased concentration of y3 val-
ues at the turn between the zones. The use of the mixed distributions of y3 al-
lowed to simulate the values of y3j having a relatively smooth histogram 
(Fig. 2.25d). 
 
2.2.4.3. Simulation of the transverse rest position 
 
The sampling of the longitudinal rest position y3j was followed by sampling of 
the transverse rest position y4j. The values y4j were generated from the logistic 
probability distributions fitted to the circumstantial data on road tanker accidents 
(Sec. 2.2.1). Each generation was preceded by a random choice among the lanes 
1 and 2 with the respective weights pi1 = 0.7 and pi2 = 0.3 (Fig. 2.23). 
In Zone 1, the position y4j was sampled from standard (non-truncated) lo-
gistic distributions Logistic(–3.52 m, 3.10 m) and Logistic(3.52 m, 3.10 m) re-
lated to the lanes 1 and 2, respectively. In Zones 2 to 5, the position y4j was sam-
pled from logistic distributions with the same parameters; however, these 
distributions were truncated on both sides (Fig. 2.26). The unmovable truncation 
points y4Rj or y4Lj determined by the position of the fence and related to the re-
spective lanes 1 or 2 were computed for each simulated value of the longitudinal 
rest position y3j. The truncation points y4Rj or y4Lj related to the wood territory on 
the opposite road side were sampled from the normal distribution N(–
5 m, 0.25 m2) individually for each y3j. 
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Fig. 2.26. Truncated logistic densities with the outermost rest positions [y4Lj, y4Rj] as-
signed to two values of the longitudinal rest position in Zone 3, y3j: a) y3j = 38.7 m; b) y3j 
= –2.48 m 
Fig. 2.26a shows the truncation interval [y4Lj, y4Rj] = [–4.75 m, 10.04 m] as-
signed to the longitudinal rest position y3j = 38.7 m simulated for Zone 3 and 
travel lane 1. The transverse rest position y4j = 7.21 m was sampled from the 
truncated Logistic(3.52 m, 3.10 m) with the density presented in Fig. 2.26a. The 
right truncation point y4Rj = 10.04 m is the distance between road centreline and 
fence minus 1.25 m (half-width of tank semi-trailer). The left truncation point 
y4Lj = –4.75 m was sampled from N(–5 m, 0.25 m2) with the density shown in 
Fig. 2.26a. The truncation interval [y4Lj, y4Rj] = [8.23 m, –5.38 m] shown in 
Fig. 2.26b is related to the travel lane 2 in Zone 3. The value y4j = –2.48 was 
sampled from the truncated density defined on this interval and shown in 
Fig. 2.26b. 
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Sampling from the truncated logistic distributions was carried out by apply-
ing the inverse distribution function method (e.g., Gentle 2003). The following 
formula was used for the generation: 
 )|)())()((( 44414 lLjLjRjjj yFyFyFuFy θ+−= −  (2.13) 
where l = 1 or 2 depending on which lane is considered; F(·) and F–1(·) are the 
direct and inverse distribution function of the logistic distribution, respectively. 
The simulated pairs (y3j, y4j) related to the coordinate systems of individual 
zones were transformed into the rest position (x1j, x2j) in the coordinate system 
{0; x1, x2} shown in Fig. 2.23. A scatter diagram drawn for 10 000 pairs (x1j, x2j) 
and in Fig. 2.24 reveals the concentration of potential BLEVE accidents in the 
territory under study. However, the tank centre coordinates (x1j, x2j) alone do not 
say anything about the orientation of the tank with respect to the road centreline 
and so the potential targets of BLEVE effects (reservoirs). 
 
2.2.4.4. Simulation of the departure angles 
 
The simulation of the departure angles y2 was the most problematic part of this 
study. Values of the departure angle, y2j, were sampled after sampling the pairs 
of the longitudinal and transverse rest position, (y3j, y4j). The sampling of y2j was 
divided into two tasks: 
1. Task 1: sampling of y2j in the case where the road tanker is far from 
roadside obstacles and its rotation can not be restricted by them. 
2. Task 2: sampling of y2j when the obstacles can or will restrict the tank 
rotation. 
In the current simulation step j, the tasks were distinguished by considering 
the difference between transverse rest position y4j and distance to a potential 
obstacle, yoj. Task 1 was solved when difference | yoj – y4j | exceeded the half-
length of tank semi-trailer (6.5 m in our case), whereas Task 2 took place when 
|
 
yoj – y4j | ≤ 6.5 m (Fig. 2.27). 
Task 1 was performed by a data-based sampling of the values y2j from the 
empirical distribution of y2 introduced in the first part of this study (Vaidogas 
and Linkutė 2012). The weak stochastic dependence between transverse rest 
position y4 and departure angle y2 was expressed by a coefficient of correlation 
between y4 and y2 equal to 0.29. The values y2j were sampled by means of the 
inverse transform method applied to a frequency polygon (e.g., Rubinstein and 
Melamed 1998). The stochastic dependence between the transverse rest position 
y4 and the departure angle y2 was regarded by applying the Thomson-Taylor 
data-based simulation (Gentle 2003). 
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Task 2 was much more difficult to solve due to lack (inaccessibility) of 
probabilistic models and circumstantial accident data allowing to simulate the 
departure angles in vicinity of roadside obstacles. Attempts to model in detail an 
interaction of vehicles with roadside objects are few and not directly applicable 
to a prediction of vehicle rotation angles (e.g., Ray 1999). Therefore the simula-
tion of y2 was underpinned by preliminary models which can be refined or re-
placed after new circumstantial information will be available. 
The data-based sampling from the empirical distribution of y2 was extended 
by an approach similar to the acceptance-rejection method widely used in the 
field of stochastic simulation (e.g., Korn et al. 2010). The initially simulated 
angle y2j was rejected and replaced by a maximum possible rotation angle y2j,max 
in those simulation steps where |
 
yoj – y4j | ≤ 6.5 m (Fig. 2.27). The initial value 
y2j was accepted or replaced by a new one using the simple rule 
  
otherwise
  if
2
,22,2
2 
 ≥=
j
maxjjmaxj
j y
yyy
y  (2.14) 
where y2j,max is the maximum possible rotation angle. The value of y2j,max was 
determined by the position of the fence on one roadside or trees on the opposite 
roadside. 
The computation of y2j,max determined by the fence was straightforward. 
However, the restriction of the tank rotation by the wood on the opposite side of 
the road and so the simulation of y2j,max was nontrivial. It was assumed that val-
ues of maximum outmost point of the tank, yo, are strongly and negatively corre-
lated with the maximum outmost position of the tank centre represented by the 
truncation points on the roadside planted with trees, y4R or y4L. The pairs 
(y4Lj, yoj) and (y4Rj, yoj) related to the respective travel lanes 1 and 2 were sampled 
from a bivariate normal distribution with the correlation coefficient equal to –
 0.9. Further parameters of this distribution are indicated in Fig. 6. The bivariate 
model assumes that the deeper is encroachment of the car into the wood the 
stronger is restriction of its rotation Fig. 2.28 illustrates the marginal densities of 
y4R and yo for the travel lane 2. 
The simulation of the departure angles y2j yielded the triples (y2j, y3j, y4j) 
which were transformed into the coordinates (x1j, x2j, x3j). The latter triples are 
visualized in Fig. 2.29 by means of arrows with the centre coordinates expressed 
by (x1j, x2j) and the rotation angle given by x3j (x3j ∈ [0°, 360°]). 
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Fig. 2.27. Simulation of the departure angle y2 in vicinity of the fence represented by the 
dimensions yoj and δ: a) clock-wise rotation of the tank; b) counter clockwise rotation of 
the tank 
 
2.2.4.5. Simulation of fragment impact on a potential barrier 
 
The simulated coordinates (x1j, x2j, x3j) can be used for assessing effects of frag-
ments generated by a road tanker BLEVE. These fragments can be projected 
towards the reservoirs or a future safety barrier. The coordinates (x1j, x2j, x3j) will 
express the position of tanker vessel at the instance of BLEVE. 
A safety barrier can be built to protect the reservoirs depicted in Figs. 2.21 
to 2.23. The barrier can run along the fenced perimeter of the facility. A possible 
barrier line (axis) is shown in Fig. 2.30 by the polygonal line B1 – B5. This figure 
also shows an illustration of four subsequent positions of a vessel sustaining a 
BLEVE, namely, (x1k, x2k, x3k), k = j, j + 1, j + 2 and j + 3. The positions j, j + 1 
and j + 2 are capable to generate a fragment with a trajectory which can intersect 
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the line B1 – B5. The position j + 3 means that such an intersection is impossible, 
as long as it is assumed that the horizontal departure angle ς1 can vary within the 
60 ° segment introduced in Sec. 2.2.3. Even if this segment will overlap the line 
B1 – B5, the fragment trajectory determined by the angle ς1 will not necessarily 
intersect this line. 
4y0
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Fig. 2.28. Simulation of the departure angle y2 in the case of a road tanker encroachment 
in the roadside wood with a clock-wise rotation with respect to travel direction 
For each triplet (x1j, x2j, x3j), values of the vertical and horizontal departure 
angles, ς1j and ς2j, can be sampled from the probability distributions suggested in 
Sec. 2.2.3. If the horizontal path of fragment shown in Fig. 2.30 will intersect the 
line B1 – B5, the simulation can be continued for the current triplet (x1j, x2j, x3j). 
This simulation should start from sampling a value of the mass of fragment, ξfrg,j, 
using the assumptions and probability distributions introduced in Sec. 2.2.3. The 
value ξfrg,j can be sampled by applying Eqs. (2.8) and (2.9) incorporated into the 
following formula: 
  
1[0.4828,] if
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Fig. 2.29. A visualization of the simulated departure angle values x3j shown by the 
arrows directed towards the front part of the tank vehicle (j = 1, 2, … , N; N = 1000) 
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where uj is a value random variable uniformly distributed over the interval ]0, 1[; 
ξcyl,j is a value of the cylindrical part between the end-cap and circumferential 
crack sampled form a uniform distribution over the interval ]0, ξcyl[ (Fig. 2.13a); 
ξfront,j is a value of the length of the oblong end-cap which will be ejected to-
wards the line B1 – B5 (Fig. 2.13b). The value ξfront,j was sampled from the beta 
distribution Be(2.0, 4.0) adjusted to the interval [0, lcyl/2]. The number 0.4828 
given in Eq. (2.15) is the probability that the explosion will generate only two 
end-caps (Sec. 2.2.3). The masses me–c, front and mcyl,1 were calculated for a spe-
cific road tanker model (Annex C). 
With the value of fragment mass, ξfrg,j, a value of the departure velocity, 
vdep,j can be sampled using the formula 
 jfrgjkjdep Ev ,,, 2 ξ/=  (2.16) 
where Ek,j is a value of the kinetic energy of the fragment. This value can be 
simulated by applying the model described in Annex B. 
The simulated values ς1j, ς2j, ξfrg,j and vdep,j yield initial conditions for a 
computation of fragment trajectory. Generally, this trajectory should be comput-
ed by solving the differential equations presented Annex B. However, the dis-
tances between the road segment D1 – D3 shown in Fig. 2.30 and the line B1 – B5 
are relatively small. The largest distance is between the points D3 and B5. It is 
approximately equal to 65 m. In addition, the relief between road and reservoirs 
is flat and nears a horizontal plane (Fig. 2.21). Therefore we assumed that the 
fragment trajectories will be approximately linear and can be modelled as shown 
in Fig. 2.19c. In addition, it was assumed that the arrival (impact) velocities varv,j 
and will be equal to the departure velocities vdep,j. This assumption is also justi-
fied by the small distances between the road and the line B1 – B5. 
To assess the impact of fragments on a barrier, which will run along the line 
B1 – B5, the following numbers of the triplets (x1j, x2j, x3j) were generated: 
1. A total of 1×106 triplets for estimating the frequencies of an impact of 
fragments on the individual barrier segments B1 – B2, B2 – B3, B3 – B4 
and B4 – B5 (see Fig. 2.30). 
2. 100 000 triplets for calculating descriptive measures of simulated sam-
ples of fragment impact characteristics. 
3. 10 000 triplets for visualising characteristics of the samples just men-
tioned. 
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Fig. 2.30. An illustration of simulated trajectories of the fragments generated by a road 
tanker BLEVE 
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For each triplet (x1j, x2j, x3j), the values of the horizontal and vertical depar-
ture angles, ς1j and ς2j were sampled from the corresponding probability distribu-
tions and it was checked, whether the horizontal path of fragment trajectory will 
cross the line B1 – B5. In 483 216 cases from 1×106 simulations , the fragment 
trajectories crossed this line. Thus, a rough estimate of the probability that the 
fragment will hit the barrier given a BLEVE is equal to 0.483. The numbers of 
crossings of individual barrier segments B1 – B2, B2 – B3, B3 – B4 and B4 – B5 
along with relative frequencies and mean values of the samples of simulated 
impact characteristics are given in Table 2.10. 
Fig. 2.31 shows a three-dimensional scatter diagram of 4774 points, where 
the fragment trajectories crossed the vertical plane running along the points B1 to 
B5. These points were obtained with 10 000 simulations of vessel fragmentation 
and fragment flights. Fig. 2.37 shows the scatter diagram of the points where 
fragment trajectories crossed the vertical plane running along the barrier seg-
ment B4 – B5. Figs. 2.31 contain histograms of the simulated samples of impact 
characteristics: masses of impacting fragments, ξfrg,j, impact velocities  varv,j, 
ricochet angles φj and altitudes of impact points harv,j (see Figs. 2.15 and 2.16 for 
a visualisation of φj and harv,j; j = 1, 2, ... , 4774). 
 
Fig. 2.31. The scatter diagram of 4774 triplets (x1,j, x2,j, harv,j) showing the points, where 
the fragments crossed the vertical plane running along the barrier line B1 – B5 (x1,j and 
x2,j are the horizontal coordinates of intersection point j and harv,j is the altitude of this 
point) 
2. PREDICTING THE EFFECTS FROM HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION... 77 
 
The 483 216 intersections counted in 100 000 simulations produced four 
samples consisting of values of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j. Mean values of these 
samples are given in Table 2.10, whereas comprehensive information about 
them can be found in Annex D. This information consists of descriptive 
measures of the samples as well as coefficients of correlation between sample 
components. 
Table 2.10. Results of the simulation of fragment flights across the barrier segments B1–
B2, B2–B3, B3–B4 and B4–B5 
Simulation result Barrier segment B1–B2 B2–B3 B3–B4 B4–B5 
Number of crossings(1) 50 768 55 315 167 342 209 791 
Relative frequency of crossings(1) 0.50768 0.55315 0.167342 0.209791 
Mean of ξfrg,j values, kg(2) 3931 4073 4137 4117 
Mean of varv,j values, km/h(2) 208 202 200 199 
Mean of φj values,° (2) 49.3 24.1 30.4 38.0 
Mean of harv,j values, m(2) 13.1 2.2 3.17 9.0 
Mean of dhor,j values(2) 23.4 16.3 46.7 75.0 
(1)
 Obtained with 1×106 simulations of fragment flights 
(2)
 Obtained with 1×105 simulations of fragment flights 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.32. The scatter diagram of the points where fragment trajectories crossed the ver-
tical plane running along the barrier segment B4 – B5 (2074 points obtained in 10 000 
simulations) 
78 2. PREDICTING THE EFFECTS FROM HAZMAT TRANSPORTATION... 
 
 
Fig. 2.33. The histogram of the simulated fragment mass values ξfrg,j related to the barrier 
segment B4 – B5 (j = 1, 2, ... , 2074) 
 
Fig. 2.34. The histogram of the simulated fragment impact velocities varv,j related to the 
barrier segment B4 – B5 (j = 1, 2, ... , 2074) 
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Fig. 2.35. The histogram of the simulated ricochet angles φj related to the barrier 
segment B4 – B5 (j = 1, 2, ... , 2074) 
 
Fig. 2.36. The histogram of the simulated impact altitudes harv,j related to the barrier 
segment B4 – B5 (j = 1, 2, ... , 2074) 
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Samples of the values ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j can be applied to a reliability-
based design of safety barriers. The most natural way to utilise these samples for 
such a design is to incorporate them into the Monte Carlo simulation of barrier 
behaviour under fragment impact (see, e. g., Marek et. al. 2003). This simulation 
will yield an estimate of the probability of barrier damage (failure), Pfe. The 
estimate Pfe will correspond to the definition of the damage event and 
mechanical model expressing damage criteria, say, a limit state function 
g(z, ξfrg, varv, φ, harv). In this function, the vector z is includes basic input 
variables on the side of barrier resistance and may include some basic variables 
representing the process of impact loading (e.g., impulse). The set of simulated 
values ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j can be used to calculate values of the binary (zero-
one) function 1(z, ξfrg, varv, φ, harv) which will represent failure or survival 
conditions of the barrier, namely, 
 
 ≤
=
otherwise0
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ϕζϕζ zz1 (2.17) 
where zj is the value of the vector of random basic variables Z generated in addi-
tion to the values ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j. With the values 1(zj, ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj, harv,j) 
the estimate of the failure probability can be computed by means of the standard 
formula 
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where N is the number of Monte Carlo simulations. If the event of barrier dam-
age by a fragment (failure due to fragment impact) is for instance, a complete 
collapse of the barrier, it can be designed for a fairly low value of the failure 
probability Pf. 
In theory, a multivariate probability distribution can be fitted to the samples 
of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j. This distribution could be applied to the estimation of 
the damage probability Pf in such methodological formats as FORM and SORM 
methods (e.g., Melchers 2002). However, fitting a four-dimensional probability 
distribution to the samples of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j can be highly complicated 
due to a stochastic dependency between the impact characteristics ξ, varv, φ and 
harv. 
Alternatively, the samples of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j can be used to specify a 
combination of conservative, unfavourable values of the impact characteristics 
ξfrg, varv, φ and harv. These values can be used as characteristic or design values 
for a conventional, deterministic design of barriers. However, the simulated 
values of the four impact characteristics ξfrg, varv, φ and harv will generally be 
interdependent. Therefore, a specification of only one and ”reliable“ set of 
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design values can be problematic. The barrier should be analysed for several sets 
of design values representing different combinations of values of ξfrg, varv, φ and 
harv. For instance, one can use the following two-step procedure: 
1. A set of percentiles of the samples consisting of the simulated values 
ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j is specified. The 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th per-
centiles of each sample can be used. This will yield 20 values of the im-
pact characteristics ξfrg, varv, φ and harv. An example of 50th and 90th 
percentiles of the impact characteristics related to the barrier segment 
B4 – B5 is presented in Table 2.10. 
2. The barrier is analysed for each combination of the aforementioned per-
centiles. The most hazardous combination of impact characteristics is 
determined by the maximum response of the barrer to the impact load-
ing. 
Some percentiles can be excluded from the aforementioned combinations. 
For instance, percentiles the ricochet angle φ which are smaller than a critical 
value must be considered in a separate analysis, because such angles of entry 
will lead to a reflection of a fragment by the target (Johnson et al. 1982). Some 
percentiles can be too conservative and require unrealistic design decisions. For 
example, the 90th percentile of the impact altitude harv requires to design a 
barrier which is almost 12 m tall. Such a barrier will intercept the fragment 
crossing the line B4–B5 with 90 % probability. However, if the height of the 
barrier segment B4–B5 will be reduced to the more realistic 7 m, the probability 
of interception will be still high and approximately equal to 80 %. 
Table 2.11. Median values and 90th percentiles of the samples of the simulated impact 
characteristics ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j related to the barrier segment B4–B5 (j = 1, 2, ... , 
20 899) 
Median values 90th percentiles 
,0.5frgζˆ = 3157 kg ,0.9frgζˆ = 8593 kg 
,0.5arvvˆ = 171.2 km/h ,0.9arvvˆ = 374 km/h 
0.5ϕˆ = 36.5 ° 0.9ϕˆ = 60.5 ° 
,0.5arvhˆ = 2.48 m* ,0.9arvhˆ = 11.5 m* 
* The value of the impact altitude harv equal to 7 m is the approximately the 80th per-
centile of the sample harv, 1 , harv, 2, ... , harv, 20 899 
 
2.3. Thermal effects from road tanker explosions 
 
Thermal effects of BLEVE on roadside objects can be predicted by mathemati-
cal models, most of which are strictly deterministic. These models cover blast, 
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fireballs, and projection of fragments (projectiles) generated by BLEVEs (CCPS 
1994; CCPS 2005a; CPR 2005; Vaidogas 2006b; Casal 2008). The models of 
BLEVE effects can be applied to predicting damage to roadside objects. A 
methodological framework for such predicting is available in the field of trans-
portation risk assessment (CCPS 1995). An example of an application of TRA to 
an assessment of individual and societal risk due to LG transportation was re-
ported by Paltrinieri et al. (2009). TRA is a widely developed methodology. 
However, our impression is that applications of TRA lack “attention to detail”, 
where a potential damage to built roadside objects is of concern (Vaidogas et al. 
2012ab). An assessment of such damage will require to consider two aspects of a 
BLEVE accident: transportation aspect (potential position of the explosion with-
in the road segment from which it can endanger a roadside object in question) 
and structural aspect (response of the roadside object to potential BLEVE ef-
fects). 
The present section attempts to give guidance on assessing the damage to 
built roadside objects from thermal radiation emitted by BLEVE fireballs. Such 
a radiation is not the furthest reaching BLEVE effect. However, it can be very 
intense in the roadside territory and, unlike blast and projectiles from an LG tank 
vessel fragmentation, it will impinge on objects build relatively close to the road 
from high elevation. The thermal radiation can be very problematic in terms of 
fire safety. The study focuses on a stochastic (Monte Carlo) simulation of 
position of road tankers before they sustain a BLEVE and thermal radiation from 
a BLEVE which can cause the thermal damage. The simulation results can be 
useful for a design of future objects and protection of existing objects located in 
the vicinity of the roads used for LG transportation. 
 
2.3.1. Risk related to thermal damage 
 
An accident occurring as a BLEVE of a road tanker will be initiated by a traffic 
accident, in which the tank vehicle is involved (Block 1, Fig. 2.37). Then the 
initiator can be followed by two typical sequences of events leading to an en-
gulfment of a tank by a fire and BLEVE of the tank (Blocks 2 to 7, Fig. 2.37). 
The fire can be fed by LG leaking from the tank or by other source, most proba-
bly, fuel of a tank truck. A fire of both LG and fuel is also possible (Planas-
Cuchi et al. 2004). 
A BLEVE can be external or internal event with respect to exposed 
roadside infrastructure. An external exposure to BLEVE hazard can result from 
a transportation of LGs over adjacent public (off-site) roads or access roads. An 
example of an external exposure to a BLEVE is given in Fig. 2.38. The internal 
expose will take place during the transportation of LGs over on-site roads. In 
congested vulnerable industrial areas adjoined by on-site roads, the on-site 
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transportation of LGs can be more hazardous than the transportation over off-
site, public roads. 
AND/OR
Traffic accident involving LG tank car (random event A)
Loss of integrity of the LG tank and leak of LG Loss of integrity of a truck fuel tank, leak of fuel
BLEVE (random event B)
Ignition of LG
Fire engulfs the LG tank
Thermal damage to mechanically undamaged 
target object (random event DT0)
OR
1
2 3
4
6
7
11
109 Vulnerability to fire damage remains unaffected Increase of vulnerability to fire damage
Thermal damage to mechanically damaged target 
object (random event DT1)12
Mechanical damage (random event DM)?
yes
8
Ignition of fuel pool5
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Fig. 2.37. Sequences of the events leading to a road tanker BLEVE and subsequent 
damage to a roadside object 
BLEVE damage to a roadside object can be caused by three effects 
generated by explosion: blast, projectile impact and thermal radiation from a 
fireball. Blasts from BLEVEs are localised and not as far reaching as fireball and 
projectile effects. If safe distances between the road and roadside objects can be 
established for fireballs then they will be safe for the blast. Such distances are 
also known as separation distances (CCPS 2005b). A separation distance equal 
to four times the potential fireball radius R is suggested as reasonable for 
thermal radiation effects and blast effects Birk (1996). An illustration of the 
distance 4R is given in Figs. 2.33 and 2.34. However, at this distance the hazard 
from projectiles is still very significant. At a distance of 4R from the side of a 
tank, approximately 80-90% of fragments should fall. A compensation for less 
than desired separation distances can be safety barriers built alongside the road. 
If designed properly, the safety barriers will provide protection against blast and 
projectiles. For effective protection, the potential BLEVE epicentre should be at 
relatively short range from the front of the barrier (Smith 2010). 
Unfortunately, barriers can provide no protection against fireball radiation 
because dimensions of fireballs from BLEVEs of road tankers exceed any 
reasonable dimensions of barriers. An illustration of these dimensions is given in 
Fig. 2.39. The geometry of the fireball shown in Fig. 2.39 was calculated for a 
typical tank semi-trailer carrying 24.7 tons of propane by applying the so-called 
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TNO fireball model CPD (2005). The model and the data used for the 
calculation are presented in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. 
A protection of roadside objects against thermal radiation from BLEVE 
fireballs should be based on either providing adequate separation distances or 
compensating less than desired safety distances by adequate resistance of target 
objects to thermal radiation. The latter option can be achieved by shielding the 
target objects from thermal radiation or making them inherently more resistant 
to such radiation. Both options require to predict intensity of thermal radiation 
from a road tanker BLEVE and to assess the risk of thermal damage to exposed 
roadside object. An assessment of this risk will require to deal with 
transportation and structural aspect of the problem. 
 
Fig. 2.38. An example of external exposure of a potential target to a BLEVE on road: a) 
an aerial view of four reservoirs of flammable materials in the vicinity of a road with a 
frequent transportation of LGs; b) schematic view with a coordinate system {0; x1, x2} 
based on road centreline and one of the reservoirs 
 
2.3.2. Geometric information on road tanker accidents 
 
Blast and projectiles generated by a road tanker BLEVE can cause mechanical 
damage, whereas the thermal radiation can ignite combustible parts of the ex-
posed object and so the damage will be caused by a subsequent, secondary fire. 
Many combustible materials ignite at ten-second exposure to 50 kW/m2 radia-
tion (Prugh 1994). The duration of a fireball generated by a BLEVE of a typical 
road tanker is up to 20 seconds. Blast and projectiles will reach the target object 
within first two or three seconds after the explosion and act a very short time. 
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Thermal radiation from a fireball will act on the object a longer time  and will 
increase from zero to a maximum value during the first third of fireball duration 
(Casal 2008). If the events of mechanical and thermal damage are modelled by 
the respective random events DM and DT, the event DM will occur first and DT 
will follow DM (Blocks 8 to 11, Fig. 2.37). 
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Fig. 2.39. Exposure of a roadside object (target) to the fireball generated by a BLEVE of 
a road tanker carrying 24.7 tons of propane (the dimensions of the fireball were 
estimated by means of the TNO model (CPD 2005) 
An occurrence of the mechanical damage event DM can lead to two 
conditions of the target object with respect to the vulnerability of this object to 
thermal radiation: 
1. An occurrence of DM does not change the vulnerability to fire damage 
(Block 9, Fig. 2.37) (e.g., a local damage to a masonry wall of an indus-
trial building hit by a projectile from a tank vessel fragmentation will not 
affect the vulnerability of its roof to thermal radiation, Fig. 2.40a). The 
events DM and DT can be considered independent and so the probability 
P(DT | B) estimated independently from P(DM | B), where B denotes the 
random event of BLEVE (Block 7, Fig. 2.37). 
2. An occurrence of DM increases abruptly the vulnerability to fire damage 
(Block 10, Fig. 1) (e.g., loss of containment by a reservoir used to store 
flammable liquid due to a projectile impact and so spill and exposure of 
this liquid to the direct action of thermal radiation will increase the 
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chance of fire, Fig. 4b). The events DM and DT can not be considered to 
be independent and so P(DT | DM ∩ B) > P(DT | B). 
The probabilities P(DT | B) and P(DT | DM ∩ B) represent two different 
accident scenarios. They can be related to the frequency of thermal damage, 
Fr(DT), by a simple expression 
Fr(DT) = Fr(T) × P(A | T) × P(B | A) × P(DT | B) (or × P(DT | DM ∩ B)) (2.19) 
where Fr(T) is the usually annual frequency of LG transportation through the 
road segment under analysis (event T); P(A | T) is the conditional probability of 
a traffic accident (event A) given T (the random event A is shown in Block 1, 
Fig. 2.37) and P(B | A) is the probability of a BLEVE given A. 
 
Fig. 2.40. An illustration of the thermal damage event DT: a) the case of an independent 
occurrence of DT  with respect to the mechanical damage by a projectile; b) the case 
where DT (ignition of flammable liquid) is dependent on an occurrence of mechanical 
damage (perforation of a reservoir wall by a projectile and subsequent leak of liquid) 
If DT is a stand-alone event, a vector of consequence severities, S, can be 
assigned to Fr(DT) and the pair {Fr(DT), S} considered a simple expression of 
risk. In the case of an escalation of DT into a larger, domino accident, the 
estimation of the frequency Fr(DT) can be treated as an estimation of frequency 
of an initiating event which triggers out a domino sequence. In both cases, the 
estimation of Fr(DT) will involve an estimation of the thermal damage 
probabilities P(DT | B) and P(DT | DM ∩ B). 
 
2.3.3. Estimating the probability of thermal damage to       
roadside structures 
 
The estimation of the conditional thermal damage probability P(DT | B) is similar 
to that of P(DT | DM ∩ B), with the difference that the first probability must be 
estimated for a mechanically undamaged target object and the second one for an 
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object in a damaged state and so more vulnerable to a thermal impact. Due to 
this similarity and for the sake of brevity, the symbol P(DT | B) will represent 
both probabilities. The thermal damage probability P(DT | B) can be expressed b 
the formula (2.2). In this formula, the general symbol D must be replaced DT and 
the remaining symbols must be interpreted as follows: y = (y1, y2) is a two-
component vector, the first component of which, y1, expresses a thermal radia-
tion intensity (heat flux) and the second, y2, the duration of exposure to this radi-
ation (fireball duration); P(DT | y) is the fragility function relating the probability 
of DT to y; x is the vector of characteristics of BLEVE accident resulting in the 
impact expressed by y; ψ(x) is the vector-function which relates x to y (i.e., y = 
ψ(x)); and f(x) and f(y) are the joint probability density functions (p.d.f.s) of x 
and y, respectively. 
The development of the fragility function P(DT | y) is a highly case-specific 
task of probabilistic structural analysis. Fragility functions are widely applied to 
seismic risk assessment and extreme-wind risk assessment. However, any 
attempts to develop a fragility function for thermal actions of external fires are 
not known to us. What is more, recipes allowing to relate the thermal radiation 
y1 and duration y2 to a specific thermal damage are very sparse and deterministic 
in nature. It is stated in the books CCPS (1994) and CCPS (2005a) that the 
radiation of 37.5 kW/m2 is sufficient to cause damage to process equipment and 
12.5 kW/m2 is the minimum energy required for ignition of wood and melting of 
plastic tubing. Most sources interpret the thermal damage simply as an ignition 
of materials exposed to thermal radiation and distinguish between ignition and 
non-ignition by specifying a pair of fixed threshold values (y1,min, y2,min) (Casal 
2008; Prugh 1994, Tewarson 2002, Babrauskas 2003). Unfortunately, such 
values are insufficient to easily develop a fragility function P(DT | y1, y2), 
especially for short-term exposures (values of y2 ranging roughly between 5 and 
20 seconds). It is highly probable that at present the analyst will have to rely on 
a simplified fragility function expressed as 
 
 ≥≥
=
otherwise0
 and if1),|( 2,21,121 minminT yyyyyyDP  (2.20) 
Fitting a well-known bivariate density f(y) to the direct data on BLEVE 
effects can be problematic. BLEVE accidents on road are unique, short-lasting 
and unexpected events. The post mortem data on them is too sparse for fitting 
f(y). However, the density f(y) and so the probability P(DT | B) can be estimated 
by propagating uncertainties expressed by the lower-level density f(x) through 
the model ψ(x) Prugh 1994. The function ψ(x) can be composed of a relatively 
large number of models available currently for the prediction of individual 
effects of BLEVE. These models are strictly deterministic, some are in 
competition for modelling individual characteristics of BLEVE fireballs (T. Ab-
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basi and S. A. Abbasi 2007). Tables 2.12 and 2.13 contain an example of ψ(x) 
composed of two sub-models ψ1(x) and ψ2(x) developed for a prediction of 
fireball radiation y1 and duration y2, respectively. 
Table 2.12. Input vector x of the model ψ(x) 
Compo-
nent of x 
Description Units Value 
x1 Position of the BLEVE centre along the axis 
{0; x1 }* (Fig. 2.37b) 
m 0 
x2 Position of the BLEVE centre along the axis 
{0; x2} (Figs. 2.32b and 2.33) 
m 5.65 
x3 Position of the BLEVE centre along the axis 
{0; x3} (Fig. 2.38) 
m 0 
x4 Capacity of the tank m3 56.14 
x5 Pressure in the vessel just before the explosion* N/m2 20×105 
x6 Degree of tank filling % 85 
x7 Density of LG (propane) kg/m3 585 
x8 Combustion heat of LG at its boiling point J/kg 46.0×106 
x9 Vaporisation heat of LG at its boiling point J/kg 0.426×106 
x10 Specific heat capacity at constant pressure J/(kg°K) 0.002582 
x11 Temperature of the fireball flame °K 2000 
x12 Partial vapour pressure of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere 
N/m2 30.39 
x13 Ambient temperature °C 10 
x14 Relative humidity % 70 
* Relief pressure of the safety valve can be assumed as the pressure at the instant of 
explosion (Casal 2008) 
 
Table 2.13. Components (sub-models) of the model ψ(x) = (ψ1(x), ψ2(x)) developed in 
by the Dutch organisation TNO (2005) 
Component of ψ(x) Description Expression of the submodel 
ψ1(x) Intensity of thermal radiation ψ1(x) = E(x) Fview(x) τa(x)* 
ψ2(x) Fireball duration ψ2(x) = 0.852(x4x5x6)0.8 
* E(x) ≡ E(x1, x2, … , x12) is the emissive power of the fireball surface; 
Fview(x) ≡ Fview(x1, x2, … , x6) is the view factor; τa(x) ≡ τa(x1, x2, … , x6, x13, x14,) is the 
atmospheric transitivity; see (CPD 2005) for a detailed description of the sub-models 
E(·), Fview(·) and τa(·) 
 
The estimation of the thermal damage probability P(DT | B) has an apparent 
transportation aspect. The thermal effect from a BLEVE fireball depends on a 
number of transportation-specific characteristics which can be taken as 
components of the input vector x in the model ψ(x). A list of these 
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characteristics depends on the type of the model used to predict the thermal 
radiation ψ1(x) and the fireball duration ψ2(x). For instance, the TNO model 
described in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 allows to classify transportation-specific 
components of x as follows: 
1. The position of exploding tank in respect to a target object. 
2. The segment of road from which a road tanker BLEVE can endanger the 
target object (unsafe road segment). 
3. Characteristics of the tank vessel used to ship LG: capacity, degree of 
filling, relief pressure of the safety valve built into the vessel and, more 
generally, mechanical characteristics of the vessel metal heated by an 
external fire preceding BLEVE. 
4. Characteristics of LG being shipped in the vessel: type and density of 
LG, combustion and vaporization heat, specific heat. Temperature of the 
fireball flame can also be attributed to the characteristics of LG. 
The tank position can be defined by applying a coordinate system fixed to 
both road and target object. An example of such a coordinate system denoted by 
{0; x1, x2} is shown in Fig. 2.38b. If the altitudes of BLEVE centre and target 
object differ much and/or the road has a non-negligible gradient, a three-
dimensional coordinate system {0; x1, x2, x3} must be used (e.g., Fig. 2.39). 
Unlike scattering of projectiles from a cylindrical vessel BLEVE and blast 
generated by such an explosion, the propagation of the thermal radiation is not 
directional Birk (1996). Therefore there is no need to model the orientation of 
the exploding tank (the angle of tank axis in relation to the road axis) in the 
coordinate system {0; x1, x2} Vaidogas et al. (2012a).  
The unsafe road segment denoted by, say, ω can be determined by plotting 
a safety distance around the target object. If this object has a relatively simple 
geometry in plan, the safety distance can be determined a single variable, say, ∆. 
Figs. 2.33b and 2.34 illustrate such a distance for the cylindrical tank “1”. It was 
assumed that ∆ is equal to four fireball radii R estimated by applying the 
deterministic model and data given in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. The safety distance ∆ 
plotted around the target object formed a road segment ω with the length of 
661.3 m (Fig. 2.38b). The geometry and of a target object and road network in 
the vicinity of the object can be irregular. However, the unsafe road segment ω 
can be identified also in such a case (Vaidogas and Linkute 2012). 
Generally, all component of the input vector x should be considered random 
and modelled by random variables. However, the variability of some 
components can be expected to be small one and so these components can be 
represented by fixed values. The position of the BLEVE centre in the road 
segment ω in undoubtedly uncertain and must be modelled by two random 
variables X1 and X2. For the model ψ(x) described in Tables 2.7 and 2.8, they 
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will be the first two random input variables. The altitude of the explosion centre 
with respect to the target, x3, can be expressed as a linear function of X1 if the 
road within ω has a longitudinal gradient. Consequently, X3 will have the same 
probability distribution as X1. The capacity of the tank, x4, and the relief pressure 
of the safety valve, x5, can be assumed to be fixed values if it is known what 
type of the tank vessel will sustain a BLEVE. However, the degree of tank 
filling, x6, can vary more than x4 and x5 and so this degree should be modelled by 
a random variable X6. 
The characteristics of LG expressed by the components x7 to x10 will depend 
on the type of LG and chemical composition of LG (Table 2.12). The variability 
of x7 to x10 must be determined by tests of LGs shipped by road tankers. If a 
specific material shipped by a road tank, which may sustain a BLEVE, is known 
in advance, the LG characteristics x7 to x10 can be assumed to be fixed. However, 
the temperature of fireball flame, x11, should be modelled as a random variable 
X11. This temperature is influenced by several random factors and, in addition, is 
difficult to measure it in experiments (Babrauskas 2003; Roberts et al. 2000). 
The ambient conditions in the TNO model are expressed by the input 
variables x12 to x14 (Table 2.12). Partial vapour pressure of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere, x11, do not vary much and can be considered non-random and equal 
to a fixed value given in Table 2.12 (CPD 2005). The ambient temperature at the 
instant of BLEVE, x13, and the corresponding relative humidity x14 are clearly 
uncertain values and they must be modelled by the respective random variables 
X13 and X14. These variables are not inherent characteristics of the LG 
transportation process. They can be attributed to the target object because 
depend on the location of a potential BLEVE accident. However, certain 
combinations of values of X13 and X14 can create dangerous traffic conditions, 
say, impaired visibility due to fog or icy road surface. They may increase the 
chance of traffic accident, in which the road tanker car will be involved, and so 
the chance of BLEVE. Consequently, the input variables X13 and X14 can not be 
completely detached from the transportation aspect of the damage prediction 
problem. 
The uncertainties related to the components of the input vector x call for 
replacing this vector by a vector with some random components, namely, 
 X = (X1, X2, X3, x4, x5, X6, x7, x8, x9, x10, X11, x12, X13, X14) (2.21) 
With the random input vector X, the output of the model ψ(X) = 
(ψ1(X), ψ2(X)) will be random and can be modelled by two random variables: 
random thermal radiation Y1 = ψ1(X) and random fireball duration Y2 = ψ2(X). 
The probability distributions of Y1 and Y2 can be estimated by applying a 
simulation-based propagation of uncertainties through the model ψ(·). Values of 
the random input vector, xj, can be sampled from probability distributions of the 
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random components of X and the corresponding output values y1j and y2j 
calculated by means of ψ(·). A repetition of this process a large number of times, 
say, N will yield an estimate of the damage probability P(DT | B), namely, 
 ∑
=
−
=
N
j jjTTe yyDPNBDP 1 21
1 ) ,|()|(  (2.22) 
where ) ,|( 21 jjT yyDP  is a value of the fragility function P(DT | y) computed for 
the pair (y1j, y2 j). 
 
2.3.4. Case study 
 
The potential thermal damage from a road tanker BLEVE fireball to the 1st of 
the four reservoirs shown in Fig. 2.38 will be analysed. The thermal radiation 
will be estimated at the centre of reservoir roof, where system components sensi-
tive to thermal radiation are installed (point “A”), and at the bottom of the diked 
area around the reservoirs, were piping and other system components are at-
tached to the reservoir (point “B”) (Fig. 2.39). Characteristics of the points “A” 
and “B” are given in Table 3. A BLEVE of a road tanker semi-truck carrying 
24.7 tons of propane will be considered. The BLEVE can occur on an unsafe 
road segment ω with the length of 661.3 m (Fig. 2.38b). The area between the 
road and the reservoirs is flat; the road segment ω has no gradient. The road has 
four lanes, each 3.75 m wide and a 5,5 m wide median which separates opposing 
lanes of traffic (Fig. 2.41). The LG is transported along the road segment ω with 
relative frequencies pi1 = 0.35, pi2 = 0.04, pi3 = 0.07 and pi4 = 0.54 shown in Fig. 
2.36a. These frequencies were obtained from an observation of traffic in the road 
segment ω. 
Table 2.14. Probability distributions of the random components of the vector X used to 
describe a road tanker BLEVE accident 
Random 
variable 
Mean Coefficient of variation 
(standard deviation) 
Probability distribution 
X1 335.1* m  0.577 (193.4 m) Uniform over the length of ω 
X2 2.174 m 5.20 (11.31 m) Mixed distribution 
X6 0.85 0.05 (0.0425) Normal 
X11 2000 °K 0.11 (220 °K) Lognormal 
X13 15 °C 0.20 (3 °C) Normal 
X14 70% 0.1 (7%) Normal 
* In the accident simulation the mean value of X1 was shifted to the zero value of the 
axis {0; x1} 
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Table 2.15. Characteristics of two vulnerable points in the reservoir system that can be 
ignited by a BLEVE fireball 
Point 
Position in the coordi-
nate system 
{0; x1, x2, x3} 
Condition of thermal 
damage Estimate of damage probability, Pe(DT|B)* 
(see Eq.(2.35)) y1,min (kW/m2) 
y2,min  
(s) 
A (0 m, 282.3 m, 47.5 m), 
Fig. 2.38 
25 10 1.021×10–3 
B (0 m, 215 m, –2.17 m) , 
Fig. 2.38 
30 10 0.1814 
* Computed with N = 1×105 
 
The BLEVE accident is described by the vector X defined by Eq. (2.21). 
Values of the deterministic components of this vector, x4, x5, x7, x8, x9, x10 and 
x12, are given in Table 2.12. The probability distribution of the longitudinal rest 
position of the road tanker and so the position of a potential BLEVE centre, X1, 
was assumed to be uniformly distributed over the length of ω (Fig. 2.38b, 
Table 2.14). This distribution expresses maximum uncertainty related to a 
potential BLEVE centre along the axis {0; x1}. The road segment did not 
experienced tank car accidents in previous years. The probability distribution of 
the transverse tank position after it comes to a complete stop and can explode, 
X2, depends on the lane of intended travel. Our previous analysis of tank car 
accident data led to the result that the transverse rest position of the tank centre 
with respect to the centreline of intended travel lane can be modelled by a 
logistic distribution Logistic(2.02 m, 3.10 m) Vaidogas et al. (2012a). The 
positive location parameter of this distribution, 2.02 m, means that the transverse 
rest position lies in average 2.02 m outwards the travel lane centreline. The 
distribution Logistic(2.02 m, 3.10 m) can be associated with each of the four 
lanes of the road under consideration by adding (subtracting) its location 
parameter to (from) the coordinate of the lane centreline along the axis {0; x2} 
(Fig. 2.42a). This will allow to construct a mixed p.d.f. of X2, in which the 
frequencies pi1 to pi4 will play the role of probabilistic weights: 
 φ(x2) = pi1 f1(x2 | –10.4, 3.10) + pi2 f2(x2 | –6.65, 3.10) +  
 + pi3 f3(x2 | 6.65, 3.10) + pi4 f4(x2 | 10.4, 3.10) (2.23) 
where φ(x2) denotes the mixed p.d.f. of X2 and fl(x2 | ·, ·) (l = 1, 2, 3, 4) are the 
logistic p.d.f.s related to the respective travel lanes. Parameters of the densities 
fl(x2 | ·, ·) in Eq. (2.23) are in meters. The graph of the bimodal density φ(x2) is 
shown in Fig. 2.42a. 
The probability distributions of the remaining random variables considered 
in the present example, X6, X11, X13 and X14, were assumed by following the 
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recommendations given by Papazoglou and Aneziris (1999) who considered the 
quantification of uncertainties related to the BLEVE thermal radiation. 
 
Fig. 2.41.  Simulation of the transverse rest position of road tanker which can sustain a 
potential BLEVE: a) relative frequencies of LG transportation through individual lanes; 
b) transverse profile of the road 
 
Fig. 2.42. Probabilistic model of the transverse rest position of the tank: a) densities of 
the transverse departure from the centrelines of individual lanes and a mixture of these 
densities, φ(x2); b) road profile and adjacent roadside territory 
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Fig. 2.43. Results of the simulation of a BLEVE thermal radiation at point “B” a) 
simulated positions of the road tank, (x1j, x2j); b) simulated pairs of the thermal radiation 
and fireball duration, (y1j, y2j) 
The values xj of the random input vector X were sampled by means of a 
stochastic simulation from the probability distributions given in Table 2.14. 
Then the simulated values xj and the model ψ(·) described in Table 2.13 were 
used to compute values of the thermal radiation and fireball duration, y1j and y2j. 
The simulation was repeated 1×105 times (N = 10 000). Fig. 2.43 shows the 
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scatter diagram of the pairs (x1j, x2j) and (y1j, y2j). With the pairs (y1j, y2j), 
estimates of the probability of thermal damage, Pe(DT|B), were computed for 
points “A” and “B” (see Table 2.15). These estimates indicate that the point “B” 
is much more vulnerable to thermal radiation than “A” and so thermal insulation 
(shielding) should be provided in order to protect this part of the reservoir 
system against BLEVE. 
 
2.4. Second chapter conclusions 
 
This chapter presented results of investigation of hazmat transportation accidents 
as well as thermal and mechanical effects induced during these accidents on 
built roadside property. Two methods suitable for a probabilistic prediction of 
these effects were proposed. The following conclusions summarise findings pre-
sented in the second chapter and results of application of the proposed methods: 
1. Two hazmat transportation accidents with the greatest potential of dam-
age to the built roadside property are BLEVE and VCE. The prevailing 
materials involved in BLEVE and VCE accidents on road and rail are 
commercial energetic hydrocarbons, especially, propane. 
2. Thermal and mechanical effects of BLEVE will substantially depend on 
the position and orientation of road or railway tanker vessel sustaining 
the explosion with respect to a potential target (vulnerable structure or 
future safety barrier). The position of vessel centre will substantially in-
fluence the thermal radiation incident on a roadside target. The orienta-
tion will determine the most probable movement trajectories of vessel 
fragments. 
3. The prediction of the position can be subdivided into the prediction of 
three circumstantial characteristics: longitudinal and transverse rest posi-
tions of the vessel with respect to road centreline or other longitudinal 
reference line as well as departure angle of the tank. These three charac-
teristics are uncertain quantities and uncertainty related to them must be 
modelled by means probability distributions. Some of these distributions 
can be fitted to statistical data; others will have to be specified subjec-
tively in line with the principles of QRA. 
4. Any systematic set of data on the position of tanker vessels which sus-
tained BLEVEs is not available or, at least, accessible. BLEVEs on road 
and rail are relatively rare, unexpected and short-lasting events. Howev-
er, data on transverse rest position and departure angles can be gained 
from accidents which were precursors of BLEVEs or accidents of non-
explosive tanks which were similar to tanks capable to cause BLEVEs. 
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5. It was possible to extract such data from reports on past road tanker ac-
cidents presented in the mass-media and the internet. Data on 151 road 
tanker accident collected from these sources allowed us to fit a logistic 
probability distribution for the transverse rest position and to establish 
empirical probability distribution for the departure angle. The stochastic 
dependence between these two circumstantial characteristics is weak, 
albeit statistically significant. 
6. A probabilistic modelling of the tanker vessel rest position along a road 
segment, from which BLEVE can affect a vulnerable roadside object, is 
problematic in terms of data. Such a road segment will be relatively 
short and data on tank accidents in this or similar segments will hardly 
be available. Consequently, the probability distribution of the longitudi-
nal rest position will have to be chosen subjectively. Methods of the 
specification of subjective probabilities and probability distributions de-
veloped and widely applied in the field of QRA can be used for the 
modelling of the longitudinal rest position. 
7. The design of a safety barrier aimed at protection against effects from a 
BLEVE will require to assess the impact of fragments of a cylindrical 
tanker vessel on the barrier. The fragment impact can be assessed by 
means of the deterministic models developed in the field of industrial 
safety. These models are suitable to extend the probabilistic modelling 
of the tanker vessel position and orientation. An application of the frag-
ment impact models must include a quantification of uncertainties relat-
ed to their input variables and, if necessary, parameters. This will allow 
to incorporate them into the framework of QRA. 
8. An assessment of thermal effects induced by a BLEVE fireball on a 
roadside target will require to simulate the position of tanker vessel with 
respect to the target. This simulation can be supplemented by a computa-
tion of the heat flux (thermal radiation) generated by the fireball. The 
heat flux can be estimated in given points on the surface of the roadside 
object and for a given position of the vessel sustaining a BLEVE. 
9. The dimensions of the fireballs, which will be generated by BLEVEs of 
typical road and railway tanker vessels, will be large. They can be up to 
300 m tall. Therefore, an effective protection of roadside objects by 
wall-shaped barriers and soil embankments will be impossible. The pro-
tection can be achieved by providing sufficiently large separation dis-
tances between the road (railway tracks) and the vulnerable roadside ob-
ject. A thermal shielding of the roadside object can also be applied, 
because duration of BLEVE fireballs is short and typically does not ex-
ceed 20 seconds. 
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3. Proposals for the design of safety 
barriers aimed at protection of 
roadside property 
The third chapter formulates a series of proposals to the design of safety barriers 
aimed at protection of roadside objects against thermal and mechanical effects of 
BLEVEs on road and rail. The first proposal considers the sitting of barriers in 
the area of potential construction and choosing the horizontal configuration for 
them. The second proposal deals with a design of a steel barrier intended for a 
protection of blast loading and fragment impact from a railway tanker BLEVE. 
It is demonstrated how to design the barrier using methods of SRA and QRA. 
The design is based on a utilisation of a small-size sample of blast loading char-
acteristics. The third proposal consists in recommendations of how to design a 
reinforced concrete barrier capable to sustain impact by fragments from a tanker 
vessel. All three proposals are expressed in the form of technical design solu-
tions. A detailed dimensioning of the barriers is not considered. The third chap-
ter presents the results of investigation published by Vaidogas and Linkutė 
(2012), Linkutė et al. (2013) and Vaidogas et al. (2013). 
 
3.1. The scope of barrier design 
 
A safety barrier must separate a vulnerable object from a potential explosion or 
fire which produce effects capable to damage the object. Safety barriers can be 
deployed to provide structural protection against blast loading and projectile 
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impact. To a certain degree, safety barriers are suitable to mitigate the level of 
thermal radiation generated by fires occurring during a hazmat transportation. 
Blast loading, fragment impact and thermal radiation may occur in combination 
during BLEVE accidents. A barrier deployed to protect roadside property must 
be designed to provide a maximum mitigation of these three effects. 
The cost of rigid, non-destructible barriers is often prohibitive and a 
significant mitigation of blast and impact loading can be achieved using 
relatively lightweight frangible or sacrificial barriers (Bogosian and Piepenburg 
2002). The energy of blast loading can be absorbed by lightweight systems used 
as sacrificial cladding. They can be mounted on the front of a non-sacrificial 
structure which will be a component of a blast wall (Guruprasad and Mukherjee 
2000ab; Hanssen et al. 2002; Juocevičius 2011). 
The process of barrier design can be subdivided into three subsequent tasks: 
1. Sitting the barrier within available area between roadside object(s) to be 
protected and potential centre of fire and/or explosion on road or rail. 
2. Choice of barrier material (usually steel or reinforced concrete). Soil 
embankment and large separation distance can also be considered as op-
tions of barrier design. 
3. Design of individual barrier elements (e.g., sacrificial cladding, support-
ing structure, barrier segments made of reinforced concrete). 
The remainder of this chapter describes considerations on how these three 
tasks could be solved. 
 
3.2. Sitting the barrier 
 
3.2.1. Determination of an unsafe road segment 
 
3.2.1.1. Geometry of an unsafe area 
 
There are two obvious geometric factors which can influence the degree of dam-
age to a roadside object from an accidental explosion on road, namely, distance 
from road to target object and relief of the terrain where the explosion can occur. 
The role of a large distance in minimising effects of a violent release of energy 
during an explosion is obvious. However, these effects can be enhanced or re-
duced if the explosion will take place on a road built on embankment or in cut-
ting, respectively (e.g., Elvik et al. 2009). 
Road segments located at large distances from the target object are natural-
ly safe. When the road comes closer to the object, the distance alone may be 
insufficient to ensure safety and a safety barrier may be required to protect the 
target object. The configuration of the barrier in the roadside terrain will directly 
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depend on the layout of the road segment where the explosion can occur and a 
safety distance around the target object. 
In the safety engineering, the terms “safety distance” and “separation dis-
tance” are used to denote a distance at which a hazard source can be placed and 
after an accident causes no destruction or risk of any kind to living beings and 
their facilities (EIGA 2007; Marangon et al. 2007; Bangash 2009; Cozzani et al. 
2009). In what follows the term “safety distance” will be applied to a minimum 
separation between an explosion on road (near the road) and a roadside object 
which will mitigate explosion effects and prevent damage to the object. Such 
effects can be air blast, fireball, primary and secondary projectiles (e.g., Casal 
2008). The above definition of the safety distance expresses only a general idea. 
A mathematical definition of this term will require to characterise it in a more 
precise way (see the subsequent subsection ”Dealing with uncertainties ...“). 
Safety distances plotted in all directions around the target object will form a 
perimeter of an unsafe zone (zone Ω, say) (Fig. 3.1). Safety distances can be 
significantly directional and so the layout of the unsafe zone Ω can be fairly 
complex. Relief around the target object and incursions of the road into envi-
ronment (embankments and cuttings) may contribute to this complexity. 
 
Fig. 3.1. Safety distance ∆, unsafe zone Ω and unsafe road segment ω at different 
configurations of the target object: a) above-ground pipeline or other energy supply line; 
b) circular storage tank; c) storage tanks arranged in a row 
In a somewhat idealised case of one or several structures having relatively 
simple geometry in plan, the safety distance can be expressed by a single varia-
ble ∆. In such a case the unsafe zone Ω will be either a land strip along a linear 
structure (e.g., pipeline or power transmission line, Fig. 3.1a) or a circle around 
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a cylindrical structure (e.g., a storage tank, Fig. 3.1b) or an area with a relatively 
simple shape along several similar structures built in a row (Fig. 3.1c). 
An intersection of the unsafe zone Ω by road network will form a road 
segment from which an accidental explosion can damage the target object. This 
segment will be denoted by the symbol ω and called the unsafe road segment 
(Fig. 3.1). The area ω can be interpreted as a set of explosion centre positions x 
= (x1, x2) defined in a coordinate system {0; x1, x2} which is fixed, for instance, 
to the target object. Clearly, an explosion can occur also outside the road surface 
denoted by ω. For example, a road tanker BLEVE may happen after a tank vehi-
cle is involved in a traffic accident, departs from the road surface and encroaches 
on the roadside territory inside the zone Ω. Generally the position of a potential 
accidental explosion on road, x, is uncertain. A bivariate probability density 
function f(x) is a natural means for quantifying this uncertainty (Vaidogas et al. 
2012ab). It is evident that the density f(x) must be defined on the zone Ω and not 
only on the segment ω. 
With the coordinate system introduced above, the direction of incidence of 
explosion effects can be expressed through the position of explosion centre x 
(Fig. 3.1b). Then the safety distance can be formulated, where appropriate, as a 
function of an incidence angle ϕ, in brief, ∆ϕ. The angle ϕ is determined by the 
explosion position x and can be related to the coordinate system {0; x1, x2} or 
principal axes of an individual target structure (Fig. 3.1bc). The safety distance 
can be a directional quantity even in the case of the cylindrical tank structures 
shown in Fig. 3.1b. Piping and other system components are attached to the 
tanks only in one or several points and so cylindrical structures can in some di-
rections be more vulnerable than in others. 
An individual structure or a set of structures built close together can be very 
irregular in plan. Safety distances ∆ϕ estimated for such structures can be highly 
directional and a corresponding unsafe zone Ω indicate an irregular layout. 
However, a road segment ω within such an area will in many cases have a regu-
lar layout (Fig. 3.2a). 
 
3.2.1.2. Dealing with uncertainties in specifying the unsafe road 
segment 
 
Factors determining safety distances around hazardous stationary equipment are 
more or less obvious and well-documented (e.g., EIGA 2007; Marangon et al. 
2007). A determination of safety distances in the case where the hazard source 
(vehicle with an explosion potential) is moving in a relative vicinity of a target 
object involves several aggravating factors: 
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Fig. 3.2. The area A0 available for sitting the barrier between road and target object(s): a) 
A0 formed by the unsafe zone with irregular shape around the target objects “1” to “3” 
and the areas A1 and A2 in which a barrier construction is prohibited; b) the choice 
between two barriers in a flat horizontal area A0; c) and d) sitting the barrier by taking 
into account the influence of the relief on attenuation or strengthening of explosion 
effects 
1. The possibility of several explosions of different nature within the same 
road segment ω (e.g., road tanker BLEVE and detonation of the load of 
explosive material). 
2. Uncertainty related to characteristics of specific explosion (e.g., orienta-
tion and tonnage of a liquefied gas tank at the instant of BLEVE). 
3. Uncertain position of explosion centre x within or near ω and variability 
in features of the territory between the position x and target object. 
4. The possibility of different degree of damage to the target object which 
can be caused by explosion of a specific type. 
An estimation of the safety distance for all possible combinations of the 
aforementioned factors is a challenging task. It will become simpler by estimat-
ing the distance for a discrete set of values of the incidence angle ϕ. The task 
can also be simplified by taking into account the fact that variety of accidental 
explosions on road is not wide. The safety distance can be estimated for each 
type of probable explosion and the most conservative value assumed as ∆ϕ. 
Generally, an explosion related to the direction ϕ and represented by the 
random event Eϕ can lead to some number of outcomes Oϕr with the outcome 
likelihoods P(Oϕr | Eϕ)×L(Eϕ), where P(Oϕr | Eϕ) is the conditional probability of 
Oϕr given Eϕ and L(Eϕ) is the likelihood of Eϕ. Alternative accident scenarios 
leading to different outcomes Oϕr are related to different degrees of damage to 
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the target object. Outcome severity can be expressed by the vector sϕr = (s1ϕr, 
s2ϕr, …, ssϕr, …) including lost money, lost time, number of fatalities, etc. and 
related to specific direction ϕ and accident scenario r (Kumamoto 2007; 
Zavadskas and Vaidogas 2009). With the above accident characteristics, the 
direction ϕ can be associated with the risk profile 
 Riskϕ ≡ {(P(Oϕr | Eϕ)×L(Eϕ), sϕr) r = 1, 2, … , nϕ} (3.1) 
where nϕ is the number of accident scenarios associated with ϕ. The above ex-
pression of risk posed a potential explosion is well-known in the field of QRA 
applied to technologies involving fire and explosion hazards (e.g., Aven and 
Vinnem 2007; Vinnem 2007). The risk expressed by Eq. (3.1) presents diverse 
and comprehensive information, especially if the vector sϕr has more than one 
component. It is difficult to specify the safety distance ∆ϕ on the basis of such 
information. In the case where the list of components ns of sϕr is identical for all 
r, the risk can be expressed in a more concise form, namely, through the vector 
of expected severities: 
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Decisions concerning ∆ϕ can be made on the basis of this vector. The 
simple decision rule is to choose such ∆ϕ which corresponds to expected 
severities ϕss  satisfying the inequalities tolss ss ,≤ϕ  for all s, where tolss ,  is a 
tolerable value of ϕss . In brief, one can write 
 ∆ϕ = } ,)(|min{ , sss tolss ∀≤∆∆ ϕ  (3.3) 
where ∆ is used as an optimisation (design) variable. Estimation of the expected 
severities ϕss  and specification of the corresponding tolerable values tolss ,  for a 
given incidence direction ϕ can be a non-trivial task. In addition, this estimation 
must be carried out repeatedly until a satisfactory value of ∆ϕ is found. 
The task of estimating the expected severities can be sidestepped in the case 
where all accident scenarios include the same random damage event D which 
can escalate into the outcomes Oϕr. Examples of D are relatively simple events: 
1. Toxic release due to loss of containment by a storage tank or rupture of a 
pipeline in consequence of an explosion. 
2. Ignition of flammable material released due to mechanical and thermal 
effects of an explosion. 
3. Interruption to service of a critical infrastructure (e.g., energy transporta-
tion system) due to explosive damage. 
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If D can be specified for a given target object, the conditional probability 
P(D | Eϕ) can be estimated and ∆ϕ chosen as a distance for which P(D | Eϕ) does 
not exceed some tolerable value Ptol: 
 ∆ϕ = }) ,|(|min{ tolPEDP ≤∆∆ ϕ  (3.4) 
where P(D | Eϕ, ∆) denotes the damage probability expressed as a function of the 
optimisation variable ∆. 
The decision rules given by Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4) are analogous to the prob-
lem of a reliability-based structural optimisation, in which a tolerable failure 
probability must be specified or, in other words, the problem “how safe is safe 
enough” solved (e.g., Lemaire 2009). Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4) yield a fixed value of 
∆ϕ although this value is obtained by carrying out a probabilistic analysis, that is, 
an estimation of the damage probability P(D | Eϕ, ∆) (Fig. 3.3a). 
 
Fig. 3.3. Two approaches to a specification of the safety distance ∆ϕ: a) specification of 
a fixed value of ∆ϕ based on a tolerable value Ptol of the damage probability P(D | Eϕ); 
b) specification of ∆ϕ based on a fixed tolerable value of explosion effect and yielding a 
boundary of the unsafe zone Ω defined by a percentile ∆ϕα of ∆ϕ 
An estimation of P(D | Eϕ, ∆) is a problem of a reliability-based structural 
analysis (RBSA). There is vast literature on a deterministic analysis and design 
of structures for explosive actions, to say nothing of the literature devoted to the 
design for fire actions (e.g., CPR 2005; Bangash and Bangash 2006; Bangash 
2009). However, RBSA applications to assessing specific explosive damage to 
large, real-world structures (not individual structural elements) are limited and 
not systematized in widely known documents. The estimation of P(D | Eϕ, ∆) is 
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possible in theory by applying sophisticated methodology of RBSA. In practice, 
such estimation will require highly specific statistical data used to feed models 
developed for predicting explosion effects and describing interaction of complex 
structures with these effects. This data can be inaccessible to the designer (land 
use planner). Our impression is that in some highly specific cases the aforemen-
tioned data and models may not be available at all. 
In the case where the damage event D can be caused by air blast only and D 
expressed by broad categories of explosive damage to buildings or industrial 
installations (minor damage, major damage, collapse), the probability 
P(D | Eϕ, ∆) can be approximately estimated with relative ease using simple em-
pirical models (probit functions) given in such documents as the Green book 
published by a Dutch organisation TNO (CPD 1992; CPR 2005). The event D 
can be associated with damage levels represented by either overpressure levels 
of incident shock wave, 0pˆ , or iso-damage diagrams (incident pressure-impulse 
diagrams or, in brief, p0-i0 diagrams). Overpressure levels 0pˆ  were chosen em-
pirically and p0-i0 iso-curves were developed both empirically and analytically 
for typical structural elements. The safety distance ∆ϕ corresponding to given 
values of 0pˆ  and regions of p0-i0 plots can be traced back from the models 
which relate values 0pˆ  and pairs (p0, i0) to explosion characteristics (e.g., 
Krauthammer 2008). Schematically these models can be represented by the 
functions 
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where e is the explosion energy (mass of explosives) and pi and pi are the scalar 
variable and vector used to express uncertainty in (inaccuracy of) the models 
ψ(⋅) and ψ(⋅), respectively. 
A solution of Eqs. (3.5) for given values of 0pˆ , (p0, i0), pi and pi will yield a 
fixed value of the safety distance ∆ϕ. However, the deterministic application of 
ψ(⋅) and ψ(⋅) is questionable due to at least two reasons: 
1. The energy (mass) e and inaccuracy measures pi and pi will be uncertain 
in many practical applications; the uncertainty in e, pi and pi is quantified 
by means of random variables, say, random variables e~  and pi~  and vec-
tor of random variables, pi~  (e.g., Aven and Zio 2011). 
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2. The damage levels D are represented by intervals of 0pˆ  and areas of 
pairs (p0, i0) in the incident pressure-impulse diagrams; the distance ∆ϕ 
can be determined with most conservative values of 0pˆ  and (p0, i0) re-
lated to specific damage level; however, this conservative approach is 
not automatically justified and so 0pˆ  and (p0, i0) related to specific dam-
age level should be considered uncertain. 
Even though the quantities on the left-hand side of Eqs. (3.5) are fixed, the 
safety distance ∆ϕ will be a function of random variables and so a random varia-
ble itself: 
 ),| ( 01 piϕ ~~ˆ epψ∆ −=  (3.6a) 
 ),| ,( 001 pi~~eip∆ −= ψϕ  (3.6b) 
where )(1 ⋅−ψ  and )(1 ⋅−ψ  denote the inverse functions of ψ(⋅) and ψ(⋅), respective-
ly. A probability density function of ∆ϕ can be estimated by means of Monte 
Carlo simulation. With the random safety distances ∆ϕ, the unsafe zone Ω will 
be fuzzy (uncertain) and its boundary can be specified by means of conservative 
percentiles ∆ϕα of ∆ϕ as shown in Fig. 3.3b. 
The two approaches to the specification of the safety distances ∆ϕ illustrated 
in Fig. 3.3 present two alternative ways of defining the unsafe zone Ω. The spec-
ification of ∆ϕ by estimating the damage probabilities P(D | Eϕ, ∆) is applicable 
to all types of explosion accidents and consistent in terms of uncertainty quanti-
fication and propagation. However, such specification can be difficult to imple-
ment. The specification of ∆ϕ on the basis of the overpressure levels 0pˆ  and iso-
damage (p0-i0) diagrams is significantly simpler; however, it is applicable only 
to specific accidents and broad damage categories caused by these accidents. 
An estimation of the safety distance ∆ϕ for fires will be somewhat simpler 
than for explosions. The distance ∆ϕ can be determined by using criteria of 
thermal damage given in such documents as the guidelines CCPS (2005a). 
Methods developed for modelling thermal radiation of pool fires and BLEVE 
fireballs can be applied to relate ∆ϕ to a radiation intensity which can be tolerat-
ed by a roadside object subjected to a fire on road (e.g., Casal 2008). 
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3.2.2. Barrier configuration within an available area 
 
The terrain physically available for barrier construction can be restricted by fac-
tors of very different nature: 
1. Land ownership. 
2. Legal requirements and regulations (e.g., prohibition of construction in 
the immediate vicinity of the road, say, in the area A1 shown in 
Fig. 3.2a). 
3. Configuration of facility involving the target object. 
4. Irregular relief of the terrain and problematic geological conditions. 
5. Architectural and aesthetical considerations. 
In some cases restrictions posed by land ownership or construction regula-
tions may force the owner of the facility at risk to built a barrier along the pe-
rimeter of the facility or even inside its territory. In such cases little space may 
be left for a barrier configuration in plan. In other cases, some area for barrier 
sitting, say, A0, will be available. The area A0 will form a part of the unsafe zone 
Ω and lie between two areas A1 and A2 in which the construction is either prohib-
ited or impossible (Fig. 3.2a). The area along the road, A1, can be required or 
recommended by regulations of road construction. For instance, a Lithuanian 
road regulation recommends 3-15 m wide clear strips alongside the roads with 
70-130 km/h speed limits (KTR 2008). The opposite restricting area A2 can be 
formed by installations surrounding the target object, for instance, diked area 
around storage tanks. 
If the area A0 is sufficiently wide to attenuate explosion effects (air blast, 
projectiles, thermal radiation), positioning the barrier may face at least three 
different situations: 
1. If A0 is flat and horizontal, the barrier can be deployed in any position 
within available space (Fig. 3.2b). The barrier built in the vicinity of the 
road (barrier B1) will have to be strong enough to resist the so-called lo-
cal explosion (e.g., Bulson 1997). The barrier sited in front of the area 
A2 (barrier B2) will have sustain a generally weaker distant “free field” 
explosion. The barrier B1 can be lower than B2 to provide protection 
against an impact by projectiles generated, for instance, by a road tanker 
BLEVE. 
2. If A0 is a sufficiently steep slope or even a banquette going upwards in 
relation to the road, the inclined A0 will attenuate air-blast and catch 
some of projectiles as shown in Fig. 3.2c (Gebbeken and Döge 2010). In 
such a case it makes sense to build the barrier in front of the area A2 (i.e., 
barrier B2 in Fig. 2c). 
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3. In case where A0 is a relatively steep downward slope, explosion effects 
will have favourable conditions to propagate towards the target object 
(Fig. 3.2d). Such surface will create the conditions for an explosion 
which can be considered intermediate between near-surface and open air 
explosion (e.g., Bulson 1997). In this case a sound decision is to build 
the barrier in front of the area A1 (i.e., barrier B1 in Fig. 3.2d). 
A sufficiently wide space between the areas A1 and A2 opens up a possibil-
ity to give the barrier different forms in plan. The simplest and probably cheap-
est to build will be a straight barrier often called the blast wall (Fig. 3.4a). If the 
barrier will have to resist very intense explosion effects, it can be shaped as “an 
arrow headed bastion” (Fig. 3.4bc). Such a shape allows to increase the potential 
angle at which air-blast and projectiles will be reflected by the barrier. 
 
Fig. 3.4. Possibilities of a horizontal configuration of a barrier in the available area A0: a) 
straight single-segment barrier (“blast wall”); b) two-segment (“arrow headed”) barrier; 
c) multi-segment barrier (“arrow headed bastion”) 
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The type of structural material, vertical section and protective capacity of a 
barrier do not need to be constant along its length. Individual barrier segments 
may differ substantially according to the demand for protective capacity. In the 
case where characteristics of explosion or fire do not depend on the position of 
vehicle within the unsafe road segment ω, this demand will be governed mainly 
by the distance between the target object and ω as well as the position of barrier 
within the area A0. 
Effectiveness of a safety barrier can be very limited when it comes to pro-
tecting against a BLEVE fireball. The height and diameter of a fireball generated 
during a road tanker BLEVE may exceed 100 m (Casal 2008). In the case where 
the horizontal distance between BLEVE and target object is small, a barrier pro-
tecting against blast and projectiles will not be able to stop thermal radiation. 
Consequently, shielding from thermal radiation should be provided in addition 
to the barrier. Such a case will be illustrated by an example presented in the next 
section. 
 
3.2.3. A practical application 
 
The roadside object to be protected by a future safety barrier consists of three 
cylindrical reservoirs built in an oil transhipment facility located on the shore in 
the main sea port of Lithuania (Fig. 3.5, see also Figs. 2.12 and 2.13). The reser-
voirs can be damaged by fire or explosion of a tank vehicle on a two-lane public 
road going along the perimeter of the facility. The speed limit on this road is 
70 km/h. The terrain schematically depicted in Fig. 3.5 is flat and horizontal. 
No land acquisition is planned by facility owners and so the barrier is to be 
built inside the fenced perimeter of the facility. The area available for barrier 
construction, A0, will be partially restricted by a 4 m clear strip alongside the 
road, A1, recommended in a Lithuanian road regulation (KTR 2008). On the op-
posite side, A0 will border the rectangular area A2 where the barrier construction 
is prohibited due to technological reasons. 
In order to keep the area occupied and obstructed by the barrier at a mini-
mum, this structure should have the form of a wall and can either be built along 
the facility perimeter (points B1 to B6, Fig. 3.5) or correspond with the contour 
of the area A2 (points C1 to C3, Fig. 3.5). Barriers sited in these two alternative 
positions will be called barrier “B” and barrier “C” and, for brevity, the word 
“barrier” will be skipped in some cases. 
Barrier “C” lies farther away from the road than barrier “B”. However, the 
distance between them is relatively small, especially between barrier segments 
protecting the 1st reservoir. Thus the position of “C” is not much better than the 
one of “B” in terms of a larger separation from a potential explosion or fire. 
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Fig. 3.5. The situation of a potential explosion on road and a roadside object to be 
protected by a safety barrier 
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Cross-sectional shape and distribution of protective capacity along the axes 
of “B” and “C” can be chosen by applying methods of structural optimisation. 
Different variants of “B” and “C” can be designed and the best one selected by 
means of formal methods of MCDM (Vaidogas 2007c; Zavadskas and Vaidogas 
2009). However, pros and cons of “B” and “C” can be weighted before the op-
timisation. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 list advantages and disadvantages of “B” and “C”, 
respectively, for the case where the barriers have to protect the facility not only 
against BLEVE but also against pool fire and formation of vapour cloud with 
subsequent flash fire or explosion. One can conclude at this stage of barrier de-
sign that, at least arithmetically, barrier “B” “overweights” barrier “C”. 
The position of endpoints of barriers “B” and “C” was chosen by introduc-
ing an unsafe road segment ω in the manner shown in Fig. 1c. The outermost 
points of ω, D1 and D3, correspond to a safety distance ∆ which is approximately 
equal to 125 m (Fig. 3.5). Two lines connecting D1 and D3 to the point D2 are 
tangents to the 3rd reservoir. These lines show two extreme trajectories of projec-
tiles which can be ejected by an explosion on road and collide with the reser-
voirs. The barriers can be ended where they intersect the line segments D1–D2 
and D2–D3. 
The safety distance ∆ used in this example is hypothetical and serves as an 
illustration. Generally, ∆ should be estimated by solving the optimisation prob-
lem given by Eq. (3.4). The random damage event D in this problem is a loss of 
containment by at least one of the reservoirs. If the reservoirs are nominally 
identical, the distance ∆ can be estimated only for one of them and the unsafe 
zone Ω plotted as shown in Fig. 3.1c. 
An estimation of the damage probability P(D | Eϕ, ∆) in Eq. (3.4) is a non-
trivial task, especially for such a complex event as BLEVE. A solution of this 
task requires a great deal of space and is beyond the scope of this study. At pre-
sent one can only say that the estimation of P(D | Eϕ, ∆) may face two problems: 
scarcity of data on effects of fires and/or explosions recorded during/after past 
accidents and need to predict these effects and response of reservoirs to them by 
means of models which are not necessarily very accurate. The best way to deal 
with these problems is an application of methods based on the Bayesian statisti-
cal theory and widely used for QRA (Juocevičius and Vaidogas 2010;Vaidogas 
2003, 2006a, 2007a, 2009; Vaidogas and Juocevičius 2007, 2008a, 2009). 
If designed properly, barriers “B” and “C” will protect the reservoirs 
against effects of blast and projectiles. They can provide also protection against 
pool fire and flash fire, both preceded by accidental release of flammable liquid 
or gas from a road tank. However, such event as a road tanker BLEVE will gen-
erate a fireball, the height of which may considerably exceed the height of “B” 
and “C”. 
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Table 3.1. List of advantages of the barriers “B” and “C” 
Barrier “B” (points B1 to B6, Fig. 3.5) 
▪ Protects larger area of the facility than barrier “C”. 
▪ Can serve as vehicle barrier (anti-ram wall) if so designed (barrier segment B2 to 
B5 should be capable to resist vehicular impact). 
▪ Can prevent a vapour cloud accidentally released from a tank vehicle from en-
croaching on the facility area along the line B1–B6 in order to avoid a Viareggio-
type accident (Pontigia et al. 2011). 
▪ Can prevent a pool of flammable liquid accidentally discharged from a tank 
vehicle in the vicinity of the segment B3–B4 from encroaching on the facility area. 
▪ Can be lower than “C”, especially in the segment B3–B4 due to reasons ex-
plained in Fig. 3.2b. 
▪ Can safely collapse onto the area A0 and so can be designed as a sacrificial bar-
rier (Krauthammer 2008). 
▪ The space behind “B” is available to provide counterforts, if necessary. 
▪ Does not restrict access to the technological area A2. 
▪ May serve as a part of perimeter fencing. 
▪ Construction of “B” should not hinder technological activities in the area A2. 
Barrier “C” (points C1 to C3, Fig. 3.5) 
▪ Can serve as an “arrow headed” barrier with a knee joint in point C2 which is 
closest to the turn of the road. 
▪ If designed taller than “B”, provides larger area of shielding against thermal 
radiation. 
▪ Will not reduce visibility at the turn of the road. 
 
Table 3.2. List of disadvantages of the barriers “B” and “C” 
Barrier “B” (points B1 to B6, Fig. 3.5) 
▪ Must have higher resistance than “C”, especially in the segment B3–B4. 
▪ Can hinder visibility on the road along the segment B3–B4. 
▪ Provides little of its surface for a reflection of blast and projectiles at large an-
gles. 
Barrier “C” (points C1 to C3, Fig. 3.5) 
▪ Protects the technological area A2 only. 
▪ Can not be designed as a “sacrificial barrier” if a collapse onto the technological 
area is not allowed. 
▪ The space behind “C” is limited to provide counterforts. 
▪ Will not prevent vapour cloud or pool of flammable liquid accidentally released 
from a tank vehicle from an encroaching on the facility territory. 
▪ Construction of “B” can hinder technological activities in the area A2. 
 
Characteristics of the fireball can be estimated by simple deterministic 
models (e.g., Casal 2008). For instance, if a typical LPG semi-trailer with a vol-
ume of 56 m3, 85% of which are filled with propane, is heated by a fire to 55 °C 
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(approximately 19 bar) and bursts, the mass of fuel involved in the fireball will 
be 23 800 kg. Estimates of fireball diameter and height of its centre are 167 m 
and 125 m, respectively. The duration of the fireball will be around 11 seconds. 
If the centre of BLEVE will be in the point E1, which is placed only 40 m apart 
from the 1st reservoir, the fireball will fully cover the 1st reservoir and partially 
the 2nd reservoir (Fig. 3.5). Thermal radiation of the fireball on the top edge of 
the 1st reservoir (point E2) is 38.5 kW/m2. Such a radiation can damage the res-
ervoirs (CCPS 2005a). A thermal shielding of these structures must be provided 
because barriers “B” and “C” will not adequately protect against thermal radia-
tion coming from the altitude far above the ground surface. 
 
3.3. Design of barrier with sacrificial cladding 
 
3.3.1. Failure probability of sacrificial cladding as a measure 
of damage degree 
 
In the case where all individual components of SC are nominally identical or a 
continuous SC can be discretised notionally into nominally identical compo-
nents, a different number of them will fail (will be “sacrificed”) at different in-
tensities of reflected blast wave. Characteristics of a pressure history of this 
wave can be represented by a ny-dimensional vector y with the components y1, 
y2, y3, … , yny  expressing overpressure, positive duration, impulse, etc. (ny  ≥ 1). 
Then the relative number of the failed components and so the degree of damage 
to SC can be estimated by a conditional probability of failure of an individual 
component: 
 )()(f y|y ii DPP U=  (3.5) 
where Di is the random event of damage to an SC component related to the fail-
ure mode i (the ith damage event, in brief). The function Pf(y) is known in SRA 
and QRA as a fragility function and its arguments y are called the demand varia-
bles (e.g., Bah et al. 2005; Langdom et al. 2010). 
If the blast wave characteristics are uncertain and represented by a random 
vector Y, the unconditional probability of SC component failure, Pf, can be 
expressed as a mean value of the fragility function Pf(⋅) with a random 
arguments Y, namely, 
 ))((d)()( f
all ff
Yyyy Yy Y PEfPP == ∫  (3.6) 
where fY(y) is the joint probability density function of Y. Eq. (3.6) is a standard 
definition of a failure probability widely used in SRA. The problem of estimat-
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ing Pf for blast loading generated by an accidental explosion is that statistical 
data for fitting the model fY(y) will typically be unavailable. However, Pf can be 
estimated with a small-size sample consisting of observations yj of Y obtained by 
experiment (Vaidogas 2007a). Let this sample be 
 y = {y1, y2, … , yj, … , yn} (3.7) 
Elements of y can be transformed into fragility function values Pf(yj) and a 
new, artificial sample {Pf(y1), Pf(y2), … , Pf(yj), … , Pf(yn)} formed. The latter 
sample can be used to compute a bootstrap confidence interval []0, fP  for Pf. The 
closer is the upper limit fP  to unity, the larger number of SC components should 
be expected to be lost in case of an explosion. Consequently, fP  can be used as a 
conservative measure of the damage to a blast wall. 
The interval estimate []0, fP  comes from the classical, Fisherian statistics. If 
necessary, the sample y can be used to estimate Pf in a Bayesian format, namely, 
by a conservative percentile of a posterior distribution obtained by applying y 
(Vaidogas 2009; Vaidogas and Juocevičius 2009; Juocevičius 2011). 
The form of the sample y assumes that there are no uncertainties in the data 
yj. This assumption may not be correct in a number of cases. For example, if the 
blast wave characteristics are not directly recorded in experiment but are 
obtained by means of a mathematical modelling, the elements of y can be 
uncertain (fuzzy). Uncertainty in an individual element of y, say, the element j 
can be quantified by an epistemic probability distribution with the density fj(y) 
(Yang and Fallah 2011). A one-dimensional visualisation of a crisp and 
uncertain data points yj and fj(y) is shown in Fig. 3.6. The interval estimation of 
Pf is possible also with the uncertain, as shown in the next section. 
 
3.3.2. Dealing with uncertainties in the mechanical model of 
sacrificial cladding 
 
In the case where the damage event(s) Di are backed by the model(s) mi, the fra-
gility function Pf(y) can be expressed as 
 0))),((()(f ≤= θ|yZy ii mPP U  (3.8) 
where Z is the vector of random input variables; θ is the vector of parameters of 
the model of mi(⋅). The random safety margin mi(Z, y | θ) is a standard function 
of SRA, in which the vector Z and so the function mi express the stochastic un-
certainty. The uncertainty modelling prevailing in QRA requires to consider an 
epistemic uncertainty related to the parameter vector θ (e.g., Li et al. 2009). This 
uncertainty can be expressed by a random vector Θ with a joint density pi(θ). 
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One or more components of Θ can be used to express uncertainty in the accura-
cy of the model mi(⋅). One can interpret the epistemic density pi(θ) as a prior 
distribution which can be updated, at least in theory, given a new data. Then the 
posterior density will have the form pi(θ | data). 
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Fig. 3.6. A schematic illustration of the epistemic uncertainty in the value of the fragility 
function )(f y~P  
With the random parameter vector Θ, the fragility function P(Di | y) 
becomes an epistemic random variable defined as 
 0)))|,((()()( ff ≤== ΘyZ|yy~ ii mPPP UΘ  (3.9) 
An illustration of the random fragility function )(f y~P  is shown in Fig. 3.6. 
This illustration assumes that the vector y has only one component, for instance, 
the positive overpressure of the reflected blast wave. 
The typical approach to dealing with epistemic uncertainties in fragility 
functions is establishing confidence bounds around the point estimates of 
fragility curve or median fragilities (e.g., Boh et al. 2005). Most authors 
consider the confidence bounds as the final result of analysis. However, a further 
propagation of the epistemic uncertainty quantified by Θ is necessary to estimate 
the failure probability Pf. In case where the explosion demand y is represented 
by the small-size sample y, the estimation of Pf can be expressed as an 
estimation of a mean of fragility function values with uncertain (fuzzy) data 
)(f jP y
~
 (j = 1, 2, … , n). Such data can be used for updating a Bayesian prior 
distribution expressing epistemic uncertainty in Pf (Vaidogas 2009). However, if 
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a development of a prior for Pf is problematic or there is no interest in the 
Bayesian estimation of Pf, the failure probability can be estimated by a Fisherian 
confidence interval computed by means of a simulation-based procedure 
explained in the remainder of the present section. 
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Fig. 3.7. The flowchart of estimating the failure probability of the sacrificial cladding, Pf 
An estimate of Pf can be obtained by computing estimates of the fragility 
function values )|(f kjP θy  for all n elements jy  of the sample y  and the values 
θk  of the parameter vector Θ generated from pi(θ) or pi(θ | data) (k = 1, 2, … , N). 
This will require to estimate the fragility function n×N times. The kth loop of the 
estimation of Pf should start from sampling the value θk (Fig. 3.7, Block 1). For 
each θk, the estimates jkpˆ  of )|(f kjP θy  should be computed for all elements of 
y  and grouped into the sample } , ... 2, 1,   ,{ njp jkk == ˆpˆ  (Fig. 3.7, Block 2). An 
illustration of three elements of kpˆ  is given in Fig. 2. The sample kpˆ  can be 
used to calculate a one-sided bootstrap confidence interval []0, kp  for Pf 
(Fig. 3.7, Blocks 3 and 4). A repetition of this process N times will yield a 
sample consisting of N upper limits of the confidence interval, namely, { kp , k = 
1, 2, … , N }(Fig. 3.7, Block 5). This sample will express the epistemic 
uncertainty related to the upper limit of this interval (see the abscissa axis in 
Fig. 2). A conservative percentile of this sample, say, 1)0.9]([ +⋅Np  can be used as 
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the final result of the conservative estimation of the failure probability Pf 
(Fig. 3.7, Block 6). 
In the case of the uncertain data expressed by the densities fj(y), the 
procedure of the estimation of Pf can be applied in a similar way, with the 
difference that some number Nl of the samples yl = {y1l, y2l, … , yjl, … , ynl} will 
have to be sampled from the distributions fj(y) (j = 1, 2, … , n). A one-
dimensional illustration of the sample element yjl is given in Fig. 3.6. The 
procedure shown in Fig. 3.7 should be applied to each yl. A repetition of this 
process Nl times will yield a sample of confidence interval limits, { kp , k = 1, 2, 
… , N×Nl}. A percentile of this sample, say, 1)0.9]([ +⋅⋅ lNNp  may serve as a 
conservative estimate of Pf. Clearly, the estimates 1)0.9]([ +⋅⋅ lNNp  will tend to be 
more conservative than 1)0.9]([ +⋅Np , because the variability of the limits kp  will 
be larger in the former case than in the latter. 
 
3.3.3. Practical application 
 
The estimation of the SC failure probability Pf will be illustrated for a blast wall 
intended to protect against a railway tanker BLEVE. The tank car is used for a 
transportation of liquefied propane. Mechanical effects of BLEVE occur as blast 
and projectiles (Vaidogas and Juocevičius 2007). The present case study will 
consider the blast loading only whereas the protection against projectiles will be 
addressed in brief at the end of this section. 
The object to be protected by the blast wall is a diesel fuel tank (”target”) 
located 63 m from external railway tracks (Fig. 3.8). The worst case scenario 
will be considered, according to which the angle of incidence of the blast wave 
will be equal to 90 degrees (Fig. 3.9). The fuel tank is surrounded by a protective 
embankment used to stabilise the blast wall. The wall is to be built from non-
sacrificial posts and SC consisting of profiled steel sections (Figs. 3.10 and 
3.11). 
48.5
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14.518
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Explosion centreA-A
see Fig. 7
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±0.0
Blast wall
The range of unsafe projectile trajectories
 
Fig. 3.8. The elevation of the accident situation 
3. PROPOSALS FOR THE DESIGN OF SAFETY BARRIERS ... 117 
 
The elements yj = (y1j, y2j) of the sample y will consist of overpressure y1j 
and positive phase duration y2j of the reflected blast wave, respectively. 
Experiments which could yield y are very expensive. Therefore, y was obtained 
by calculation and not by a direct recording yj. The real-world statistical sample 
used in this case study was compiled from 30 data pairs (x1j, x2j), where x1j and 
x2j is weight and pressure of liquefied propane in the tank car j, respectively 
(Table 3.3, Cols. 2 and 3). The pairs (x1j, x2j) were used to calculate the mass of 
trinitrotoluene (TNT) which could cause an explosion with an energy equivalent 
to the energy of BLEVE (Table 3.3, Col. 4) (Vaidogas and Juocevičius 2007). 
The TNT mass and the explosion stand-off equal to 48.5 m were used to 
calculate y1j and y2j by applying a standard empirical model developed for TNT 
(Palanivelu et al. 2010) (Table 3.3, Cols. 5 and 6). 
Target
Blast wall
A
A
Railway tracks
11.2°
Explosion centre
90°
63
Incident blast 
wave
Rigit towers
 
Fig. 3.9. The plan of the potential accident site 
 
Fig. 3.10. Details of the blast wall: a) vertical section; b) profiled steel section; c) view 
from the back showing a safety net; d) plan 
118 3. PROPOSALS FOR THE DESIGN OF SAFETY BARRIERS ... 
 
Table 3.3. Characteristics of the reflected blast wave, y1j and y2j 
j x1j, kg x2j,kPa TNT, kg y1j, kPa y2j, ms 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 60939 2575 83.29 13.51 24.74 
2 57566 2462 90.30 14.04 25.08 
3 57419 2395 77.14 13.04 24.43 
4 59472 2602 99.41 14.69 25.48 
5 54108 2453 73.21 12.72 24.21 
6 56751 2312 66.63 12.18 23.84 
7 61307 2615 71.69 12.60 24.13 
8 59950 2264 89.97 14.01 25.06 
9 55176 2572 74.78 12.85 24.30 
10 58094 2531 73.30 12.73 24.22 
11 57839 2446 83.50 13.53 24.75 
12 58116 2270 52.10 13.42 24.68 
13 57777 2424 83.45 13.52 24.75 
14 60724 2457 79.33 13.21 24.54 
15 56333 2411 77.83 13.09 24.46 
16 55878 2193 71.71 12.60 24.13 
17 59339 1922 64.05 11.96 23.68 
 
Two random damage events D1 and D2 related to the maximum dynamic 
response of profiled sections and backed by the respective safety margins m1 and 
m2 expressed by Eq. (1.3) will be considered. The fragility function Pf(y) will 
have the form )|( 21 yDDP U . The safety margins expressed as functions of 
random variables present in the mechanical model of profiled sections have the 
form 
 11 )|()|,( ypm R −= ΘZΘyZ  (3.10a) 
 )|,()|,()|,(
,,2 ΘyZΘyZΘyZ max dynplpl uum −=  (3.10b) 
where )  , , ,( 4321 ZZZZ=Z  and )  , ... , ,( 521 ΘΘΘ=Θ  are the vectors used to model 
aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, respectively (Table 3.4); )(⋅Rp , upl,max(·) and 
upl,dyn(·) are deterministic functions used to compute quantities given in 
Eqs. (1.3). 
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Table 3.4. Aleatory and epistemic random variables used in the analysis of the blast wall 
under design 
Description and notation 
(notation used this study ≡ notation from the original text 
by Louca et al. (2004)) 
Mean/coeff. 
of variation 
Probability 
distribution 
Aleatory random quantities (components of Z) 
Span (spacing of posts) Z1 ≡ L (m) (see Fig. 3.10d) 2.0/0.005* Lognormal 
Static yield strength of profiled section steel, Z2 ≡ py 
(MPa) 554/0.11
*
 Lognormal 
Modulus of elasticity of profiled section steel, Z3 ≡ E 
(GPa) 200/0.06
*
 Normal 
Natural period of elastic vibration of profiled sections, Z4 
≡ T (ms)
 
3.4/0.05 Normal 
Epistemic random quantities (components of Θ) 
Enhancement factor for steel strength, Θ1 ≡ γ; the uncer-
tainty in Θ1 was modelled by the expression 1 + ∆×ξ** (∆ 
= 0.12) 
1.012/0.011 Beta, ξ ~ Be(1, 9) 
The factor of uncertainty related to the model of ductility 
ratio µ, Θ2 1/0.04 
Normal 
N(1, 0.04) 
Reduction factor for stiffness of profiled sheet, Θ3 ≡ fK; 
the uncertainty in Θ3 was modelled by the expression 1 –
 ∆×ξ*** (∆ = 0.3); the mode of Θ3 is equal to 0.85 
0.85/0.05 Beta, ξ ~ Be(6, 6) 
Reduction factor for transverse stress effect, Θ4  ≡ fC 0.99/0.085 Beta Be(70, 1) 
Reduction factor for flattering of cross-section, Θ5 ≡ fF; 
the uncertainty in Θ5 was modelled by the expression 1 –
 ∆×ξ*** (∆ = 0.2); the mode of Θ5 is equal to 0.952 
0.933/0.038
2 
Beta, 
ξ ~ Be(2, 4) 
*
 Spaethe (1987) 
** This linear transformation is used to obtain a Beta distribution defined on the interval 
]1, 1.12 [ which covers potential values of the strength enhancement factor 
(Juocevičius and Vaidogas 2010) 
*** This linear transformation is used to obtain a Beta distribution defined on the inter-
val [∆, 1] 
 
Probability distributions of the components of Z and Θ were chosen partly 
on the basis of information on natural variability of the quantities used in the 
analysis and partly on the basis of subjective reasoning. Cross-sectional 
dimensions of profiled sections are considered to be fixed (deterministic) 
quantities (Fig. 3.10b). 
The probability distributions of the random variables Z1 to Z3 can be easily 
specified from information on random properties of steel structures (e.g., 
Spaethe 1987). The natural period of elastic vibration, Z4, is considered to be an 
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aleatory quantity because it can be measured experimentally. We assumed the 
nominal value of this period, 3.4 ms, given by Louca et al. (2004) to be a mean 
value of a normal distribution of Z4. The probability distributions of the 
epistemic variables grouped into the vector Θ were used to express uncertainty 
related to parameters of the models pR(·), upl,max(·) and upl,dyn(·). These 
distributions quantify the doubts expressed by Louca et al. (2004) and 
Juocevičius and Vaidogas (2010) about quantities represented by Θ. 
The functions on the right-hand side of Eqs. (9) are based on a mechanical 
model of profiled sections proposed by Louca et al. (2004). The dynamic 
pressure capacity is given by 
 54
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R =ΘZ  (3.11) 
where lE(·) is the effective span; wel is the deterministic elastic section modulus 
depending on the cross-sectional dimensions; l is the cross-sectional width 
(Fig. 3.10b). 
The maximum plastic dynamic deflection capacity is given by 
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where µ(·) is the function used to compute the ductility ratio and given by 
 



= )(
),,,|Z,(
,)|,(
1
543121
4
2
2 yp
ΘΘΘΘZp
Z
yφΘµ
r
RΘYZ  (3.13) 
where φ(·,·) is the function fitted to the graphs developed by Biggs (1964) and 
used for retrieving values of µ(·). 
The dynamic plastic deflection due to the blast load is computed using the 
following expression 
 )(
384
),()()|,( 2
3
11
4
1 yδ
Z
ΘZlyp
u Erdynpl ⋅=ΘyZ,  (3.14) 
where δ(y2) is the dynamic loading factor computed by 
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In the present case study, these ranges of the sample components y1j and y2j 
are [11.6 kPa, 14.4 kPa] and [23.0 ms, 25.8 ms], respectively. An illustration of 
the fragility function )|(f kP θy  estimated for one realisation kθ  of Θ is shown in 
Fig. 3.11. 
Fig. 3.12 shows a histogram of the sample 00}5 , ... 2, 1,   ,{ =kpk  obtained by 
generating 500 values θk and applying the procedure shown in Fig. 3.7 (N = 
500). Exceeding the maximum dynamic plastic deflection (the event D2) was 
dominating failure mode and this failure determined the confidence limits kp . 
The 90th percentile of the above sample, 1)0.9]([ +⋅Np , is equal to 0.263. This value 
is a conservative estimate of the SC failure probability Pf. It means that less than 
26.3% of profiled sections will be destroyed (“sacrificed”) in case of an 
explosion. This percentage can be changed as needed by redesigning SC, say, 
choosing a different profiled section. 
A BLEVE produces high-energy projectiles generated by a rupture of tank 
car vessel (Vaidogas and Juocevičius 2007). It is highly probable that the blast 
wall under study will have to sustain an impact by some of them. Therefore, the 
height of the wall will be governed by unsafe trajectories of potential projectiles 
(Fig. 3.9). The profiled sections will not be able to stop larger projectiles and, in 
our opinion, a safety net should be added behind the cladding (Fig. 3.10c and d). 
The net can be designed to sustain not only primary projectiles from vessel 
rupture but also profiled sections which will fail under blast loading and/or 
projectile impact. The space between cladding and safety net, δnet, should allow 
to reach the maximum dynamic plastic deflection of the profiled sections, upl,max 
(Fig. 3.10d). As this deflection is a random quantity, the value of δnet can be 
chosen by reducing the probability ))|,((
, maxpluP δ≥ΘyZmax  to some small and 
tolerable value. 
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Fig. 3.11. The surface of the fragility function )(f y
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Fig. 3.12. Histogram of the sample 00}5 , ... 2, 1,   ,{ =kpk  
The horizontal cables of the net can span over several posts. Cable ends can 
be anchored in rigid towers distributed along the barrier (Fig. 3.9). Additional 
anchors can be added where the cables cross the posts (Fig. 3.10d). This will add 
extra stability to the posts and so the cladding. However, a detailed design of 
safety net, posts, and towers was beyond the scope of this case study. 
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3.4. Proposals to design of a reinforced concrete 
barrier capable to resist fragment impact 
 
3.4.1. The choice of barrier material 
 
A safety barrier to be built in an industrial area must be relatively cheep and not 
necessarily attractive in the architectural sense. The barrier intended to protect 
roadside property against fragments resulting from a BLEVE on road or rail can 
be built from three obvious materials: reinforced concrete (RC), steel and soil. A 
combination of these materials in one barrier is also possible. An example of 
such a combination is shown in Fig. 3.10. 
An RC barrier can be from in-situ concrete. However, a better choice is to 
apply precast concrete segments similar to those used in the Berlin wall and 
known also as Stützwandelement UL 12.11 (Fig. 3.13). A barrier built of precast 
RC segments can be massive, tall, require minimum maintenance and occupy a 
relatively little space. One can expect that it will be substantially cheaper than a 
structural steel barrier with similar dimensions and protective capacity. A proper 
provision of reinforcement may assure a ”sacrificial“ behaviour of an RC barrier 
during the impact. In addition, the RC barrier will provide protection not only 
against fragment impact but also a blast resulting from a BLEVE. Finally, RC 
segments, which are relatively narrow in front, will allow to easily adjust the 
barrier to the relief where the area of barrier construction is not flat. 
A barrier made of structural steel will require constant maintenance. 
Moreover, barrier elements capable to withstand an impact of large high-energy 
fragments of road and railway tanker vessels will have to be massive and so 
expensive. It is highly probable that a steel barrier will include RC components, 
such as foundations and posts or similar cantilever elements. In addition, a steel 
barrier built in the vicinity of road or tracks can be insufficiently resistant to 
open-air fires. 
A soil embankment can assure a good protection against fragment impact 
provided that it is adequately dimensioned and will cross the most of probable 
fragment trajectories. An embankment can be relatively cheap and build in a 
short time. However, a sufficiently tall embankment will be very wide at original 
ground surface. Thus, it will occupy large area between roadside target and 
centre of a potential explosion. In some cases such area will be unavailable. In 
addition, slopes of an embankment can be insufficiently steep to provide an 
adequate protection against blast loading. 
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Fig. 3.13. Impact of fragments on a Berlin-wall-type barrier a) impact by the blunt end 
of an oblong end-cap at large obliquity; b) impact by the sharp edge of the oblong end-
cap; c) impact by the sharp edge of a simple end-cap and impact at a low altitude 
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Fig. 3.14. Two views of the soil embankment built in the Lithuanian railway 
infrastructure to protect fuel tanks against a potential BLEVE on tracks (the top photo 
was obtained from maps.lt website, the bottom photo was made by the author) 
An example of a really existing embankment build to protect fuel tanks 
against fragment impacts is shown in Fig. 3.14. A construction of such a barrier 
was encouraged by a safety study carried out for Lithuanian railways (Vaidogas 
et al. 2012c). 
The pros and cons of an application of the three aforementioned building 
materials allow to conclude that a barrier made of precast RC segments can be a 
fairly good solution in many practical situations. A more formal choice of the 
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material for a construction of a safety barrier is suggested by Zavadskas and 
Vaidogas (2009). They suggested to apply MCDM methods for such a choice. 
 
3.4.2. Good barrier design practice 
 
Fragment impact on the safety barrier will result in both local wall damage and 
in overall dynamic response of the barrier. Local damage will consist of spalling 
of concrete from the front (impacted) face and possible scabbing of concrete 
from the rear face of the wall with fragment penetration into the wall (Fig. 3.13). 
End-caps of road and railway tanker vessels will be large as compared to, say, 
most military missiles and their velocities will be relatively low (in most cases 
less than 400 km/h, see Fig. 2.31). Therefore, a perforation of the barrier wall by 
an end-cap with subsequent passing through the wall is not likely unless the wall 
is inadequately thin. It is natural to expect that the local damage will be deeper if 
the barrier is hit by a sharp edge of an end-cap. If the obliquity of the impact will 
be large and, in addition, the barrier will be hit by a ”blunt“ end of the end-cap, 
the fragment may bounce off (ricochet) without creating any considerable dam-
age (Fig. 3.13a). 
Good barrier design practice should be based on the following attitudes: 
1. Local damage to the barrier can be of any magnitude and include even a 
perforation, as long as the barrier will stop the fragment, bounce it off or 
decrease its kinetic energy to a safe level. 
2. Collapse of the barrier resulting from its inability to withstand the ener-
gy absorbed from the projectile should be prevented. 
3. A specific barrier segment or set of adjacent segments will be hit by a 
vessel end-cap only once per accident involving one or several BLEVEs. 
BLEVEs of road tankers reported in the literature involved only one 
vessel. Some railway accidents caused several BLEVEs of railroad tank-
ers. However, fragments of tanker vessels were projected in different di-
rections without the hazard of hitting the same target more than one 
time. The Crescent City railway accident is an illustration of such a situ-
ation (CCPS 1994). 
4. The dimensions of potential end-caps of tanker vessels suggest that an 
impact will damage up to three adjacent wall segments with the width in 
front of 2 to 3 meters (Fig. 3.13a). These segments can be ”sacrified“ 
and replaced by new ones at relatively low cost. 
A reinforced concrete barrier should be designed so that it will fail in duc-
tile manner and absorb the inputted energy without collapse. To ensure ductility, 
the barrier should be designed to have grater lateral load carrying capacity in 
shear than in bending and should be under-reinforced so that the bending capaci-
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ty is governed by yielding of tensile reinforcement rather than crushing of the 
concrete in compression. 
 
3.4.3. The problems of design of a concrete barrier 
 
A great deal of work has been done on the penetrative power of cased explosives 
but information pertaining to vessel burst fragments is less extensive. Fragments 
generated from road and railway tanker vessels are of irregular shape and rela-
tively low energy density. Their penetrative or destructive power depends on 
their orientation at the moment of impact with a target. Due to their irregular 
shape, fragments usually produced by the bursting of a vessel have much lower 
penetrating power, often only half, than compact blunt fragments, while pointed 
projectiles have appreciably more (Mannan 2005). As the size of the fragment 
increases, the response of the target (safety barrier) becomes increasingly signif-
icant. Kennedy (1976) has proposed that the target response may be modelled by 
assuming it to be subject to a rectangular pulse forcing function. With this as-
sumption it is then possible to apply conventional structural response techniques 
to estimate the susceptibility of a structure to a missile hit. 
Collapse of a ductile barrier will occur when the kinematic energy absorbed 
by the barrier from the impacting fragment will exceed the strain energy capaci-
ty of the barrier. Thus, to evaluate the capacity of a barrier wall to withstand the 
overall effect of a fragment impact, it is necessary to determine both the strain 
energy capacity of the barrier, and the kinetic energy of the barrier and the kinet-
ic energy absorbed by the barrier from the impacting fragment. 
A number of analysis techniques can be used to ensure that a ductile barrier 
wall has sufficient energy absorbing capacity to prevent collapse when subjected 
to a fragment impact. These techniques were suggested several decades ago, 
among others, by Willamson and Alvy (1973), Kennedy (1976) and Baker et. al. 
(1978), and Johnson et. al. (1982). 
 
3.4.3.1. Impact obliquity and ricochet of fragments 
 
A fragment from a tanker vessel will impinge the barrier at some obliquity. 
Fig. 3.15 shows the configuration of an oblique impact characterised by the an-
gle of obliquity, θ. The ricochet of the fragment refers to the impact phenome-
non, whereby a fragment, which strikes the barrier at high velocity and small 
angle of inclination (ricochet angle) φ, changes its direction of flight without 
being stopped by the barrier and without passing through it. The ricochet of the 
fragment happens by the lateral component of the target reaction or contact forc-
es and is opposed to bouncing in which the elastic recovery forces within the 
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fragment or other projectile and the barrier (target) are responsible for the rever-
sal of fragment (projectile) trajectory. 
At sufficiently high speed varr, there can exist a critical angle of entry (criti-
cal ricochet) angle φc, below which the ricochet occurs. The critical ricochet 
angle φc was assessed for series of small and hard bodies which resemble mili-
tary projectiles (Johnson et. al. 1982). However, any systematic investigation of 
the ricochet and the angle φc of such projectiles as large chunks of tanker vessels 
generated by BLEVE does not seem to exist. And so the existence of φc for ves-
sel fragments can be assumed only hypothetically. The determination of φc for 
vessel fragments can be fact that unbalanced forces at the nose of the impacting 
fragment can produce a moment which could turn the fragment away from an 
initial ricochet angle φ. 
 
Fig. 3.15. The configuration of an oblique impact by a vessel fragment into a safety 
barrier 
The conditions φ < φc and φ > φc represent two different cases of impact 
loading on a barrier. In the case φ < φc, the fragment will be diverted from a po-
tentially hazardous trajectory and minor local damage to the barrier can be ex-
pected. The impact will cause an overall dynamic response of the barrier. In the 
opposite case φ < φc, the ricochet will not occur and the impact will cause certain 
local damage and the overall response. The local damage will consist of spalling 
of concrete from the impacted face and scrabbing of concrete from the rear face 
of the barrier together with fragment penetration into the barrier wall (Fig. 3.13). 
The impact by a fragment will be a ”plastic impact“ if the fragment will 
stick to the barrier after impact or else will fall from the barrier with effectively 
no rebound energy (Kennedy 1976). In the case of the plastic impact, portions of 
the total kinetic energy of the impacting fragment, KEF, will be converted to 
strain energy associated with deformability of the fragment and energy losses 
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associated with barrier penetration. The remainder of the energy KEF will be 
absorbed by the barrier. 
 
3.4.3.2. Conservation of energy for fragment impact 
 
In the case of the plastic impact, the conservation of energy requires that the 
following relation is satisfied: 
 BLFF KEESEKE ++=  (3.16) 
where KEF is the total kinetic energy of the fragment just prior to impact; SEF is 
the strain energy absorbed in the fragment as a result of non-recoverable frag-
ment deformation; EL is the energy loss associated with local fragment penetra-
tion of barrier; and KEB is the kinetic energy absorbed by the barrier during im-
pact. 
The kinetic energy of the fragment prior to impact, KEF, is defined by the 
standard expression 20.5 avrfrg vξ . By conservation of momentum it can be shown 
that for the plastic impact the kinetic energy absorbed by the barrier, KEB, is 
related to the fragment kinetic energy by the following equation (Kennedy 
1976): 
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where the variable RM represent the mass ratio given by 
 
B
F
M W
WR =  (3.18) 
where WF is the fragment weight (N) and WB is the effective inertial weight of 
the barrier at the end of impact (N). The value WB is a function of the deformed 
shape of the barrier immediately following impact and is generally less than the 
total barrier weight. 
When one assumes both non-deformable fragment and a massive barrier, 
then both RM and SEF go to zero (Fig. 3.16). Then all of the fragment kinetic 
energy is available to penetrate the target. With a deformable fragment of a non-
massive barrier, a portion of the fragment kinetic energy is used to deform the 
fragment and the barrier. This reduces the energy available to penetrate the bar-
rier. 
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3.4.3.3. Fragment deformability and impact loading time history 
 
Using the fragment impact pressure or impact force time history and input load-
ing, the overall barrier response time history can be determined by performing a 
dynamic analysis of the barrier. The barrier's response in many cases will go 
beyond elastic response and so such an analysis would have to generally be a 
non-linear analysis. 
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Fig. 3.16. The relation between the mass ratio RM and the ratio of the barrier and 
fragment kinetic energies, KEB/KEF, expressed as the ratio RM /(1 + RM) 
The impact pressure time history of a non-deformable fragment will have 
the peak value of pressure or force (Fig. 3.17). For such a fragment, the real im-
pact pressure time history can be replaced by an approximate time history which 
has a constant time history throughout the duration of impact. The approximate 
time history should the proper total impulse applied to the barrier. 
Fig. 3.17 shows the influence of fragment deformability on the impact pres-
sure (force) time history. If a fragment undergoes a significant crash upon im-
pact this crush significantly lengthens the duration of impact and reduces the 
depth of possible penetration. 
 
3.4.3.4. Ensuring ductility of the barrier 
 
An analysis of the barrier has not necessarily to ensure that the barrier will not 
collapse as a result of a fragment impact. However, such an analysis should en-
sure that the barrier will fail in ductile manner. To ensure ductility, the barrier 
should be designed to have greater lateral load carrying capacity in shear than in 
bending and should be under-reinforced so that the bending capacity is governed 
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by yielding of the tensile reinforcement rather than crushing of the concrete in 
compression. 
 
Fig. 3.17. A schematic representation of impact pressure (force) time histories of 
deformable and non-deformable fragments (in line with Kennedy (1976)) 
Collapse of the barrier will occur when the kinetic energy absorbed by the 
barrier from the impacting fragment will exceed the strain energy capacity of the 
barrier, SEB. Therefore, to evaluate the capacity of the barrier to overall effect it 
is necessary t determine both the strain energy capacity of the barrier, SEB, and 
the kinetic energy absorbed from the impacting missile, KEB. 
For the plastic impact, the kinetic energy absorbed by the barrier, KEB, is 
defined by Eq. (3.17). For a barrier failing in flexure, the strain energy capacity 
SEB can be conservatively determined by yield line analysis. One can assume 
that 
1. Yield hinges occur whenever the moment reaches the ultimate moment 
capacity. 
2. Sufficient hinges form to develop a collapse mechanism prior to col-
lapse. 
Assuming that all of the strain energy occurs along these yield hinges and 
ignoring any elastic strain energy in zones outside of the zone of yielding, a con-
servative estimate of the total strain energy capacity of the barrier is obtained 
from the following equation: 
 ∑
=
=
hN
h
huhuhB lrmSE
1
 (3.19) 
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where Nh is the number of yield hinges; muh is the moment capacity per unit 
length of the hinge h; ruh is the total rotation of the hinge h at the time of col-
lapse; and lh is the length of the hinge h. The yield line of the concrete barrier 
shown in Fig. 3.13 will form at the bottom of the barrier wall (Nh = 1). The 
length of this line, lh, will be equal to the length of the barrier segment. The bar-
rier will collapse when the rotational capacity is exceeded along the yield line. 
The ultimate moment capacity muh can be determined in accordance with 
the principles of ultimate strength design. The rotational capacity of under-
reinforced concrete beams with laced tensile and compressive reinforcement, the 
rotational capacity should be limited to 5° (0.0873 rad) (Kennedy 1976). For 
rotations beyond this limit, the concrete cover over compressive steel begins to 
crush and the moment capacity of the beam is reduced. 
To ensure that a barrier can develop the strain energy capacity defined by 
Eq. (3.19), it is necessary to prevent a premature shear failure at a low level im-
pact (Fig. 3.13c). This can be prevented by ensuring that the concentrated load 
capacity of the slab in shear either significantly exceeds the load capacity in 
flexure or else exceeds the peak impact force applied at a low altitude, whichev-
er is less. 
 
3.4.3.5. The problems to be investigated prior to a barrier design 
 
The phenomena of impact dynamics, impact damage and response of barrier to 
impact loading described in this section must be taken into account in order to 
design a barrier capable to resist the impact of large chunks of road or railway 
tanker vessels. However, the practical design should be preceded by an investi-
gation or clarification of some aspects of the aforementioned phenomena: 
1. An existence of the ricochet phenomenon must be proved and the criti-
cal ricochet angle φc determined for typical impact orientations and 
shapes of impacting fragments (Fig. 3.15). 
2. The deformability of the fragments, which could impact the barrier, 
must be estimated. This will allow to classify the fragment as ”hard“ or 
”soft“ projectiles depending on whether the fragment deformability is 
small or large relative to the target deformability. The deformability of 
the fragment will determine the character of impact pressure (force) time 
history (Fig. 3.17). This investigation should allow to estimate the strain 
energy absorbed in the fragment as a result of non-recoverable fragment 
deformation, SEF (see Eq. (3.16)). 
3. The penetration of the barrier by fragment at blunt and sharp orienta-
tions must be investigated in order to assess the energy loss associated 
with local penetration, EL (see Eq. (3.16)).  
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4. An algorithm of the assessment of the effective inertial weight of the 
barrier, WB, must be developed (see Eq. (3.18)). 
5. Mathematical models allowing to determine components of the strain 
energy capacity of the barrier SEB should be made available (see 
Eq. (3.19)). This especially pertains to the rotational capacity of barrier 
hinges, ruh. 
A development of practical procedures of the safety barrier design might 
require to solve further problems on the side of predicting the impact loading 
and the side of barrier response to this loading. One of these problems is an in-
vestigation of a combined effect of blast and fragment impact caused by a tanker 
vessel BLEVE. The design of a safety barrier which will be deployed in the im-
mediate vicinity of a potential BLEVE epicentre will be another problem to be 
solved in the future. A formal, mathematical optimisation of the barrier cross-
sectional geometry and positioning with the available sitting area might also 
belong to the future problems. Safety barriers are not a panacea for all hazards 
posed by hazmat transportation. But, in case of a severe accident, most property 
owners will wellcome a barrier deployed between accident epicentre and vulner-
able objects belonging to them. 
 
3.5. Third chapter conclusions 
 
An exploration of the possibilities to design safety barriers aimed at protection 
of roadside objects against mechanical and thermal effects of BLEVEs on road 
and rail has led to the following conclutions: 
1. The main problems of sitting a safety barrier include: a) determination 
of a road segment from which roadside property can be damaged; b) 
specification of an area for a barrier construction between the unsafe 
road segment and property to be protected; and c) positioning the barrier 
in the available area. A solution of these three problems will yield input 
information for a detailed design of the barrier. 
2. The determination of the unsafe road segment will be a non-trivial prob-
lem. A comprehensive solution of this problem requires assessing a po-
tential explosion and/or fire damage to an unprotected roadside object by 
applying methods of SRA and QRA. A layout of the unsafe road seg-
ment will determine the area where the barrier is required. This area 
should fully overlap the area available for barrier construction. A con-
figuration of the latter area will be influenced by factors of very different 
nature. The size, layout and obliquity of the construction area will influ-
ence decisions concerting a configuration of the barrier in plan and posi-
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tioning it between road (railway tracks) and roadside objects subjected 
to the hazard of fire or explosion on road. 
3. Methods applied to solving problems of sitting a safety barrier will 
range from rigorous mathematical techniques of probabilistic structural 
analysis to a judgemental choice of barrier configuration and position in 
plan. Results produced by these methods can positively contribute to 
improving the final design of the barrier and so increasing safety of 
hazmat transportation. 
4. The barrier aim at a protection from the blast loading generated by 
BLEVE can be designed with a sacrificial cladding. Such a design may 
face considerable uncertainties related to potential blast loading. The be-
haviour of SC components subjected to blast loading may also be uncer-
tain to a large degree. A consistent quantification and propagation of 
these uncertainties is possible by combining methods of SRA and QRA. 
5. An application of SRA and QRA methods to an analysis of SC compo-
nents can yield an estimate of probability of their failure under blast 
loading. This probability can be used as a measure of explosive damage 
to SC provided that the SC consists of nominally identical components. 
A component failure probability will be proportional to the relative 
number of the components which may fail (be “sacrificed”) in case of an 
explosion. 
6. An estimation of the SC failure probability will require to specify a 
probabilistic model of blast wave characteristics. Such model can be dif-
ficult to obtain as post-mortem data on transportation-related BLEVES 
are rarely available in the amount allowing to compile a statistical sam-
ple for fitting the model. However, the SC failure probability can be es-
timated without such model. 
7. A small-size sample of blast loading characteristics recorded in experi-
ment or estimated by explosion simulation can be directly applied to the 
probability estimation. Such estimation can be carried out by a simula-
tion-based propagation of stochastic and epistemic uncertainties through 
a fragility function developed for an SC component. The estimate will 
have the form of a one-sided confidence interval of the failure probabil-
ity. The upper limit of this interval can be used for making decisions 
concerning the degree of the damage to SC which may be caused by an 
explosion. 
8. Massive reinforced concrete barriers can be deployed where they will 
have to resist an impact by tanker vessel fragments. These barriers can 
be constructed from segments which may be similar to widely-known 
Berlin-wall segments. The segments can be connected to each other, to 
achieve a redistribution of impact effects among several segments. The 
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high of the segments can be determined by a simulation of fragment tra-
jectories described in the second chapter of this dissertation. The rein-
forcement of the barriers can be provided in such a way which allows 
large plastic deformations of the barrier wall and so an absorption of cer-
tain part of kinetic energy of impacting fragment. 
9. In the case where the horizontal distance between BLEVE and target ob-
ject is small, a barrier protecting against blast and projectiles will not be 
able to stop thermal radiation. Consequently, shielding from thermal ra-
diation should be provided in addition to the barrier. Alternatively, the 
target object can be protected by providing a large separation distance 
between target object and potential epicentre of BLEVE. 
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General conclusions 
The results presented in the dissertation were obtained by an investigation of the 
risk posed to build roadside property by transportation of hazardous materials (in 
brief, hazmat transportation). Such risk can be controlled by deploying safety 
barriers between road (railway tracks) used for hazmat transportation and vul-
nerable roadside object(s). Design of such barrier is a complex multi-
disciplinary problem. Exploring the possibilities to solve this problem led to the 
following conclusions: 
1. An review of applications of the transportation risk assessment devel-
oped to manage hazmat transportation accidents and often abbreviated to 
TRA, led to the conclusion that most TRA applications deal with indi-
vidual and societal risk to exposed population. The accident scenario 
prevailing in these applications is release of toxic materials and subse-
quent intoxication of population. Risk to built roadside property (build-
ings, objects of traffic infrastructure, industrial installations) is men-
tioned in the literature but is not considered in detail. 
2. An analysis of hazmat transportation accident data led to the result that 
the greatest potential of damage to the built roadside property possesses 
boiling liquid vapour explosion known by the abbreviation BLEVE and 
vapour cloud explosion often abbreviated to VCE. The prevailing mate-
rials involved in BLEVEs and VCEs on road and rail are commercial 
energetic hydrocarbons, especially, propane. This material was involved 
in 65 % of BLEVE accidents on road and 40 % of accidents on rail. 
BLEVEs are more frequent, as compared to VCEs. Therefore BLEVEs 
pose the largest risk to the roadside property. 
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3. A consideration of how to reduce the risk to roadside property posed by 
BLEVEs on road and rail led to the conclusion that this can be done by 
means of safety barriers. They can be deployed between the road (rail-
way trucks) used for hazmat transportation and vulnerable roadside ob-
jects. Safety barriers can be designed as fence-shaped structures or soil 
embankments. Adequate separation distances between traffic routes and 
vulnerable nearby objects can also serve, where possible, as safety barri-
ers. 
4. An analysis of possibilities to assess thermal and mechanical effects of a 
BLEVE on a roadside object led to the result that a solution of this prob-
lem should be based on predicting the position and orientation of a road 
or railway tanker vessel sustaining the BLEVE. Such predicting will 
face considerable uncertainties and these must be quantified by means of 
probability distributions. Some of these distributions can be fitted to sta-
tistical data on traffic accidents; others will have to be specified subjec-
tively in line with the principles of the quantitative risk assessment usu-
ally abbreviated to QRA. Data on traffic accidents of road tankers 
indicate that the transverse rest position of the tank can be modelled by a 
logistic probability distribution with the mean of 2.02 m and the stand-
ard deviation of 5.62 m. The departure angle of the tank can be charac-
terised by an empirical distribution with the mean of 2.83° and the 
standard deviation of 56.8°. 
5. An analysis of deterministic models developed to predict thermal and 
mechanical effects of BLEVEs revealed that these models can supple-
ment the modelling of tanker vessel position and orientation. Probabilis-
tic elements can be incorporated into the models of the thermal and me-
chanical effects. They will allow to quantify uncertainties in the effects 
according to the principles of QRA. Technically, these uncertainties can 
be expressed by means of probability distributions and propagated by 
applying a stochastic (Monte Carlo) simulation. 
6. An examination of the possibilities to design safety barriers in line with 
the principles of QRA led to the conclusion that this structure can be de-
veloped using two types of statistical samples of BLEVE effects: a 
large-size sample obtained by the stochastic simulation and a small size-
sample gained by experiment, post-mortem investigation of accidents or 
in other similar way. Information delivered by these samples can be used 
to estimate the probability of barrier failure. This figure can serve as the 
main measure of barrier behaviour under the actions of BLEVE. 
7. A consideration of potential materials for constructing safety barriers al-
lows to conclude that steel barriers can be effective as sacrificial blast 
walls. Massive reinforced concrete barriers and soil embankments will 
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be effective against fragments generated by BLEVEs of road and rail-
way tanker vessels. Mass of these fragments can reach 10 tons and the 
impact velocity can be up to 400 km/h. Given the characteristics of blast 
loading and fragment impact, conventional structural response tech-
niques can be applied to estimate the susceptibility of steel and rein-
forced concrete barriers to these effects. 
8. A study of the thermal effects of BLEVEs reveals that the dimensions of 
the fireballs, which can be generated by explosions of typical road and 
railway tanker vessels, will be large. They can be up to 300 m tall and 
the fireball diameter can reach 200 m. Therefore, an effective protection 
of roadside objects by wall-shaped barriers and soil embankments will 
be ineffective. The protection can be achieved by providing sufficiently 
large separation distances between the road (railway tracks) and the vul-
nerable roadside object. A thermal shielding of the roadside object can 
also be applied, because duration of BLEVE fireballs is short and typi-
cally does not exceed 20 seconds. 
9. A consideration of the methodological procedures proposed in this work 
led to the conclusion that the success of their a practical application will 
depend on designer’s skills in solving two tasks: predicting thermal and 
mechanical effects of fires and explosions on road and rail (or, in brief, 
Task ”A“) and, secondly, utilising results of this predicting to a design 
of a safety barrier (briefly, Task ”B“). The design of a safety barrier 
conceptualised as a fence or a soil embankment or an adequate separa-
tion distance will be a manageable problem as long as the potential ef-
fects of fires and explosions were predicted appropriately. 
10. A solution of the tasks ”A“ and ”B“ is a multi-disciplinary problem. The 
task ”A“ lies, in essence, beyond the scope of the traditional civil engi-
neering. Typically, it is solved by chemical, mechanical and fire safety 
engineers capable to deal with such phenomena as BLEVE and VCE. 
Ideally, these specialists should be skilled at modelling uncertainties re-
lated to effects of BLEVE or VCE or, alternatively, their team should 
include a person capable to do this. 
11. The aforementioned task ”B“ is within the competence of the structural 
engineer who will design a safety barrier. If effects of BLEVE or VCE 
were predicted in line with probabilistic principles of QRA, the design 
of the barrier by means of structural reliability analysis will make the 
best of this prediction. The barrier can also be designed by means of tra-
ditional, deterministic methods. However, the deterministic design will 
require to represent highly uncertain and interdependent effects of 
BLEVE or VCE by fixed design values. Such values can be inaccurate 
or insufficiently conservative. 
 141 
 
References 
Abbasi, T.; Abbasi, S.A. 2007. The boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE): Mecha-
nism, consequence assessment, management, Journal of Hazardous Materials 141(3): 489–519. 
Abdel-Aty, M. A. and Radwan, A. E. 2000. Modelling traffic accident occurrence and involve-
ment, Accident Analysis and Prevention 32(5): 633–642. 
Abdolhamidzadeh, B.; Abbasi, T.; Rashtchian, D.; Abbasi, S.A. 2010a. Domono effect in process-
industry accidents – An inventory of past events and identification of some patterns, Journal of 
Loss Prevention in Pocess 24(5): 575–593. 
Abdolhamidzadeh, B.; Abbasi, T.; Rashtchian, D.; Abbasi, S.A. 2011. A new method for assess-
ment domino effects in chemical process industry. Journal of Hazardous Materials 182(1–3): 
416–426. 
Al-Ghamdi, A. S. 2003. Analysis of traffic accidents at urban intersections in Riyadh. Accident 
Analysis and Prevention 35(5): 717–724. 
Atahan, A. O.; Yücel, A. Ö.; Erdem, M. M. 2014. Crach testing and evaluation of a new genera-
tion L1 containment level guardrail, Engineering Failure Analysis 38: 25–37. 
Aven, T. 2003. Foundations of Risk Analysis. A Knowledge and Decision Related Perspective. 
Chichester: Wiley. 
Aven, T.2009. Perspectives on risk in a decision-making context – Review and discussion, Safety 
Science 47(6): 798–806. 
Aven, T.; Vinnem, J. E. 2007. Risk Management: with Applications from Offshore Petroleum 
Industry. 1st edition. London: Springer. 212 p. 
Aven, T.; Zio, E. 2011. Some considerations on thetreatment of uncertainties in risk assessment 
for practical decision making. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 96(1): 64–74. 
Babrauskas, V. 2003. Ignition Handbook. Issaquah: Fire Science Publishers. 
Bahei-El-Din, Y. A.; Dvorak, G. J.; Fredricksen, O. J. 2006. A blast-tolerant sandwich plate 
design with a polyurea interlayer, International Journal of Solids and Structures 43(25-26): 7644–
7658 
142 REFERENCES 
 
Baker, W. E.; Kulesz, J. J.; Ricker, R. L; Bessey, R. L.; Westine, V. B.; Parr, V.B.; Oldham, G. A. 
1997. Workbook for preciting pressure wave and fragment effects of exploding propellant tanks 
and gas storage vessels. Nasa contractor report 134906. Springfield: NASA. 561 p. 
Bakke, J. R.; van Wingender, K.; Hoorelbeke, P.; Brewerton, B. 2010. A Study on the Effect of 
Trees on Gas Explosions, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23(6): 878–884. 
Bangash, M. Y. H. 2009. Shock, Impact and Explosion: Structural Analysis and Design. 1st 
edition. Berlin: Springer. 1410 p. 
Bangash, M. Y. H.; Bangash, T. 2006. Explosion-Resistant Buildings: Design, Analysis and Case 
Studies. 1st edition. Berlin: Springer. 805 p.  
Batarlienė, N. 2008. Pavojingų krovinių vežimo pagrindai: mokomoji knyga. Vilnius: Technika 
152 p. 
Baum, M. R. 1988. Disruptive failure of pressure vessels: Preliminary design guidelines for 
fragment velocity and extent of hazardous zone,  Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology 110(2): 
168–176. 
Baum, M. R. 1995. Rupture of a gas-pressurised cylindrical vessel: the velocity of a detached end-
cap, Journal of Los Prevention in the Process Industies 8(3): 149–161. 
Baum, M. R. 2001. The velocity of large missiles resulting from axial rupture of gas pressurised 
cylindrical vessels, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 14(3): 199–203.  
Biggs, J. M. 1964. Introduction to structural dynamics. New York etc.: McGraw-Hill. 178 p. 
Birk, A.M. 1996. Hazards from propane BLEVESs: An update and proposal for emergency re-
sponders, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 9(2): 173–181. 
Bogosian, D.; Piepenburg, D. 2002. Effectiveness of frangible barriers for blast shielding. 
Proceedings of the 17th International Symposium on the Military Aspects of Blast and Shock. June 
2002, Las Vegas. USA, 1–11. 
Boh, J.W.; Louca, L.A.; Choo, Y.S. 2005. Energy absorbing passive impact barrier for profiled 
blastwalls, International Journal of Impact Engineering 31(8): 976–995. 
Bonilla Martinez, J. M.; Belmonte Perez, J.; Marin Ayala, J. A. 2012. Analysis of the explosion of 
a liquefied-natural-gas road tanker, Securidad y Medio Ambiente 32(127): 1–20. 
Borovinšek, M.; Vesenjak, M.; Ulbin, M.; Re, Z. 2007. Simulation of crach test for high 
containment levels of road safety barriers, Engineering Failure Analysis 14(8): 1711–1718. 
Boudet, H. Sc.; Jayasundera, D. Ch.; Davis, J. 2011. Drivers of Conflict in Developing Country 
Infrastructure Projects: Experience from the Water and Pipeline Sectors, Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management 137(7): 498–511. 
Bubbico, R.; Di Cave, S.; Mazzarotta, B. 2004a. Risk analysis for road and rail transport of haz-
ardous materials: a simplified approach, Journal of Loss Prevention in Pocess Industries 17(6): 
477–482. 
Bubbico, R.; Di Cave, S.; Mazzarotta, B. 2004b. Risk analysis for road and rail transport of haz-
ardous materials: a GIS approach, Journal of Loss Prevention in Pocess Industries 17(6): 483–
488. 
Bulson, P. S. 1997. Explosive Loading on Engineering Structures. London: E & FN Spon. 272 p. 
Cahen, B. 2006. Implementation of New Legislative Measures on Industrial Risks Prevention and 
Control in Urban Areas, Journal of Hazardous Materials 130(3): 293–299. 
Casal, J. 2008. Evaluation of the Effects and Consequences of Major Accidents in Industrial 
Plants. Amsterdam etc.: Elsevier. 378 p. 
REFERENCES 143 
 
Casal, J.; Salla, J. M. 2006. Using liquid superheat energy for a quick estimation of overpressure 
in BLEVEs and similar explosions, Journal of Hazardous Materials A137(3): 1321–1327. 
Chang, L. Y. 2005. Analysis of freeway accident frequencies: Negative binomial regression versus 
artificial neural network, Safety Science 43(8): 541–557. 
Changlong, Z.; Juncheng, J.; Xiongjun, Y. 2012. Study on ignition probability of flammable mate-
rials after leakage accidents, Procedia Engineering 45: 435–441. 
CCPS 1994. Guidelines for Evaluating the Characteristics of Vapor Cloud Explosions, Flash 
Fires, and BLEVEs. New York: Center for Chemical Process Safety of AIChE. 
CCPS 1995. Guidelines for Chemical Transportation Risk Analysis. New York: Center for Chemi-
cal Process Safety of AIChE. 
CCPS 2005a. Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis. 2thed. New York: Cen-
ter for Chemical Process Safety of AIChE. 
CCPS 2005b. Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout. New York: Center for Chemical Process 
Safety of AIChE. 
Cheng, W.; Washington, S. P. 2005. Experimental evaluation of hotspot evaluation methods, Ac-
cident Analysis and Prevention 37(5): 870–881. 
Chi, Y.; Langdon, G. S.; Nurick, G. N. 2010. The influence of core height and face plate thickness 
on the response of honeycomb sandwich panels subjected to blast loading, Materials and Design 
31(4): 1887–1899. 
Cozzani, V.; Bandini, R.; Basta, C.; Christou, M. D. 2006. Application of Land-Use Planning 
Criteria for the Control of Major Accident Hazards: A case-study, Journal of Hazardous Materials 
A136(2): 170–180. 
Cozzani, V.; Tugnoli, A.; Saalzano, E. 2009. The Development of an Inherent Safety Approach to 
the Prevention of Domino Accidents, Accident Analysis and Prevention 41(6): 1216–1227. 
CPD 1992. Methods for the Determination of Possible Damage to People and Objects from Re-
leases of Hazardous Materials – ‘Green Book’. The Hague: Committee for the Prevention of Dis-
asters. 
CPD 1999. Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment – ‘Purple Book’. Publication Series on 
Dangerous Substances (PGS3). The Hague: Committee for the Prevention of Disasters. 
CPD 2005. Methods for the Calculation of Physical Effects due to Releases of Hazardous Materi-
als (Liquids and Gases) – ‘Yellow Book’. Publication Series on Dangerous Substances (PGS2). 
The Hague: Committee for the Prevention of Disasters. 
CPR 2005. Methoden voor het Bepalen van Mogelijke Schade aan Mensen en Goederen door Het 
Vrijkomen van Gevaarlijke Stiffen – ‘Green Book’. Den Haag: Commissive van preventive van 
rampen door gevaarlijke stiffen. 
Čygas, D; Jasiūnienė, V.; Bartkevičius, M. 2009. Assessment of special plans and technical design 
with regard to traffic safety, Journal of civil engineering and management 15(4): 411–418. 
Darbra, R. M.; Palacios, A.; Casal, J. 2010. Domino Effect in Chemical Accidents: Main Features 
and Accident Sequences, Journal of Hazardous Materials 183(1–3): 565–573. 
Eichler, T. V.; Napadentsky, H. S. 1977. Accidental Vapour Phase Explosions on Transportation 
Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants. Final Report Prepated to US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
Washington: NUREG. 
EIGA 2007. Determination of Safety Distances. IGC Doc 75/07/E. Brussuels: European Industrial 
Gases Association. 
144 REFERENCES 
 
Elvik, R.; Høve, A., Vaa, T. Sørensen, M. 2009. The Handbook of Road Safety Measures. 2nd ed. 
Bingley: Emerald. 1009 p. 
EN 1317 2010. Road restraint systems. European standard EN 1317 Parts 1–8. English version. 
Brussels CEN. 
Evans, M.; Hastings, N. Peacock, B. 2001. Statistical Distributions. 3rd ed. New York etc.: Wiley. 
Fabiano, B.; Curro, F. Palazzi, E.; Pastorino, R. 2002. A fremawork for risk assessment and deci-
sion-making strategies in dangerous good transportation, Journal of Hazardous Materials 93(1): 
1–15. 
FACTS 2014. Hazardous materials accidents knowledge base. Retrieved April 18, 2014, From 
FACTS Link: http://factsonline.nl/browse-chemical-accidents-in-database. 
FM Global 2013. Evaluationg vapour cloud explosions using a flame acceleration method. Prop-
erty Loss Prevention Data Sheets. Johnston: Factory Mutual Insurance Company.  
Forster, H.; Gunther, W. 2009. Explosion Protection for Vehicles Intended for the Transport of 
Flammable Gases and Liquids – an Investigation into Technical and Operational Basics, Journal 
of Hazardous Materials 164 (2–3): 1064–1073. 
Franck, H., Franck, D. 2010. Mathematical methods for ccident reconstruction. A forensic engi-
neering perspective. Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis Group. 
Garrick, B. J. 2008. Quantifying and Controlling Catastrophic Risks. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Gebbeken, N.; Doge, T. 2010. Explosion Protection – Architectural Design, Urban Planning and 
Landscape Planning, International Journal of Protective Structures 1(1): 1–22. 
Genova, B.; Silvestrini, M.; Leon Trujillo, F.J. 2008. Evaluation of the blast-wave overpressure 
and fragments initial velocity for a BLEVE event via empirical correlations derived by a simpli-
fied model of released energy, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21(1): 110–
117. 
Gentle, J. E. 2003. Random Number Generation and Monte Carlo Methods. 2th ed. New York etc.: 
Springer. 
Gheorghe, A. V.; Birchmeier, J.; Vamanu, D.; Papazoglou, I., Kröger, W. 2005. Comprehensive 
risk assessment for rail transportation of dangerous goods: a validated platform for decision mak-
ing, Reliability Engineering and System Safety 88(3): 247–272. 
Grislis, A. 2010. Longer combination vehicles and road safety, Transport 25(3): 336–343. 
Gubinelli, G.; Zanelli, S.; Cozzani, V. 2004. A simplified model for the assessment of the impact 
probability of fragments, Journal of Hazardous Materials 116(3): 175–187. 
Gubinelli, G.; Cozzani, V. 2009. Assessment of missile hazards: evaluation of the fragment num-
ber and drag factors, Journal of Hazardous Materials 161(1): 439–449. 
Guruprasad, S.; Mukherjee, A. 2000a. Layered sacrificial claddings under blast loading. Part I–
analytical studies, International Journal of Impact Engineering 24(9): 957–973. 
Guruprasad, S.; Mukherjee, A. 2000b. Layered sacrificial claddings under blast loading. Part II–
experimental studies, International Journal of Impact Engineering 24(9): 975–984. 
Haleem, K.; Abdel-Aty, M.; Mackie, K. 2010. Using a reliability process to reduce uncertainty in 
predicting crashes at unsignalised intersections, Accident Analysis and Prevention 42(2): 654–666. 
Hanssen, A. G.; Enstock, L.; Langseth, M. 2002. Close-range loading of aluminium foam panels, 
International Journal of Impact Engineering 27(6): 593–618. 
Hauptmanns, U. 2001a. A procedure for analyzing the flight of missiles from explosions of cylin-
drical vessels, Journal of Loss Prevention in Pocess Industries 14(5): 395–402. 
REFERENCES 145 
 
Hauptmans, U. 2001b. A Monte-Carlo based  procedure for treating the flight of missiles from 
tank explosions, Probabilistic Engineering Mechanics 16(4): 307–312. 
Holden, P. L. 1988. Assessment of Missile Hazards: Review of Incident Experience Relevant to 
Major Hazard Plant. Warrington, Cheshire: Safety and Reliability Directorate. 
Huang, H.; Abdel-Aty, M. 2010. Multilevel data and Bayesian analysis in traffic safety, Accident 
Analysis and Prevention 42(6): 1556–1565. 
Hwang, C. L.; Yoon K. S. 1981. Multiple Decision Making Methods and Applications, Lecture 
Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Berlin: Springer 186 p. 
Jasiūnienė, V.; Čygas, D. 2013. Raod accident prediction model for the roads of national 
significance of Lithuania, The Baltic Journal of Road and Brigde Engineering 8(1): 66–73. 
Johnson, D. M. 2010. The Potential for Vapour Cloud Explosions – Lessons from the Buncefield 
Accident, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23(6): 921–927. 
Johnson, W.; Sengupta, A. K.; Ghosh, S. K. 1982. High velocity oblique impact and ricochet 
mainly of long rod projectiles: an overview, International Journal of Mechanical Sciences 24(7): 
425–436. 
Juocevičius, V. 2011. A method for assessing risk to engineering structures exposed to accidental 
actions, Doctoral dissertation. Vilnius, Technika. 144 p. 
Juocevičius, V.; Vaidogas, E. R. 2010. Effect of explosive loading on mechanical properties of 
concrete and reinforcing steel: towards developing a predictive model, Mechanika, 81(1): 5–12. 
Karagiozova, D., Langdon, G. S.; Nurick, G. N. 2010. Blast attenuation in Cymat foam core 
sacrificial claddings, International Journal of Mechanical Sciences 52(5): 758–776. 
Kavalov, B., Petric, H., Georgakaki, A. 2007. Liquefied Natural Gas for Europe – Some Important 
Issues for Consideration. JRC Reference Report. Luxembourg: European Communities. 
Kazanci, Z.; Mecitoglu, Z. 2008. Nonlinear dynamic behaviour of simply supported laminated 
composite plates subjected to blast load, Journal of Sound and Vibration 317(3–5): 883–897. 
Kelly, D.  L.; Smith, C. L. 2009. Bayesian inference in probabilistic risk assessment – the current 
state of the art, Reliability Engineering and System Safety 94(2): 628–643. 
Kennedy, R. P. 1975. A review of procedures for the analysis and design of concrete structures to 
resist missile impact effects, Nuclear Engineering and Design 37(2): 183–203. 
Korn, R.; Korn, E.; Kroisandt. 2010. Monte Carlo Methods in Finance and Insurance. Boca Raton 
etc.: CRC Press. 
Krauthammer, T. 2008. Modern Protective Structures. Boca Raton etc: CRC Press. 528 p. 
KTR 2008. Kelių techninis reglamentas KTR 1.01:2008. Vilnius: Lietuvos Respublikos Aplinkos 
Ministerija. 
Kumamoto, H. 2007. Satisfying Safety Goals by Probabilistic Risk Assessment. London: Springer. 
Langdon, G. S.; Karagiozova, D.; Theobald, M. D.; Nurick, G. N.; Lu, G.; Merrett, R. P. 2010. 
Fracture of aluminium foam core sacrificial cladding subjected to air-blast loading, International 
Journal of Impact Engineering 37(6): 638–651. 
Lee, J.; Mannering, F. 2002. Impact of roadside features on the frequency and severity of run-off-
roadway accidents: an empirical analysis, Accident Analysis and Prevention 34(2): 149–161. 
Lee, K. H.; Rosowsky, D. V. 2006. Fragility analysis of woodframe buildings considering com-
bined snow and earthquake loading, Structural Safety 28(3): 289–303. 
Lees, F. P. 2001. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. Hazard Identificatin, Assessment and 
Control. Oxford: Butterworth & Heinemann. 
146 REFERENCES 
 
Lemaire, M. 2009. Structural Reliability. London: ISTE. 504 p. 
Lenoir, E. M.; Davenport, J. A. 1993. A survey of vapor cloud explosions: Second update, Process 
Safety Progress 12(1): 12–33. 
Li, R.; Kardomateas, G. J.; Simitses, G. J. 2009. Point-wise impulse (blast) response of a 
composite sandwich plate including core compressibility effects, International Journal of Solids 
and Structures 46(10): 2216–2223. 
Louca, L. A.; Boh, J. W.; Choo, Y. S. 2004. Design and analysis of stainless steel profiled blast 
barriers, Journal of Constructional Steel Research 60(12): 1699–1723. 
Lozano, A.; Munoz, A.; Antun, J. P.; Granados, F.; Guarneros, L. 2010. Analysis of Hazmat 
Transportation Accidents in Congested Urban Areas, Based on Actual Accidents in Mexico, 
Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2(3): 6053–6064. 
Luria, P.; Aspinall, P. A. 2003. Evaluating a multi-criteria model for hazard assessment in urban 
design, Environmental Impact Assessment Review 23(5): 625–653. 
Ma, G. W.; Ye, Z. Q. 2007. Energy absorption of double-layer foam cladding for blast alleviation, 
International Journal of Impact Engineering 34(2): 329–347. 
Mannan, S. (ed.) 2005. Lees’s Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. Elsevier: Amsterdam etc. 
Marangon, A.; Carcassi, M.; Engebo, A.; Nilsen, S. 2007. Safety Distances: Definition and 
Values, International Journal of Hydrogen Energy 32(13): 2192–2197. 
Marek, P; Brozzetti, J.; Guštar, M; Tikalsky, P. 2003. Probabolistic Asssessment of Structures 
using Monte Carlo Simulation: Background, Exercises and Software. 2 nd edition. ITAM CAS 
CR: Praha. 471 p. 
Melchers, R. E. 2002. Structural Reliability Analysis and Prediction. 2 nd ed. John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd: England. 
Mébarki, A.; Mercier, F.; Nguyen, Q. B; Ami Saada, R.; Meftah, F.; Reimeringer, M. 2007. A 
probabilistic model for the vulnerablility of metal plates under the impact of cylindrical projectiles, 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 20(4): 128–134. 
Mébarki, A.; Mercier, F.; Nguyen, Q. B; Ami Saada, R.; Reimeringer, M. 2008. Reliability analy-
sis of metallic targets under metallic rods impact: towards a simplified probabilistic approach, 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 21(4): 518–527. 
Mébarki, A.; Mercier, F.; Nguyen, Q. B; Ami Saada, R. 2009a. Structural fragments and 
explosions in industrial facilities. Part I: Probabilistic description of the source terms, Journal of 
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 22(4): 408–416. 
Mébarki, A.; Nguyen, R; Mercier, F. 2009b. Structural fragments and explosions in industrial 
facilities. Part I: Projectile trajectory and probability of impact, Journal of Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries 22(4): 417–425. 
Montella, A. 2010. A comparative analysis of hotspot identification methods, Accident Analysis 
and Prevention 42(2): 571–581. 
Nagashima, M.; Tsuchiya, M.; Asada, M. 2011. Reducing the Economic Risk of LNG Tank 
Construction under Conditions of Fluctuating Resource Prices, Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management 137(5): 382–391. 
Neuenhaus, D. H. J. F.; Geβler, U. J.; Feldman, M. 2013. Using multibody–system modeling to 
make accurate pradictions of vehicle impacts on road restraint systems, International Journal of 
Non-Lineear Mechanics 53: 24–31. 
REFERENCES 147 
 
Nguyen, Q. B; Mébarki, A.; Ami Saada, R.; Mercier, F.; Remeringer, M. 2009. Integrated proba-
bilistic framework for domino effect and risk analysis, Advances in Engineering Software 40(9): 
892–901. 
Oggero, A.; Darbra, R. M.; Darbra, R. M.; Munoz., M.; Planas, E.; Casal, J.; 2006. A survey of 
accidents occurring during the transport of hazardous substances by road and rail, Journal of Haz-
ardoud Materials 133(1–3): 1–7. 
OTIF 2010. Composition of Dangerous Goods Trains to Prevent a BLEVE and its Effect on Exter-
nal Safety. Berne: Intergovernmental Organisation for International Carriage by Rail. 
Palanivelu, S.; Van Paepegem, W.; Degrieck, J.; Kakogiannis, D.; Van Ackeren, J.; Van 
Hemelrijck, D.; Wastiels, J.; Vantomme, J. 2010. Comparative study of the quasi-static energy 
absorption of small-scale composite tubes with different geometrical shapes for use in sacrificial 
cladding structures, Polymer Testing 29(3): 381–396. 
Paltrinieri, N.; Landucci, G.; Molag, M.; Bonvicini, S.; Spadoni, G.; Cozzani, V. 2009. Risk re-
duciton in road and rail LPG transportation by passive fire protection, Journal of Hazardous Mate-
rials 167(1–3): 332–344. 
Papazoglou, I. A., Aneziris, O. N. (1999). Uncertainty Quantification in the Health Consequences 
of the Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion. Journal of Havardous Materials 67(3): 217–
235. 
Pellissetti, M.F.; Schueller, G. I. 2006. On general purpose software in structural reliability – An 
overview, Structural Safety 28(1-2): 3–16. 
PHMSA 2014. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administation. Retrieved April 18, 2014, 
From PHMSA Link: http://phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/library/data-stats/incidents. 
Planas-Cuchi, E; Gasulla, N.; Ventosa, A.; Casal, J. 2004. Explosion of a road tanker containing 
liquefied natural gas, Journal of Loss Prevention in Process Industries 17 (4): 315–321. 
Pontiggia, M.; Landucci, G.; Busini, V.; Derudi, M.; Alba, M.; Scaioni, M.; Bonvicini, S.; 
Cossani, V.; Rota, R. 2011. CFD Model Simulation of LPG Dispersion in Urban Areas, 
Atmospheric Environment 45(24): 3913–3923. 
Prentkovskis, O.; Beljatynskij, A.; Juodvalkienė, E.; Prentkovskienė, R. 2010. A study of the 
deflections of metal road guardrail post, The Baltic Journal of Road and Bridge Engineering 5(2): 
104–109. 
Prentkovskis, O.; Tretjakovas, J.; Švedas, A.; Bieliatynskyi, A.; Daniūnas, A.; Krayushkina, K. 
2012. The analysis of the deformation state of the double-wave guardrail mounted on bridges and 
viaducts of the motor roads in Lithuania and Ukraine, Journal of Civil Engineering and 
Management 18(5): 761–771. 
Prugh, R. W. 1991. Quantutative evaluation of “BLEVE” hazards, Journal of Fire Protection 
Engineering 3(1): 9–24. 
Prugh, R. W. 1994. Quantitative evaluation of fireball hazards, Process Safety Progress 13(2): 83–
91. 
Quest Consultants 2009. Comparative Quantitative Risk Analysis of Motor Gasoline, LPG, and 
Anhydrous Ammonia as an Automotive Fuel. Prepared for Iaowa State University. Norman, Okla-
homa: Quest Consultants Inc. 
Ray, M. H. 1999. Impact conditions on side- impact collisions with fixed roadside ogjects.  
Accident Analysis and Prevention 3(1): 21–30. 
Reid, J. D.; Kuipers, D.; Sicking D. L.; Faller, R. K. 2009. Impact performance of W–beam  
guardrail installed at variuos frlare rates, International Journal of Impact Engineering 36(3): 476–
485. 
148 REFERENCES 
 
Ren, Z.; Vesenjak, M. 2005. Computational and experimental crach analysis of the road safety 
barrier, Engineering Failure Analysis 12(6): 963–973. 
Roberts, T.; Gosse, A.; Hawksworth, S. 2000. Thermal radiation from fireballs on failure of lique-
fied peotroleum gas storage, Institution of Chemical Engineers 78(3): 184–192. 
Ronza, A.; Vilchez, J. A.; Casal, J. 2007. Using transportation accident databases to investigate 
ignition and explosion probabilities of flammable spills, Journal of Hazardous Materials 146 (1–
2): 106–123. 
Rubinstein, R. Y.; Melamed, B. 1998. Modern Simulation and Modelling. New York: Wiley. 
Samuel, C.; Keren, N.; Shelly, M.C.; Freeman, S.A. 2009. Frequency analysis of hazardous mate-
rial transportation incidents as a function of distance from origin to incident location, Journal of 
Loss Prevention in Process Industries 22(6): 783–790. 
Smith, P. D. 2010. Blast Walls for Structural Protection against Hight Explosive Threats: A 
Review, International Journal of Protective Structures 1(1): 67–84. 
Spaethe, G. 1987. Die Sicherheit tragender Baukonstruktionen. Berlin: VEB Verlag für 
Bauwesen. 124 p. 
Spek, A. C. E.; Wieringa, P. A.; Janssen, W. H. 2006. Intersection approach speed and accident 
probability, Transportation Research Part F: Traffic. Psychology and Behaviour 9(2): 155–171. 
Spraggings, B. H. 2010. The case for rail transportation of hazardous materials, Journal of Man-
agement and Marketing Research, 3(1): 88–95.  
Straub, D., Der Kiureghian, A. 2008. Improved seismic fragility modelling from empirical data, 
Structural Safety 30(4): 320–336. 
Su, Y.; Wu, C. Q.; Griffith, M. 2008. Mitigation of blast effects on aluminium foam protected 
masonry walls, Transactions of Tianjin University 14(1): 558–562. 
Sun, D.; Jiang, J.; Zhang, M.; Wang, Z.; Huang, G.; Qiao, J. 2012. Parametric appraoch of the 
domino effect for structural fragments, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 25(1): 
114–126. 
Tauseef, S. M., Abbasi, T., Abbasi, S. A. 2010a. Risks of Fire and Explosion Associated with the 
Increasing Use of Liquefied Petroleum Gas. Journal of Failure Analysis and Prevention 10(4): 
322–333. 
Taveau, J. 2010b. Risk assessment and land-use planning regulations in France following the AZF 
disaster, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 23(6): 813–823. 
Tewarson, A. 2002. Generation of Heat and Chemical Compounds in Fires. In SFPE Handbook of 
Fire Protection Engineering, 5th ed. Quincy, MA: NFPA & SFPE. 
Theobald, M. D.; Nurick, G. N. 2010. Experimental and numerical analysis of tube-core claddings 
under blast loads, International Journal of Impact Engineering 37(3): 333–348. 
TNO 2005. Tanks. Reduction of the risk of a BLEVE. TNO Report. The Hague: TNO. 
Trépanier, M.; Leroux, M. H.; De Marcellis-Warin, N. 2009. Cross-analysis of hazmat road acci-
dents using multiple databases, Accident Analysis and Prevention 41(6): 1192–1198. 
Triantaphyllou, E. 2000. Multi-Criteria Decision Making Methods: A Comparative Study. Series 
Applied Optimization 44, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher. 
TSB 1999. Railway Investigation Report. Derailment and Collision. Canadian National Train No. 
U-783-21-30 and Train No. M-306-31-30 Mile 50.84, Saint-Hyacinthe Subdivision Mont-Saint-
Hilaire, Quebec, 30 December 1999. Report Number R99H0010. Gatineau: Trasportation Safety 
Board of Canada. 
REFERENCES 149 
 
Tugnoli, A.; Milazzo, M. F.; Landucci, G.; Cozzani, V.; Maschio, G. 2014. Assessment of the 
hazard due to fragment projection: A case study, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Indus-
tries 28(1): 36–46.  
Turskis, Z.; Zavadskas, E. K. 2010. A new fuzzy additive ratio assessment method (ARAS-F). 
Case study: the analysis of fuzzy multiple criteria in order to select the logistic centerns location, 
Transport 25(4): 423–432.  
Vaidogas, E. R. 2003. Accidental explosions: Bayesian uncertainty handling in assessing damage 
to structures. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Applications of Statistics and 
Probability in Civil Engineering, July 6-9, 2003, San Francisco, CA, Eds. A Der Kiureghian, S. 
Madanat, J. M. Pestana. Rotterdam: Milpress Science Publishers 1: 1191–198. 
Vaidogas, E. R. 2006a. First step towards preventing losses due to mechanical damage from ab-
normal actions: Knowledge-based forecasting the actions, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Pro-
cess Industries 19(5): 375–385. 
Vaidogas, E. R. 2006b. Bayesian Approach to Forecasting Damage to Buildings from Accidental 
Explosions on Railway. Transport and Telecommunication 7(1): 34–43. 
Vaidogas, E. R. 2007a. Handling uncertainties in structural fragility by means of the Bayesian 
bootstrap resampling. Proceedings on CD of the 10th Int. Conf. on Applications of Statistics and 
Probability in Civil Engineering (ICASP10), Tokyo, Japan, Jul 31-Aug 03, 2007, Eds. J. Kanda, T. 
Takada, H. Furuta. London: Taylor & Francis.  
Vaidogas, E. R. 2007b. Prediction of Accidental Actions Likely to Occur on Building Structures. 
An Approach Based on Stochastic Simulation. Vilnius: Technika 247 p. 
Vaidogas, E. R. 2007c. Risk Oriented Design of Protective Highway Structures, The Baltic 
Journal of Road and Bridge Engineering 2(4): 155–163. 
Vaidogas, E. R. 2009. On applying sparse and uncertain information to estimating the probability 
of failure to to rare abnormal situations, Information Technology and Control 38(2): 135–146. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Juocevičius, V. 2007. Assessing external threats to structures using limited statis-
tical data: an approach based on data resampling, Technological and Economic Development of 
Economy 13(2): 170–175. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Juocevičius, V. 2008a. Reliability of a timber structure exposed to fire: estima-
tion using fragility function, Mechanika 73(5): 35–42. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Juocevičius, V. 2008b. Sustainable Development and Major Industrial Accidents: 
The Beneficial Role of Risk-Oriented Structural Engineering, Technological and Economic De-
velopment of Economy 14(4): 612–627. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Juocevičius, V. 2009. Assessment of Structures Subjected to Accidental Actions 
Using Crisp and Uncertain Fragility Functions, Journal of Civil Engineering and Management 
15(1): 95–104. 
Vaidogas, E. R., Juocevičius, V.; Kisežauskienė, L.; Stulgys, D. 2012c. „BLEVE“ sprogimo 
galimo poveikio darbuotojams, kuro bazei ir kitiems strateginiams objektams AB „Lietuvos 
geležinkeliai“ Vaidotų geležinkelio stotyje. Tyrimų studija. Vilnius: Lietuvos geležinkeliai. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Šakėnaitė, J. 2010. Protecting built property against fire disasters: multi-attribute 
decision making with respect to fire risk, International Journal of Strategic Property Management 
14(4): 391–407. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Šakėnaitė, J. 2011. Multi-Attribute Decision-Making in Economics of Fire 
Protection, Inzinerine Ekonomika– Engineering Economics 22(3): 262–270. 
Vinnem, J. E. 2007. Offshore Risk Assessment. Principles, Modelling and Applications of QRA 
Studies. 2nd edition. London: Springer. 577 p. 
150 REFERENCES 
 
Yang, Y.; Fallah, A. S; Saunders M.; Louca A. 2011. On the dynamic response of sandwich panels 
with different core set-ups subjected to global and local blast loads, Engineering Structures 
33(10): 2781–2793. 
Yang, Y.; Fallah, A. S. 2011. On the dynamic response of sandwich panels with different core set-
ups subject-ed to global and local blast loads, Engineering Structures 33(10): 2781–2793.  
Ye, X.; Pendyala, R. M.; Washington, S. P.; Konduri, K.; Oh, J. 2009. A simultaneous equations 
model of crash frequency by collision type for rural intersections, Safety Science 47(3): 443–452. 
Zavadskas, E. K.; Vaidogas, E. R. 2009. Multiattribute Selection from Alternative Designs of 
Infrastructure Components of Accidental Situations, Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure 
Engineering 24(5): 346–358. 
 
  
151 
 
 
 
The list of author‘s scientific 
publications on the subject 
In reviewed scientific periodical publications 
 
Linkutė (Kisežauskienė), L.; Juocevičius, V.; Vaidogas, E. R. 2013.A probabilistic design of 
sacrificial cladding for a blast wall using limited statistical information on blast loading, 
Mechanika 19(1): 58–66. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Linkutė (Kisežauskienė), L. 2012. Sitting the barrier aimed at protecting roadside 
property from accidental fires and explosions on road: a pre-optimisation stage, The Baltic journal 
of road and bridge engineering 7(4): 277–287. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Linkutė (Kisežauskienė), L.; Stulgys, D. 2012a. Simulation-based predicting the 
position of road tank explosions. Part I: data and models, Transport 27(1): 14–24. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Linkutė (Kisežauskienė), L.; Stulgys, D. 2012b. Simulation-based predicting the 
position of road tank explosions. Part II: a case study, Transport 27(2): 118–128. 
 
In other editions 
Linkutė (Kisežauskienė), L. 2011. Data on traffic accidents involving fires and explosions, 14-
osios Lietuvos jaunųjų mokslininkų konferencijos „Mokslas – Lietuvos ateitis“ 2011 metų teminės 
konferencijos „Statyba“ (2011 m. kovo 23–25 d.) straipsnių rinkinys Vilnius: Technika: 1–6. 
Linkutė (Kisežauskienė), L.; Juocevičius, V.; Vaidogas, E. R. 2011. Numerical evaluation of 
concrete and steel strain rate in the RC section subjected to high rate loading, Mechanika 
proceedings of the 16th international conference, 7, 8 April, 2011, Kaunas University of 
Technology, Lithuania. 209–214. 
152 THE LIST OF AUTHOR'S SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS ... 
 
 
 
Linkutė (Kisežauskienė), L.; Vaidogas, E. R. 2011. Design of roads and railways used for the 
transport of explosive materials. 8th International Conference "Environmental Engineering", May 
19-20, 2011, Vilnius, Lithuania. Sustainable Urban development. Roads and Railways. 
Technologies of Geodesy and Cadastre. Vilnius: Technika 3: 1121–1127. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Kisežauskienė, L. 2012. Transportation of liquefied gasses: assessing the risk of 
thermal damage to roadside infrastructure from a road tank “Bleve”, Transport and 
telecommunication 13(4): 284–293. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Kisežauskienė, L. 2013. Risk to built property posed by transportation of 
liquefied gasses , Journal of Polish Safety and Reliability Association (JPSRA 2013) 4(1): 43–50. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Kisežauskienė, L. 2014. Technogeninės avarijos – rimtas iššūkis statinių 
projektuotojams, Statyba ir architektūra 8: 42–44. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Kisežauskienė, L.; Juocevičius, V. 2013. An assessment of reliability of a blast 
wall using limited statistical information on blast loading, Journal of Polish Safety and Reliability 
Association (JPSRA 2013) 4(2): 259–265. 
Vaidogas, E. R.; Kisežauskienė, L.; Stulgys, D. 2013. Assessing risk to built roadside property 
posed by transportation of liquefied gasses, TRANSBALTICA 2013: the 8th International 
Conference May 9–10, 2013, Vilnius, Lithuania: selected papers Vilnius: Technika: 254–259. 
 
 153 
  
Summary in Lithuanian 
Problemos formulavimas 
Darbe tiriamos avarijos transportuojant pavojingąsias medžiagas ir tų avarijų keliamos 
rizikos mažinimo galimybės. Tokios avarijos pasireiškia kaip pavojingųjų medžiagų 
nuotėkiai, sprogimai ir gaisrai. Jie įvyksta vežant pavojingąsias medžiagas automobiliais 
bei traukiniais. Šių avarijų pasekmės būna sunkios: jų metu net žūsta žmonės, 
pažeidžiami ir prie transporto linijų esantys pakelės objektai. Tokių objektų pažeidimus 
sukelia šiluminė spinduliuotė ir mechaniniai poveikiai. 
Šiame darbe pagrindinis dėmesys skiriamas statybinių objektų, esančių ties keliais 
ir geležinkeliais, apsaugai nuo gaisrų ir sprogimų. Apsauga užtikrinama statant saugos 
barjerus tarp transporto linijų ir pažeidžiamų pakelės objektų. Pagrindinė problema, 
kylanti projektuojant tokius barjerus, yra neapibrėžtumai, susiję su šilumine spinduliuote 
ir mechaniniais poveikiais, sukeliamais gaisrų ir sprogimų automobilių kelių ir 
geležinkelių infrastruktūroje. 
Darbo aktualumas 
Šio darbo aktualumą lemia avarijos, kylančios vežant pavojingąsias medžiagas. 
Nepaisant to, kad transporto saugos srityje diegiama daug naujovių, gaisrus ir sprogimus 
sukeliančios sunkvežimių ir traukinių avarijos įvyksta dažnai. Kai kurios gerai žinomos 
avarijos įvyko tankiai užstatytose teritorijose ir buvo labai stambios. Verta paminėti 
tokias avarijas: traukinio cisternos sprogimus Viaredžo (Italija, 2009) ir Balstogės 
(Lenkija, 2010) miestuose, bei automobilinių cisternų sprogimus Ispanijoje 1978, 2002, 
2011. Todėl žmonių, turto ir gamtos apsaugojimas nuo tokių avarijų vis dar lieka opia 
problema. 
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Tyrimų objektas 
Disertacijos tyrimo objektas yra rizikos, kylančios greta kelių ir geležinkelių esantiems, 
sprogimams ir gaisrams jautriems statybiniams objektams, vertinimas ir mažinimas. 
Tiriama, kaip mažinti riziką, statant saugos barjerus tarp pavojingųjų medžiagų 
transportavimo arterijų ir pažeidžiamų pakelės statinių. 
Darbo tikslas 
Pagrindinis darbo tikslas – pasiūlyti, kaip projektuoti saugos barjerus, tinkamus 
apsaugoti pažeidžiamus pakelės objektus nuo gaisrų ir sprogimų, kylančių keliuose ir 
geležinkeliuose. Šie pasiūlymai apima rekomendacijas, kaip prognozuoti gaisrų ir 
sprogimų poveikį. Taip pat buvo siekta sukurti projektinius saugos barjerų pasiūlymus. 
Darbo uždaviniai 
1. Nustatyti pavojingųjų medžiagų vežimo avarijas, kurios gali sukelti didžiausias 
statybinių pakelės objektų pažaidas. 
2. Ištirti kelių eismo įvykius, siekiant prognozuoti potencialias automobilinių 
cisternų sprogimų padėtis ir poveikius pakelės objektams. 
3. Ištirti, kaip vertinti šiluminį sprogstančios automobilinės cisternos poveikį 
pakelės objektams, atsižvelgiant į galimą šio poveikio neapibrėžtumą. 
4. Sukurti kiekybiniu rizikos vertinimu grindžiamą procedūrą, leidžiančią 
prognozuoti automobilinės cisternos skeveldrų poveikį saugos barjerui. 
5. Ištirti, kaip išdėstyti saugos barjerus greta transporto arterijų. 
6. Pasiūlyti saugos barjero su sunaikinamuoju apdaru projektą. Šis barjeras turi 
sumažinti sprogimo bangą, sukeliamą geležinkelio cisternos sprogimo. 
7. Pasiūlyti projektinį gelžbetoninio saugos barjero sprendimą. Barjeras turi būti 
statomas iš surenkamų segmentų ir apsaugoti pažeidžiamus pakelės objektus, 
nuo sprogstančios cisternos skeveldrų smūgių. 
Tyrimų metodika 
Tyrimų metodika buvo sudaryta derinant kiekybinės rizikos vertinimo, matematinės 
statistikos, stochastinio modeliavimo ir konstrukcijų patikimumo analizės metodus. 
Metodologinė tyrimo ašis yra neapibrėžtumų, susijusių su gaisrų ir sprogimų poveikiais, 
vertinimas ir transformavimas. Kiekybinio neapibrėžtumų modeliavimo rezultatai 
taikomi projektuojant saugos barjerus. Transformuoti neapibrėžtumus taikomas 
stochastinis (Monte Karlo) modeliavimas. Neapibrėžtumų modeliavimo rezultatai buvo 
suderinti su derterministiniais saugos barjerų skaičiavimo modeliais. 
Dabo mokslinis naujumas 
Pagrindinis darbo naujumas glūdi idėjoje, kaip remiantis kiekybinės rizikos analizės 
principais projektuoti saugos barjerus, galinčius apsaugoti statybinius pakelės objektus 
nuo gaisrų ir sprogimų transporto arterijose. Iki šiol panašūs barjerai buvo įrengiami tik 
aplink karinius objektus, kuriems grėsė išorės pavojus. Kiti nauji elementai yra: 
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1. Tikimybių teorijos metodų taikymas modeliuojant neapibrėžtumus, susijusius 
su gaisrų ir sprogimų keliuose ir geležinkeliuose poveikiais. 
2. Stochastinio modeliavimo taikymas projektuojant saugos barjerus. 
3. Saugos barjerų projektavimas naudojant mažas statistines imtis, kurias sudaro 
duomenys apie poveikius barjerams. 
4. Projektiniai plieninio ir gelžbetoninio saugos barjerų, galinčių apsaugoti pakelės 
objektus nuo cisternų sprogimų, pasiūlymai. 
Darbo rezultatų praktinė reikšmė 
Šis darbas suteikia galimybę mažinti pavojingųjų medžiagų vežimo riziką. Santykinai 
mažos investicijos į pakelėje statomus saugos barjerus leis išvengti didelių nuostolių, 
sukeliamų gaisrų ir sprogimų keliuose ir geležinkeliuose. Darbe siūlomas metodas padės 
apsaugoti pažeidžiamus pakelės objektus, saugos barjerus projektuojant kiekybinio 
rizikos vertinimo principais. Metodo šerdį sudaro tikimybinis gaisrų ir sprogimų 
poveikių pakelės objektams neapibrėžtumų modeliavimas. Šie neapibrėžtumai yra dideli 
ir tik metodiškai atsižvelgiant į juos bus galima projektuoti praktiškai naudingus, realiai 
saugą užtikrinančius barjerus. Darbe pateikti projektiniai dviejų saugos barjerų 
pasiūlymai padės praktiškai įgyvendinti tokių konstrukcijų projektavimą. 
Ginamieji teiginiai 
1. Pavojingiausi statybiniams pakelės objektams degių ir sprogių medžiagų 
vežimo avarijų scenarijai yra besiplečiančių verdančio skysčio garų sprogimas 
(toliau vadinamas anglišku trumpiniu BLEVE) ir garų debesies sprogimas 
(literatūroje dažnai žymimas trumpiniu VCE). BLEVE yra dažnesni už VCE ir 
jų poveikiai įvairesni. Taigi, BLEVE kelia didžiausią pavojų pakelės objektams. 
2. BLEVE tipo avarijų mechaninio ir šiluminio poveikių prognozavimas susijęs su 
dideliais neapibrėžtumais. Šiuos neapibrėžtumus reikia kiekybiškai vertinti, 
kartu taikant tikimybinį ir stochastinį modeliavimą. Toks modeliavimas leidžia 
generuoti dideles statistines BLEVE poveikių reikšmių imtis, tinkančias saugos 
barjerų projektavimui. 
3. Turint statistiniu požiūriu mažo dydžio sprogimo apkrovos reikšmių imtį, gautą 
eksperimentuojant arba tiriant praeities avarijas, saugos barjerą reikia 
projektuoti derinant kartotinį statistinį ėmimą su konstrukcijų patikimumo 
teorijos metodais. Tai leis įvertinti barjero pažaidų tikimybes ir jų pagrindu 
priimti projektinius sprendimus. 
4. Saugos barjerų parinkimą įtakoja galimų konstrukcinių sprendimų įvairovė. 
Plienas, gelžbetonis ar net gruntas gali būti naudojami projektuojant ir statant 
saugos barjerus. Tačiau projektuoti reikia taikant kiekybinio rizikos vertinimo ir 
konstrukcijų patikimumo teorijos metodus. Jie leis tinkamai atsižvelgti į 
sprogimų ir gaisrų keliuose ir geležinkeliuose poveikių neapibrėžtumus. 
Darbo rezultatų aprobavimas 
Pagrindiniai šios disertacijos teiginiai buvo išspausdinti septyniuose moksliniuose 
straipsniuose: keturi iš jų – ISI Web of Science duomenų bazėje (Vaidogas ir kt. 2012ab, 
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Vaidogas ir Linkutė 2012, Linkutė ir kt. 2013), trys straipsniai kituose žurnaluose 
(Vaidogas ir Kisežauskienė 2012, Vaidogas ir kt. 2013ab). 
Pagrindiniai darbo teiginiai pateikti trijose tarptautinėse konferencijose: 
– 11-oje tarptautinėje konferencijoje „Mechanika 2011“, Kaune, 2011; 
– 8-oje tarptautinėje konferencijoje „Aplinkos inžinerija“, Vilniuje, 2011; 
– 8-oje tarptautinėje konferencijoje „Transbaltica 2013“, Vilniuje, 2013. 
Disertacijos struktūra 
Darbas susideda iš įvado, 3 skyrių, išvadų, literatūros sąrašo, autoriaus publikacijų 
sąrašo ir šešių priedų. 
Disertacijos apimtis yra 169 puslapiai be priedų. Darbe pateiktos 49 formulės, 62 
paveikslai ir 20 lentelių. Literatūros sąrašą sudaro 171 cituotos publikacijos. 
 
1. Pavojingųjų medžiagų vežimo keliama rizika: 
apžvalga statybos inžinerijos požiūriu 
 
Pirmame skyriuje apžvelgiamos ir vertinamos publikacijos apie riziką, kylančią vežant 
pavojingąsias medžiagas. Taip pat nagrinėjami iki šiol sukurti metodai, skirti projektuoti 
saugos barjerus, statomus pažeidžiamiems pakelės objektams apsaugoti nuo gaisrų ir 
sprogimų keliuose bei geležinkeliuose. Publikacijų apžvalga apima bendruosius 
transporto rizikos analizės aspektus, pakelės objektus galinčius pažeisti reiškinius, 
statybinius šios analizės aspektus ir apsauginių barjerų projektavimo problemas. Dalis 
apžvalgos pateikta straipsniuose Vaidogas ir kt. (2012ab) bei Linkutė ir kt. (2013). 
Pavojingųjų medžiagų vežimo avarijos dažniausiai pasireiškia gaisrais, rečiau 
sprogimais ir dar rečiau dujų nuotėkiais (Darbra ir kt. 2010). Apžvalginis skyrius 
pradedamas trumpu rizikos, kurią kelia pavojingųjų medžiagų vežimas, kiekybinio 
vertinimo aprašymu. Ši mokslo sritis yra vadinama transporto rizikos analize. 
Konstatuojama, kad iki šiol vertinant pavojingųjų medžiagų vežimo riziką, daugiausiai 
dėmesio buvo telkiama į nuodinguosius nuotėkius, darančius žalą pakelėje esantiems 
žmonėms (CCPS 1995; CPD 1999; Fabiano ir kt. 2002; Bubbico ir kt. 2004ab; 
Gheorghe ir kt. 2005; Grislis 2010). Daug mažiau dėmesio buvo skirta keliuose ir 
geležinkeliuose vykstantiems gaisrams ir sprogimams, galintiems pažeisti statybinius 
pakelės objektus. 
Degiųjų ir sprogiųjų medžiagų vežimas keliais ir geležinkeliais nemažėja. Tokių 
medžiagų daugiau vežama geležinkeliais nei automobilių keliais. Todėl, vežant 
krovinius geležinkeliais, vyksta didesni gaisrai ir sprogimai, nei vežant keliais (pvz., 
Pontigia ir kt. 2011). Tačiau žala, padaryta užsidegus ar sprogus automobilinei cisternai 
arba kitos rūšies automobiliui, gali būti didesnė, nes keliai dažnai tiesiami tankiai 
apgyvendintose plotuose, arti pažeidžiamų statybinių pakelės objektų, pavojingųjų 
pramonės įmonių teritorijose (Lozano ir kt. 2010). 
Pirmame skyriuje teigiama, kad didelį pavojų statybiniams pakelės objektams kelia 
dviejų rūšių sprogimai: gaisro kaitinamos geležinkelio arba automobilinės cisternos 
sprogimas ir iš tokios cisternos nutekėjusių dujų arba garų debesies sprogimas. Pirmasis 
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sprogimas yra vadinamas besiplečiančių verdančio skysčio garų sprogimu ir dažnai 
žymimas anglišku trumpiniu BLEVE. Antrasis sprogimas dar vadinamas garų debesies 
sprogimu ir neretai žymimas anglišku trumpiniu VCE. Sprogimas VCE būdu sukelia 
mechaninį sprogimo bangos poveikį. Debesies degimo plote pasireiškia ir šiluminis 
poveikis. Sprogimas BLEVE būdu sukelia mechaninius sprogimo bangos ir skeveldrų 
poveikius bei šiluminę ugnies kamuolio spinduliuotę (pvz., CCPS 1994; Casal 2008). 
Pirmame skyriuje rašoma, kad apsaugoti statybinius pakelės objektus nuo tokių 
reiškinių, kaip BLEVE arba VCE, galima dviem būdais: įrengiant saugos barjerą tarp 
kelio (geležinkelio) ir pakelės objekto arba užtikrinant didelį, saugų atstumą tarp 
transporto arterijos ir objekto. Saugos barjerai yra panašūs į sprogimo sienas (angl. blast 
walls), skirtas apsaugoti nuo karinių ginklų poveikių arba improvizuotų sprogstamųjų 
užtaisų (pvz., Smith 2010). Abi konstrukcijos turi sumažinti sprogimo bangos energiją. 
Todėl patirtis projektuojant sprogimo sienas gali būti naudojama projektuojant saugos 
barjerus. Tačiau tarp sprogimo sienų ir saugos barjerų yra skirtumų. Sprogimo sienos 
užtikrina apsaugą nuo karinės amunicijos ir nėra skirtos apsaugoti nuo aukštų ugnies 
kamuolių bei sunkių ir santykinai lėtų skeveldrų, susidarančių sprogstant geležinkelio 
arba automobilinei cisternai. Sprogimo siena apriboja matomumą ir tuo pačiu mažina 
saugumą. Matomumo sumažėjimas, įrengus saugos barjerą, neturėtų būti problema, kol 
jis nekenkia eismo saugumui ir (arba) nevėlina darbuotojų įspėjimo apie gresiantį gaisrą 
ar sprogimą kelyje. 
Šiame disertacijos skyriuje trumpai apžvelgiama sprogimo sienų skaičiavimo ir 
projektavimo patirtis, kuri gali būti naudinga įrengiant saugos barjerus. Standus, mažai 
besideformuojantis saugos barjeras atspindės dalį sprogimo bangos energijos atgal į 
sprogimo šaltinio pusę, todėl pažeidžiamas objektas bus saugesnis. Daugiau deformuotis 
galintis barjeras yra racionalesnis, nes sugers nemažą dalį šios energijos. Barjeras taip 
pat gali būti projektuojamas kaip lengva konstrukcija, kurią sunaikins sprogimo banga, 
arba turėti sunaikinamą dangą, įrengiamą ant standaus jo pagrindo. Tokios dangos 
pavyzdžiai yra parodyti S1 pav. 
 
S1 pav. Sunaikinamos saugos barjero dangos rūšys: a) sluoksniuotoji danga, pritvirtinta prie 
ištisinio pagrindo; b) profiliuotųjų lakštų siena, paremta statramsčiais, c) sluoksniuotoji danga, 
pritvirtinta prie statramsčių (Linkutė ir kt. 2013) 
Pirmo skyriaus pabaigoje saugos barjerai lyginami su apsauginiais atitvarais, 
užtikrinančiais saugų automobilių eismą. Nustatyta, kad tarp šių konstrukcijų yra 
panašumų. Dinaminiai baigtinių elementų metodai, taikomi skaičiuojant apsauginius 
atitvarus, gali būti pritaikyti ir projektuojant sunaikinamas saugos barjerų dangas. Tačiau 
kartu teigiama, kad tarp šių konstrukcijų yra daugiau skirtumų, nei panašumų. Jos 
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nemažai skiriasi pagal paskirtį, poveikius, laikyseną apkrovimo metu, galimą statybos 
vietą, norminį reguliavimą. Tačiau arti kelio esančius saugos barjerus galima statyti 
kartu su apsauginiais atitvarais, kad barjerai būtų apsaugoti nuo avarinių automobilių 
smūgių. 
Pirmas disertacijos skyrius užbaigiamas išvadomis ir disertacijos uždavinių 
formulavimu. 
 
2. Avarijų vežant pavojingąsias medžiagas poveikių 
prognozavimas 
 
Antras skyrius pradedamas pavojingiausių avarijų, galinčių įvykti keliais ir 
geležinkeliais vežant degias ir sprogias medžiagas, nustatymu. Nustatyta, kad didžiausią 
pavojų kelia geležinkelio ir automobilinių cisternų sprogimai BLEVE būdu. Antrame 
disertacijos skyriuje pasiūlytos trys skaitinės procedūros, skirtos vertinti šiluminius ir 
mechaninius BLEVE sprogimų poveikius. Dėmesys sutelktas į du BLEVE poveikius: 
šiluminę sprogimo sukeliamo ugnies kamuolio spinduliuotę ir sprogimo metu 
susidarančių skeveldrų smūgius. Pirmoji procedūra sukurta prognozuoti sprogstančių 
automobilinių cisternų padėtį galimo taikinio atžvilgiu. Antroji procedūra skirta vertinti 
BLEVE sprogimo sukeliamo ugnies kamuolio poveikį pakelės objektui. Trečioji 
procedūra leidžia prognozuoti automobilinių cisternų skeveldrų poveikį pakelės objektui 
arba galimam saugos barjerui. Visos trys procedūros pagrįstos tikimybiniu modeliavimu. 
Jos gali būti panaudotos vertinant pavojingųjų krovinių transportavimo  riziką. Antro 
skyriaus rezultatai yra paskelbti straipsniuose Vaidogas ir kt. (2012ab), Vaidogas ir 
Kisežauskienė (2012), Kisežauskienė ir Vaidogas (2013). 
Gaisrai ir sprogimai keliuose ir geležinkeliuose kyla vežant, pakraunant ir 
iškraunant degias ir sprogias medžiagas. Dažniausiai tokias avarijas sukeliančios 
medžiagos yra komerciniai energetiniai angliavandeniliai. Duomenų apie avarijas vežant 
pavojingąsias medžiagas šaltiniai yra tokios duomenų bazės, kaip pavojingųjų medžiagų 
transportavimo incidentų sistema (HMIRS) (PHMSA 2014; Ronza ir kt. 2007). Ši 
duomenų bazė yra vieša ir prieinama internete. Kokybiškas informacijos apie BLEVE 
avarijas šaltinis yra FACTS duomenų bazė (FACTS 2014). Rengiant disertaciją, buvo 
išnagrinėtos FACTS duomenų bazėje aprašytos 43 BLEVE avarijos keliuose ir 38 
avarijos geležinkeliuose. BLEVE avarijų dažniai, jas skirstant pagal vežamas medžiagas, 
pateikti S1 ir S2 lentelėse. Matyti, kad dažniausiai sprogimus BLEVE būdu sukeldavo 
komerciniai angliavandeniliai: propanas, benzinas, dyzelinas. Siekiant per daug 
neišplėsti tyrimų srities, disertacijoje buvo nagrinėjami tik geležinkelio ir automobilinių 
cisternų sprogimai BLEVE būdu. Saugos barjerų projektavimas buvo analizuotas 
vertinant du pagrindinius BLEVE poveikius: galimus skeveldrų smūgius ir šiluminę 
ugnies kamuolio spinduliuotę. 
Sprogimo BLEVE būdu sukeliamas statybinio pakelės objekto (taikinio) 
pažeidimas gali būti laikomas atsitiktiniu įvykiu D, kurio dažnį galima suskaičiuoti pagal 
formulę 
 Fr(D) = Fr(M) P(A | M) P(B | A) P(D | B). (S1) 
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čia Fr(⋅) – dažnio simbolis; P(⋅ | ⋅) – sąlyginės tikimybės simbolis; M – pavojingosios 
medžiagos vežimo įvykis; A – atsitiktinis eismo avarijos, galinčios eskaluotis į sprogimą 
BLEVE būdu, įvykis; B – atsitiktinis sprogimo BLEVE būdu įvykis. 
Vertinant pakelės objekto pažeidimo tikimybę P(D
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y) – pažeidžiamumo funkcija, siejantį įvykį D su sprogimų poveikių vektoriumi 
y; x – BLEVE avarijos charakteristikų vektorius; ψ(x) – vektorinė funkcija, siejanti y su 
x; f(y) ir f(x) – simultaninės vektorių y ir x tikimybinio tankio funkcijos. 
Pažeidžiamumo funkcija P(D
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y) turi būti sudaroma pasitelkiant statybinių 
konstrukcijų patikimumo teorijos metodus. Parinkti tankio funkciją f(y) yra sunku dėl 
duomenų stokos. Tačiau tikimybę P(D
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B) galima vertinti parenkant žemesnio lygio 
tankio funkciją f(x) ir pasitelkiant deterministinius BLEVE poveikių modelius, kuriuos 
galima įtraukti į funkciją ψ(x). 
 
S1 lentelė. Sprogimų BLEVE būdu, įvykusių vežant pavojingąsias medžiagas keliais, 
pasiskirstymas pagal medžiagą (duomenys gauti išnagrinėjus 43 sprogimus) 
BLEVE sprogimą sukėlusi vežama medžiaga Sprogimų BLEVE būdu skaičius 
Propanas 28 
Dyzelinas 3 
Degios suskystintos dujos 2 
Benzinas 2 
Butanas, deguonis, freonas, hidraulinis tepalas, 
metanas, metanolis, propilenas Po vieną sprogimą 
 
S2 lentelė. Sprogimų BLEVE būdu, įvykusių geležinkeliais vežant pavojingąsias medžiagas, 
pasiskirstymas pagal medžiagą (duomenys gauti išnagrinėjus 38 sprogimus) 
BLEVE sprogimą sukėlusi vežama medžiaga Sprogimų BLEVE būdu skaičius 
Propanas 15 
Benzinas 4 
Vinilchloridas 2 
Butadienas 2 
Amoniakas 2 
Acto rūgštis, akrilo rūgštis, amonio fosfatas, butanas, 
chloras, dimetileteris, dyzelinas, etilenglikolis, 
isobutanas, metanas, naftos žaliava, natrio sulfidas, 
sieros rūgštis 
Po vieną sprogimą 
 
Vektorių x turi sudaryti BLEVE būdu sprogstančios cisternos charakteristikos. 
BLEVE poveikiai galimam taikiniui priklausys nuo cisternos padėties ir pasisukimo 
kampo sprogimo metu. Išanalizavus susidariusių skeveldrų pasiskirstymą sprogus 
cisternai, buvo nustatyta, kad jų trajektorijos stipriai priklauso nuo cisternos padėties 
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(yra kryptinės) (Birk 1996; Casal 2008). Todėl cisternos padėtį ir orientaciją galima 
išreikšti trimis x komponentais: 
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S2 pav. Pakelės objekto (taikinio) padėtis BLEVE pavojaus atžvilgiu su žemės paviršiumi 
susietoje koordinačių sistemoje {0; x1, x2, x3} (Vaidogas ir kt. 2012a) 
1. Cisternos centro koordinatėmis x1 ir x2 koordinačių sistemoje, kuri apima kelią 
ir taikinį (S2 pav.). 
2. Cisternos pasisukimo kampu x3, matuojamu judėjimo krypties ir kelio ašies 
atžvilgiu (S2 pav.). 
Žinant koordinates x1, x2 ir x3, galima apskaičiuoti atstumą ∆, susidarantį tarp 
BLEVE sprogimo centro ir taikinio bei vertinti šio sprogimo poveikius (S2 pav.). 
Siekiant parinkti koordinačių x1, x2 ir x3 tikimybių skirstinius ir sukaupti 
informaciją apie kitas BLEVE charakteristikas, disertaciniame darbe buvo sudaryta 
automobilinių cisternų avarijų duomenų bazė (žr. priedą A). Ji talpina informaciją apie 
151 transporto įvykį. Dauguma jų vyko 2007–2011 metais. 120 avarijų įvyko lygiose 
vietovėse arba vietovėse beveik su lygiais pakelės plotais. 17 avarijų atveju cisternos 
sustojo nuokalnėje ir 5 atvejais – įkalnėje. Vertikalų gradientą buvo sunku nustatyti tik 9 
atvejais. Skersinė po avarijos sustojusios automobilinės cisternos padėtis (skersinis 
nuokrypis) x2 buvo įvertinta 129 atvejams, o pasisukimo kampas x3 – 122 atvejams. 
Reikšmių x2i (i = 1, 2, ... , 129) ir x3i (i = 1, 2, ... , 122) histogramos pavaizduotos S3 pav. 
Nuokrypį x2 pasiūlyta aprašyti logistiniu tikimybių skirstiniu, o pasisukimo kampą x3 
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apibūdinti empirine pasiskirstymo funkcija. Tikimybinį išilginės sustojimo koordinatės 
x1 skirstinį buvo sunkiausia parinkti dėl duomenų stokos. Todėl, vertinant BLEVE 
sukeliamą riziką, koordinatę x1 galima nusakyti tolygiuoju tikimybių skirstiniu. Jis 
išreikš maksimalų neapibrėžtumą x1 atžvilgiu. 
Parinkus koordinačių x1, x2 ir x3 tikimybių skirstinius, buvo stochastiškai 
modeliuojamos (generuojamos) šių dydžių reikšmės, gaunami vektoriai xj = (x1j x2j, 3j) ir 
skaičiuojamos poveikių vektoriaus y reikšmės yj = ψ(xj) (j = 1, 2, ... , N, o N – 
modeliavimo ciklų skaičius). Vektoraus y reikšmėmis buvo imami tokie dydžiai: 
1. Vertinant cisternos skeveldrų smūgius į taikinį arba saugos barjerą, vektoriaus y 
komponentai buvo: skeveldros masė (y1 ≡ ξ), skeveldros greitis smūgio metu (y2 ≡ varr) ir rikošeto kampas (y3 ≡ φarr) (S4 pav.). 
2. Vertinant šiluminį BLEVE sprogimo metu susidarančio ugnies kamuolio 
poveikį, vektoriaus y komponentai buvo: šiluminė spinduliuotė pasirinktame 
taikinio taške (y1) ir ugnies kamuolio egzistavimo trukmė (y2) (S5 pav. 
vaizduoja du taikinio (talpyklos) taškus, kuriuose gali būti vertinama šiluminė 
spinduliuotė). 
 
S3 pav. Duomenų apie automobilinių cisternų avarijas apdorojimo rezultatai: a) sustojimo padėtis 
skersai kelio; b) pasisukimo kampas sustojus (Vaidogas ir kt. 2012a) 
Vertinant skeveldrų smūgius į projektuojamą saugos barjerą (taikinį), funkcija ψ(x) 
buvo sudaryta iš deterministinių modelių, nusakančių cisternos skilimą į skeveldras ir 
skeveldrų skriejimo trajektorijas. Vertinant šiluminę ugnies kamuolio spinduliuotę, 
funkcija ψ(x) buvo sukonstruota taikant deterministinį Olandijos mokslo tyrimo 
organizacijos TNO modelį (CPD 1992; CPR 2005). Abiem atvejais, įvesties vektorius x 
be koordinačių x1, x2 ir x3 turėjo ir daugiau komponentų, būtinų poveikių y reikšmėms 
skaičiuoti. Atlikus stochastinį modeliavimą, buvo gautos BLEVE poveikių reikšmių yj 
imtys, kurias galima taikyti vertinant galimas taikinio pažaidas arba projektuojant saugos 
barjerą. Jei nagrinėjamą taikinio arba barjero pažaidą laikyti atsitiktiniu įvykiu D, tai 
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reikšmės yj gali būti taikomos vertinant sąlyginę pažaidos tikimybę P(D | B) (žr. (S1) 
lygtį). Šios tikimybės įvertį galima skaičiuoti pagal formulę: 
 
S4 pav. Skeveldros smūgio į saugos barjerą charakteristikos (vektoriaus y komponentai) 
 
S5 pav. Ugnies kamuolys, susidarysiantis BLEVE būdu sprogus 24,7 tonų propano cisternai, bei 
du taikinio taškai, kuriuose vertinama šiluminė spinduliuotė (Vaidogas ir Kisežauskienė 2012) 
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yj) – pažeidžiamumo funkcijos P(D | y) reikšmė, apskaičiuota vektoriui yj (žr. 
(S2) lygtį). BLEVE poveikių reikšmių yj imtis taip pat galima taikyti parenkant 
charakteristines poveikių reikšmes. 
Antrame disertacijos skyriuje išspręsti du uždaviniai, kurie iliustruoja, kaip gauti 
reikšmių yj imtis. Pavyzdžiuose nagrinėtos dvi skirtingose Lietuvos vietose pastatytos 
pavojingųjų medžiagų talpyklos. Pirmame pavyzdyje buvo vertinama, kokius skeveldrų 
poveikius gali patirti projektuojamas saugos barjeras, kurį numatoma išdėstyti išilgai 
kelio Klaipėdos mieste. Antrame pavyzdyje skaičiuota, kokia šiluminė spinduliuotė gali 
veikti talpyklas, jei BLEVE sprogimas įvyks kelyje Vilnius–Kaunas. 
 
3. Projektiniai pakelės objektus saugančių barjerų 
pasiūlymai 
 
Trečiame skyriuje pasiūlyti keli projektiniai saugos barjerų sprendimai. Šie barjerai 
turėtų padėti apsaugoti pakelės objektus nuo sprogimų BLEVE būdu, galinčių kilti 
keliuose ir geležinkeliuose. Pirmas pasiūlymas apima saugos barjero išdėstymą 
turimame statybos plote ir barjero formos parinkimą. Antras pasiūlymas yra preliminarus 
sunaikinamo plieninio barjero projektas. Barjeras turi apsaugoti pakelės objektus nuo 
geležinkelio cisternos sprogimo BLEVE būdu. Svarstoma, kaip projektuoti tokį barjerą, 
derinant konstrukcijų patikimumo ir kiekybinės rizikos analizės metodus. Projektuojama 
turint mažą sprogimo bangos charakteristikų imtį. Trečias pasiūlymas yra 
rekomendacijos, kaip projektuoti gelžbetoninį barjerą. Jis turi atlaikyti cisternos 
sprogimo metu susidariusių skeveldrų smūgius. Visi trys projektiniai pasiūlymai turi 
išankstinių konstrukcinių sprendimų pobūdį. Detalus barjerų projektavimas 
nenagrinėjamas. Trečio skyriaus rezultatai pateikti publikacijose Vaidogas ir Linkutė 
(2012), Linkutė ir kt. (2013) ir Vaidogas ir kt. (2013). 
Geometriniai veiksniai, kurie labiausiai lemia pakelės objektų terminio ir 
mechaninio pažeidimo laipsnį yra atstumas nuo sprogimo šaltinio iki pažeidžiamo 
objekto ir pakelės reljefas. Didėjant atstumui tarp transporto avarijos vietos ir pakelės 
objekto, mažėja sprogimo bangos energija, šiluminė spinduliuotė, skeveldrų greitis ir 
aukštis. Tačiau gaisrų ir sprogimų poveikis gali didėti arba mažėti priklausomai nuo to, 
kurioje vietoje įvyks avarija, ar pakelė lygi, kalvota ar nuožulni. 
Pakelės objekto atžvilgiu nesaugią kelio (geležinkelio) atkarpą ω galima nustatyti 
nuo objekto link kelio atidedant saugų atstumą ∆ (S6 pav.). Saugus atstumas ∆ gali 
priklausyti (būti kryptiniu) arba ne nuo atidėjimo krypties. Jį gali lemti ir vietovės 
reljefas. Atidėjus saugų atstumą ∆, bus suformuota nesaugi zona Ω. Jei transporto 
priemonės gaisras arba sprogimas įvyks zonoje Ω, pakelės objektas gali būti pažeistas. 
Norint pastatyti saugos barjerą tarp kelio (geležinkelio) ir pakelės objekto 
(pažeidžiamos teritorijos), reikia turėti žemės sklypą, kurio plotas yra A0. Plotas A0 
sudarys dalį nesaugios zonos Ω ir bus tarp šalikelės ploto A1 ir saugomos teritorijos A2 
(S7 pav.). Plotą A1 lems transporto statinius reglamentuojantys dokumentai, o ploto A0 
dydį ir formą daugiausiai lems žemės nuosavybės padėtis, saugomo ploto A2 forma, 
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vietovės reljefas ir geologinės sąlygos. Jei plotas A0 yra pakankamai didelis, barjerui 
galima suteikti įvairias formas. Pigiausias ir paprasčiausias bus tiesus barjeras 
(S7 pav. a). Strėlės ir bastiono pavidalo barjerai bus efektyvesni atspindint sprogimo 
bangą ir nukreipiant skeveldras (S7 pav. bc). Tačiau tokiems barjerams statyti prireiks 
didesnio ploto. 
 
S6 pav. Saugus atstumas ∆ ir nesaugi kelio atkarpa skirtingiems objektams: a) dujotiekis; b) 
apskrita pavienė talpykla; c) eile išdėstytos talpyklos (Vaidogas ir Linkutė 2012) 
Trečiajame disertacijos skyriuje aptartos statybinės medžiagos, kurias galima 
naudoti saugos barjerams įrengti. Jei barjeras bus tvoros pavidalo konstrukcija, jį galima 
statyti iš gelžbetonio arba plieno. Jei reikia, šias medžiagas galima derinti. Tačiau barjerą 
galima įrengti sukasant grunto pylimą tarp kelio ir pažeidžiamo pakelės objekto. 
Gelžbetoninis arba plieninis barjeras gali sustabdyti (nukreipti) BLEVE metu 
susidarančias skeveldras ir sumažinti sprogimo bangos energiją. Grunto pylimas 
apsaugos nuo skeveldrų. Tačiau jei jo šlaitai nebus pakankamai statūs, o pylimo aukštis 
didelis, jis nedaug mažins sprogimo bangos energiją. Nepriklausomai nuo to, kokia 
medžiaga bus naudojama įrengiant saugos barjerą, jis nebus veiksmingas apsaugant greta 
kelio arba geležinkelio esantį pakelės objektą nuo šiluminės BLEVE sprogimo ugnies 
kamuolio spinduliuotės. Čia „barjeru“ gali būti didelis atstumas nuo galimo sprogimo 
epicentro arba šiluminis pakelės objekto ekranavimas. 
Projektinis disertacijoje siūlomo plieninio barjero sprendinys pavaizduotas 
S8 paveiksle. Barjero dalis yra sunaikinama danga iš profiliuotų plieninių lakštų, turinti 
sugerti BLEVE sprogimo bangą. Šio sprogimo metu susidarančias cisternos skeveldras 
turi sustabdyti plieninių lynų tinklas, įrengiamas priešingoje pavojui barjero pusėje. 
Disertacijoje pasiūlytas metodas, kaip projektuoti sunaikinamą dangą turint mažo dydžio 
statistinę sprogimo bangos charakteristikų imtį. Šiame metode suderinti profiliuoto 
lakšto skaičiavimas statybinių konstrukcijų patikimumo teorijos principais ir kartotinio 
statistinio ėmimo (angl. bootstrap) procedūra (Linkutė ir kt. 2013). 
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S7 pav. Horizontalus saugos barjero išdėstymas plote A0: a) tiesi sienos atkarpa; b) strėlės 
pavidalo barjeras; c) bastiono pavidalo barjeras (Vaidogas ir Linkutė 2012) 
 
S8 pav. Projektinis plieninio saugos barjero su sunaikinama danga ir apsauginiu tinklu 
pasiūlymas: a) pjūvis; b) planas (Linkutė ir kt. 2013) 
Trečiajame disertacijos skyriuje taip pat pateikiamas projektinis gelžbetoninio 
saugos barjero pasiūlymas. Barjerą galima projektuoti iš surenkamų gelžbetoninių 
elementų, pavaizduotų S9 paveiksle. Toks barjeras leis sustabdyti BLEVE sprogimo 
metu susidarančias cisternos skeveldras. Jei barjeras bus pastatytas netoli nuo galimo 
BLEVE sprogimo epicentro, jis atspindės ir, jei bus specialiai tam projektuotas, sugers 
namažą dalį sprogimo bangos energijos. Trečiajame skyriuje aptarta, kaip projektuoti 
gelžbetoninį barjerą, kad jis reaguotų į skeveldrų smūgius kaip plastiška konstrukcija. 
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S9 pav. Projektinis gelžbetoninio saugos barjero pasiūlymas 
 
S10 pav. Grunto pylimas (dešinėje), pastatytas apsaugoti degalų saugyklą (kairėje) nuo 
geležinkelio cisternos sprogimo BLEVE būdu (autorės nuotrauka) 
Saugos barjeras gali turėti ir grunto pylimo pavidalą. Pylimas apsaugos pakelės 
objektą nuo cisternų skeveldrų poveikio su sąlyga, kad jis bus tinkamų matmenų ir 
išdėstytas labiausiai tikėtinų skeveldrų trajektorijų vietoje. Pylimai gali būti labai pigūs 
ir supilami per trumpą laiką. Tačiau tam, kad pylimas būtų pakankamai aukštas, jis turi 
būti labai platus ir užimti didelį plotą tarp saugomo pakelės objekto ir galimos sprogimo 
vietos. Kai kuriais atvejais gali trūkti vietos tokiam pylimui pastatyti. Be to, pylimo 
šlaitai gali būti nepakankamai statūs, kad būtų užtikrinta tinkama apsauga nuo sprogimo 
bangos poveikio. Grunto pylimo, pastatyto apsaugoti degalų saugyklas nuo skeveldrų 
poveikio, pavyzdys pateiktas S10 ir 3.14 paveiksluose). Šio pylimo statybą paskatino 
saugos studija, atlikta užsakius „Lietuvos geležinkeliams“. (Vaidogas ir kt. 2012c). 
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Bendrosios išvados 
 
 
1. Mokslo publikacijų, skirtų transporto rizikai vertinti, apžvalga leido padaryti 
išvadą, kad daugelis mokslininkų nagrinėja asmeninės ir grupinės rizikos 
skaičiavimą. Ši rizika tenka pakelės gyventojams. Vyraujantis avarijos 
scenarijus transporto rizikos vertinimuose yra nuodingosios medžiagos 
nuotėkis, sukeliantis gyventojų apsinuodijimus. Rizika, kylanti statybiniam 
pakelės turtui (pastatams, transporto infrastruktūros objektams, pramonės 
įmonėms), yra minima literatūroje, tačiau detaliai nenagrinėjama.  
2. Išanalizavus duomenis apie pavojingųjų medžiagų vežimo avarijas, nustatyta, 
kad didžiausią žalos statybiniam turtui potencialą turi sprogimai BLEVE būdu 
ir garų debesų sprogimai. Dažniausiai abiejų rūšių sprogimus sukelia vežami 
komerciniai angliavandeniliai, ypač propanas. Jo vežimo avarijų nuošimtis kitų 
medžiagų atžvilgiu yra apie 65 % keliuose ir apie 40 % geležinkeliuose. 
Sprogimai BLEVE būdu dažnesni už garų debesų sprogimus, todėl pirmieji 
kelia didžiausią pavojų statybiniam pavojų turtui. 
3. Svarstant, kaip galima sumažinti riziką statybiniam pakelės turtui, keliamą 
BLEVE sprogimų keliuose ir geležinkeliuose, nustatyta, kad tai galima padaryti 
statant saugos barjerus. Juos galima išdėstyti tarp kelių ir geležinkelių, kuriais 
vežamos pavojingosios medžiagos, ir pažeidžiamų pakelės objektų. Barjerai 
gali turėti tvoros pavidalą arba jais gali būti grunto pylimai. Barjeru taip pat gali 
būti didelis atstumas tarp transporto arterijų ir pakelės objektų.  
4. Išanalizavus galimybes vertinti šiluminį ir mechaninį BLEVE sprogimo poveikį 
pakelės objektams prieita išvados, kad šį uždavinį reikia pradėti spręsti 
prognozuojant sprogstančios automobilinės arba geležinkelio cisternos padėtį ir 
orientaciją taikinio atžvilgiu. Toks prognozavimas bus susijęs su dideliais 
neapibrėžtumais, kuriuos reikia kiekybiškai išreikšti tikimybių skirtiniais. Kai 
kuriuos iš šių skirstinių galima parinkti remiantis statistiniais duomenimis apie 
transporto įvykius. Kitus teks užduoti subjektyviai, taikant kiekybinio rizikos 
vertinimo principus. Duomenys apie automobilinių cisternų avarijas leidžia 
daryti išvadą, kad avariją patyrusios cisternos centro padėtį skersai kelio reikia 
aprašyti logistiniu tikimybių skirstiniu su vidurkiu 2,02 m ir standartu 5,62 m. 
Tokios cisternos pasisukimo kampui kelio ašies atžvilgiu nusakyti tiks 
empirinis tikimybių skirstinys su vidurkiu 2,83° ir standartu 56,8°. 
5. Analizuojant deterministinius modelius, skirtus prognozuoti šiluminį ir 
mechaninį BLEVE sprogimo poveikį, nustatyta, kad šiais modeliais galima 
praplėsti cisternos indo padėties ir orientacijos sprogimo metu modeliavimą. 
Taikant šiuos modelius bus galima įvertinti poveikių neapibrėžtumus pagal 
kiekybinio rizikos vertinimo principus. Techniškai šiuos neapibrėžtumus galima 
išreikšti tikimybių skirstiniais ir transformuoti, pasitelkiant stochastinį (Monte 
Karlo) modeliavimą. 
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6. Išnagrinėjus galimybes projektuoti saugos barjerus pagal kiekybinio rizikos 
vertinimo principus, nustatyta, kad tai galima daryti naudojant dviejų rūšių 
statistines BLEVE poveikių reikšmių imtis: didelę imtį, gautą stochastiškai 
modeliuojant, ir mažos apimties imtį, gautą eksperimentuojant arba tiriant 
įvykusias avarijas. Informacija, gaunama su šiomis imtimis, gali būti 
naudojama vertinant barjero atsako tikimybę. Šios tikimybės įvertis gali būti 
pagrindinis rodiklis, nusakantis barjero reakciją į BLEVE poveikius. 
7. Išnagrinėjus statybines medžiagas, kurias galima naudoti įrengiant saugos 
barjerus prieita prie išvados, kad iš plieno galima statyti barjerus, kurie suirs 
absorbuodami sprogimo poveikį. Tokie barjerai vadinami sunaikinamais 
barjerais. Masyvūs gelžbetoniniai barjerai ir grunto pylimai bus veiksmingi 
sulaikant skeveldras, susidarančias sprogstant automobilinėms ir geležinkelio 
cisternoms. Šių skeveldrų masė gali būti iki 10 tonų, o smūgiavimo greitis siekti 
400 km/h. Tinkamai įvertinus galimą sprogimo bangą ir tikėtinus cisternos 
skeveldrų smūgius, plieninių ir gelžbetoninių konstrukcijų skaičiavimą galima 
atlikti taikant įprastinius konstrukcijų projektavimo metodus. 
8. BLEVE sprogimų poveikių tyrimas atskleidė, kad ugnies kamuolys, kylantis 
sprogstant tipinėms automobilinėms ir geležinkelio cisternoms, bus didelis. Jis 
gali siekti 300 m aukštį, o jo skersmuo gali būti iki 200 m. Todėl tvoros 
pavidalo barjerai arba grunto pylimai menkai apsaugos pakelės objektus nuo 
šiluminio ugnies kamuolio poveikio. Šiuos objektus galima apsaugoti, 
užtikrinant didelį atstumą tarp kelio (geležinkelio) ir pažeidžiamo taikinio. 
Pakelės objektai taip pat gali būti apsaugoti šiluminiais ekranais, nes BLEVE 
sprogimo metu susidarančio ugnies kamuolio trukmė yra santykinai trumpa ir 
dažnai neviršija 20 sekundžių. 
9. Išanalizavus šiame darbe siūlomas metodines procedūras prieita išvados, kad 
praktinio jų taikymo sėkmė priklausys nuo to, kaip projektuotojas sugebės 
išspręsti du uždavinius: kaip prognozuoti šiluminius ir mechaninius gaisrų ir 
sprogimų, galinčių įvykti keliuose ir geležinkeliuose, poveikius (trumpai, 
uždavinį „A“) ir kaip tinkamai išnaudoti šio prognozavimo rezultatus, 
projektuojant saugos barjerą (trumpai, uždavinį „B“). Saugos barjero, turinčio 
tvoros, grunto pylimo arba pakankamo saugaus atstumo pavidalą, 
projektavimas bus santykinai paprastas, turint realistiškus galimų gaisrų ir 
sprogimų poveikių įverčius. 
10. „A“ ir „B“ uždavinių sprendimas yra tarpdalykinė problema. Uždaviniys „A“ 
yra, iš esmės, nestatybinis uždavinys. Jį turėtų spręsti chemijos, mechanikos ir 
gaisrinės saugos inžinieriai, išmanantys tokius reiškinius, kaip BLEVE ir garų 
debesies sprogimas. Šie inžinieriai taip pat turėtų sugebėti modeliuoti 
neapibrėžtumus, susijusius su tokių sprogimų poveikiais. 
11. Aukščiau minėtas uždavinys „B“ turi būti sprendžiamas statinių 
konstruktoriaus, kuris projektuos saugos barjerą. Jei gaisrų ir sprogimų 
poveikiai bus prognozuojami, remiantis tikimybių modeliavimu ir kiekybinio 
rizikos vertinimo principais, geriausiai šios prognozės rezultatai bus išnaudoti 
barjerą projektuojant statybinių konstrukcijų patikimumo teorijos metodais. 
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Saugos barjerą taip pat galima projektuoti, pasitelkiant tradicinius, 
deterministinius metodus. Taip projektuojant, gaisrų ir sprogimų poveikiai turės 
būti išreiškiami fiksuotomis skaičiuotinėmis reikšmėmis. Tačiau jos gali būti 
netikslios arba nepakankamai konservatyvios. 
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Annexes 
Annexes are given in the enclosed compact disc. They include textual infor-
mation, computation results and data collected for the purposes of the investiga-
tion described in this dissertation. Annexes are arranged in six sections entitled 
as follows: 
 
Annex A. Database on road tank car accidents 
Annex B. Kinematic characteristics of fragments 
Annex C. Information on the road tanker considered in the case study 
Annex D. Results of fragment impact simulation in the case study 
Annex E. Results of fragment impact simulation in the case study  
Annex F. Results of fragment impact simulation in the case study 
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Annex A. Database on road tanker accidents 
 
The present annex contains a database with the information on 151 traffic acci-
dent in which road tankers and several similar vehicles were involved. The in-
formation consists mainly of the data on the final rest position of the tankers as 
well as material shipped by them. The database was arranged in the form of the 
Table A1. 
Table A1. Database containing information on 151 road tanker accidents 
No Date Location Material(1) y1 
 (m)(2)  
y2 
 (°)(3) 
Rest 
pos.(4) 
1 1964/08/09 Louisiana LPG 19.10 70 A 
2 1981/11/02 Kansas City, Mis-
souri LPG 4.60 -160 
B 
3 1984/10/25 Jacksonville, 
 Florida LPG 14.40 -15 
B 
4 1985/01/24 Jean, Texas oil 0 0 N 
5 1962/08/03 Houston, Texas gasoline 0 0 N 
6 1984/09/03 Norfolk, Texas gasoline 0 0 N 
7 2002/07/12 Masnoa, Syria fuel 0 0 N 
8 2005/08/10 Salt Lake City explosive 0 0 N 
9 2006/04/19 Hubei Province, China diesel 11.60 10 
A 
10 2007/02/08 Mahanoy fuel 17.60 0 C 
11 2007/04/27 Houston, diesel 0 0 C 
12 2007/04/30 Oakland gasoline 0 0 B 
13 2007/09/10 Sacramento, 
 Mexico 
ammonium 
nitrate 0 0 
A 
14 2007/11/16 Lake, Dallas diesel 0 0 A 
15 2007/12/05 Everett gasoline 9.60 0 A 
16 2008/02/14 not reported hydrogen 0 0 0 
17 2008/04/26 Chicago LPG 0 0 C 
18 2009/01/12 Kissimmee, 
 Florida yogurt 9.10 0 
A 
19 2009/02/01 Nairobi, Kenya Petrol 3.10 0 C 
20 2009/04/01 Pasadena, 
 California gasoline 18.10 35 
A 
21 2009/07/05 Ocraoke firework 11.10 150 A 
22 2009/07/15 Michigan LPG 18.10 70 C 
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Table A1. Continued 
23 2009/07/15 Detroit gasoline 0 0 N 
24 2009/07/24 Fullerton, 
 California frozen meat 9.10 0 
C 
25 2009/07/25 Central Florida gasoline 11.05 0 C 
26 2009/07/25 Oak Park, 
 Michigan 
diesel gaso-
line 12.35 0 
A 
27 2009/07/26 New Castle propane 11.10 0 B 
28 2009/08/24 Elmore, 
 Minnesota fuel 0 -170 
C 
29 2009/08/26 Rochester, 
 Indiana LPG 3.85 -20 
C 
30 2009/09/10 Cedar Rapid, 
 Indiana Fuel 11.60 0 
C 
31 2009/09/24 Bakersfield tequila bot-tles 12.05 -60 
C 
32 2009/09/25 Bloomfield, 
 Indiana hot asphalt 16.35 70 
A 
33 2009/10/17 Tampa, 
 Florida 
sulphuric 
acid 10.10 0 
A 
34 2009/10/19 Oxford, 
 Indiana fuel 11.05 85 
A 
35 2009/10/22 Indianapolis propane 18.10 85 B 
36 2009/10/22 Indiana propane 0 0 N 
37 2009/10/23 Fayetteville Fuel 11.95 0 C 
38 2009/11/16 Orlando, 
 Florida LPG 13.45 -5 
A 
39 2009/11/30 Kansas City hydrochloride 
acid (HCL) 11.60 -20 
A 
40 2009/12/10 Paramus, 
 New Jersey 
coca cola 
cans 
8.15 0 A 
41 2009/12/12 Saylorsburg, Penn-
sylvania fuel 44.60 90 
C 
42 2009/12/12 Merrill, 
 Indiana fuel 18.05 45 
A 
43 2009/12/20 Casper LPG 9.80 25 C 
44 2009/12/22 Warsaw, 
 Indiana 
anhydrous 
ammonia 14.95 -10 
A 
45 2009/12/30 Tulsa, 
 Oklahoma diesel 7.15 -30 
A 
46 2009/12/31 Karunagapally, 
 India LPG 3.10 170 
A 
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Table A1. Continued 
47 2010/01/18 De Witt, 
 New York crud oil 20.00 -50 
C 
48 2010/01/20 Williamston, Michi-gan 
boxes or 
cereal 12.35 10 
C 
49 2010/01/23 Brooklyn, 
 JAV gasoline 13.35 -40 
A 
50 2010/01/23 Melville, 
 New York fuel 13.30 -20 
A 
51 2010/01/25 Montpellier, 
 Vermont propane 3.10 -90 
C 
52 2010/01/28 Montpellier, 
 Vermont milk 5.35 80 
A 
53 2010/02/05 New Stanton, Penn-
sylvania candy bars 17.60 0 
B 
54 2010/02/08 Hoyden, 
 Indiana LPG 13.05 25 
C 
55 2010/02/10 Dearborn, 
 Missouri milk 24.84 0 
C 
56 2010/02/12 Shuyler, 
 New York palettes 14.05 0 
C 
57 
2010/02/17 
Donald 
 Sonville, 
 Louisiana 
sulphuric 
acid (H2SO4) 14.35 0 
C 
58 
2010/02/22 
Grand Hawen Tow-
ship, 
 Michigan 
LNG 6.70 0 
C 
59 2010/03/05 Phoenix, 
 Arizona LPG 14.60 10 
C 
60 2010/03/22 Seminary, 
 Mississippi grain 4.05 0 
C 
61 2010/04/02 Sherman, 
 Maine LPG 11.35 0 
C 
62 2010/04/01 Chicago, 
 Illinois LPG 0.10 -100 
C 
63 2010/04/02 Burverde, 
 Texas propane 14.60 70 
C 
64 2010/04/05 Woodbine, 
 New Jersey Fuel 16.55 5 
A 
65 2010/04/07 Wamsutter, Wyo-
ming crude oil 11.55 0 
A 
66 2010/04/07 Bethpage, 
 New York fuel 11.35 0 
A 
67 2010/04/14 Roy, Utah diesel 8.60 -90 C 
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Table A1. Continued 
68 2010/04/26 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma flour 16.10 -15 
C 
69 2010/05/03 Wythe County, Vir-ginia LPG 21.10 55 
C 
70 2010/05/05 Weedsport, 
 New York 
aliunimum 
soda cans 6.70 70 
A 
71 2010/05/05 San Antonio fuel 0 0 B 
72 2010/05/07 Skerwood, 
 Oregon propane 5.25 -5 
A 
73 2010/05/08 Scarborough, 
 Maine empty 12.25 0 
C 
74 
2010/05/10 
Madison 
 County, 
 Kentucky 
propane 16.35 45 
C 
75 2010/05/16 Miami Gardens, Florida fuel oil 11.05 0 
A 
76 2010/05/18 Walthan, Massachu-
setts woodchips 18.85 30 
A 
77 2010/05/18 Sissonville, 
 Virginia fuel 17.05 90 
A 
78 2010/05/19 Brighton, 
 Michigan 
monolube 
3400 10.05 5 
A 
79 2010/05/20 Caledonia, Wiscon-
sin bread 9.60 0 
C 
80 2010/05/27 Revelstoke fuel 13.60 180 A 
81 2010/05/28 Carona, 
 Los Angeles gasoline 11.60 0 
A 
82 2010/05/29 Tynsborough, Mas-
sachusetts aerosol paint 12.40 0 
A 
83 2010/05/29 Los Angles gasoline 12.60 0 A 
84 2010/05/30 Harrison, 
 Ohio LPG 10.50 10 
C 
85 2010/05/31 Tyler, Texas gas 9.25 0 C 
86 2010/06/03 Napa County, Cali-fornia ceramic pipe 5.25 -20 
C 
87 2010/06/10 Charlotte, 
 Michigan LPG 10.55 -90 
A 
88 2010/06/11 Poulsbo, 
 Washington Fuel 5.40 85 
C 
89 2010/06/15 Newport, 
 Virginia 
sulphuric 
acid 18.95 0 
A 
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Table A1. Continued 
90 2010/06/16 San Diego, Califor-
nia gasoline 0 0 
C 
91 2010/06/18 Henderson, Ken-tucky propane 1.55 -90 
C 
92 2010/06/22 Foxboro, Massachu-
setts jet fuel -2.65 45 
A 
93 2010/06/26 Broadhead, Wiscon-
sin milk 5.90 10 
C 
94 2010/06/28 Hyderabad, 
 Pakistan thinner 0 0 
N 
95 2010/06/28 Catskill, 
 New York hypochlorite 11.35 0 
C 
96 2010/06/29 Cartez, 
 Florida LPG 6.70 -50 
B 
97 2010/07/02 Charlotte, 
 Carolina ceiled steel 13.30 0 
C 
98 2010/07/03 Kishnasha, 
 Congo oil 14.60 -20 
A 
99 2010/07/04 N. Carolina fireworks 13.60 130 A 
100 2010/07/08 Venice, 
 Florida propane 9.60 0 
C 
101 2010/07/08 Fairwax, Virginia 
prefabricated 
mobile house 12.35 -10 
A 
102 2010/07/14 Kirvin, 
 Kansas propane 9.60 0 
A 
103 2010/07/19 San Diego, Califor-
nia gravel 0.90 -90 
A 
104 2010/07/24 Waynesboro, Vir-ginia 
building 
lumber 13.45 10 
C 
105 2010/07/26 Inclive vil., 
 Nevada 
building de-
bris 10.93 0 
C 
106 2010/07/28 Peidmont, 
 S. Carolina fuel 22.60 15 
C 
107 2010/08/04 Cedar Rapids, Iowa sodium hy-droxide 16.35 35 
A 
108 2010/08/09 Highland, Illinois food 14.60 0 C 
109 2010/08/12 Unity, Wisconsin milk 17.95 -70 C 
110 2010/08/13 Clover, South Caro-lina yarn 10.60 5 
C 
111 2010/08/16 Fort Mill, South Carolina gasoline 13.60 0 
A 
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Table A1. Continued 
112 2010/08/16 Charlotte, North Carolinas fuel 0 0 
A 
113 2010/08/16 Coloma, Michigan propane 18.15 -20 C 
114 2010/08/18 Salt Lake City, Utah ham 15.65 95 C 
115 2010/08/20 Armold, Maryland LPG 8.85 -5 A 
116 2010/08/21 Arizona diesel 27.60 50 C 
117 2010/08/24 Santa Barbara, Cali-fornia LPG 15.60 0 
C 
118 2010/08/26 Montreal, Canada LPG 11.35 0 A 
119 2010/08/27 Gilroy, California broccoli 5.80 0 C 
120 2010/08/28 Utah diesel 18.10 90 B 
121 2010/08/29 Hamshire, Texas isobutene 19.85 90 B 
122 2010/08/31 Falcon Heights, Minnesota LPG 11.10 10 
A 
123 
2010/09/03 Dearborn County, Indiana 
molten 
phthalic an-
hydride 
22.85 40 
B 
124 2010/09/07 Issaquah, Washington 
steel con-
struction 10.45 0 
C 
125 2010/09/08 Lake Worth, 
 Florida PVC pipe 4.35 5 
A 
126 2010/09/10 Sacramento, 
 Mexico dynamite 12.60 -20 
C 
127 2010/09/14 Cache County, Utah banana 13.35 0 
A 
128 2010/09/22 Helena, 
 Montana cattle 14,05 -5 
A 
129 2010/09/29 Columbia, South Carolina LPG 4.60 -100 
A 
130 2010/10/12 New Mexico diesel 0 0 C 
131 2010/10/13 Oldham County ink 1.85 -90 C 
132 2010/10/18 Morgan Hill molten wax 2.15 -90 A 
133 2010/10/23 South Bend, 
 Indiana mandarins 14.60 0 
A 
134 2010/10/28 Los Angles, Cali-fornia LPG 8.10 0 
A 
135 2010/10/29 Albuquerque, New Mexico LPG 2.85 -80 
A 
136 2010/11/01 Foxboro, Massachu-
setts candles 2.90 15 
C 
137 2010/11/02 Parma, Idaho empty 7.85 35 A 
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Table A1. Continued  
138 2010/11/05 Ibadan, Nigeria petrol fuel 0 0 B 
139 2010/11/09 California tar 4.05 15 A 
140 2010/11/10 Mt. Juliet, 
 Tennessee 
ferric chlo-
ride 17.35 -10 
C 
141 2010/11/26 Rufus, 
 Oregon LPG 3.65 -30 
A 
142 2010/12/07 Sent Louis automotive parts 7.70 -10 
A 
143 2010/12/10 Bakers Corner, Indi-
ana 
propane 22.40 0 C 
144 2010/12/12 Maysville, 
 Kentuky paper 6.75 0 
C 
145 2010/12/14 Lansing, 
 Michigan LNG 7.80 0 
A 
146 2010/12/16 Remington, 
 Indiana fuel 9.60 0 
A 
147 2010/12/18 Ningxiang, 
 Japan fireworks 0 0 
B 
148 2010/12/20 Utah bride oil 4.60 -50 A 
149 2010/12/21 Canada oil 11.85  A 
150 2011/01/10 Oklahoma propane 21.10 -90 C 
151 2011/01/31 Matttoon, 
 Kentucky 
anhydrous 
ammonia 14.45 -85 
B 
Notes: 
(1)
 Material = material shipped by the vehicle involved in a traffic accident 
(2) y1 = transverse rest position in the vehicle-based coordinate system {0; y1, y2, y3} 
shown in Fig. 2.5 (Sec. 2.2.1) 
(3) y2 = departure angle in the vehicle-based coordinate system {0; y1, y2, y3} shown in 
Fig. 2.5 (Sec. 2.2.1) 
(4) Rest pos. (rest position) = the dominant rest position of the tanker vessel with re-
spect to a horizontal orientation of the principal vessel axis shown in cases a), b) and 
c) of Fig. 2.17 (Sec. 2.2.3); letters ”A“,”B“, and ”C“ correspond to these three cases; 
the letter ”D“ means that the position was different from all three positions indicated 
in Fig. 2.17; the letter “N” means that the vessel position was not identifiable 
 
Table A2. Worldwide data on 43 BLEVE accidents on road in the period 1959 to 2011 
(information was extracted from the FACTS database, FACTS (2014))  
Year Country Location Material involved in BLEVE 
1959 USA Road LPG (propane) 
1962 USA Road LPG (propane) 
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Table A2. Continued 
1963 Netherlands Level crossing LPG (butane, propane) 
1967 Belgium Road Propylene 
1970 USA Built-up-area Oxygen (liquid)/lox 
1970 USA Engineering-works LPG (propane) 
1972 USA Road Propylene 
1973 France Road LPG (propane) 
1975 USA Road LPG (butane, propane) 
1976 USA Road LPG (propane) 
1977 USA Unknown LP LPG (propane)G 
1977 Netherlands Road LPG (propane) 
1978 Netherlands Road Inflammable liquid gas 
1978 Denmark Road Benzene  
1979 Canada Level crossing LPG (propane) 
1979 Netherlands Road LPG (propane) 
1980 USA Road Benzene 
1980 Netherlands Road Hydraulic oil 
1980 Netherlands Road LPG (propane) 
1981 Netherlands Road LPG (propane) 
1981 USA Road LPG (propane) 
1981 Netherlands Road LPG (propane) 
1982 India Road LPG (propane) 
1982 Netherlands Road Freon  
1984 Netherlands Road LPG (propane) 
1984 Netherlands Road LPG (propane) 
1990 Estonia Road LPG (propane) 
1995 USA Road LPG (propane) 
1996 India Tunnel LPG (propane) 
1997 Malaysia Road LPG (propane) 
1997 France Road LPG (propane) 
1998 France Road LPG (propane) 
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Table A2. Continued 
1998 India Parking LPG (propane) 
1998 USA Road Diesel oil/Fuel 
1999 Greece Road LPG (propane) 
2001 Netherlands Road Diesel oil 
2001 India Road Inflammable liquefied gas 
2002 Estonia Road Diesel oil 
2003 France Road LPG (propane) 
2006 Zambia Road Methanol 
2007 France Parking LPG (propane) 
2007 Greece Road LPG (propane) 
2011 Spain Road LPG (propane) 
 
Table A3. Data on 38 BLEVE accidents on rail in the years 1958 to 2003 (extracted 
from the FACTS database, FACTS (2014)) 
Year Country Location Material involved in BLEVE 
1958 Denmark Rail yard LPG (propane) 
1968 USA Railway Vinyl chloride  
1969 USA Railway LPG (propane) 
1969 USA Railway LPG (propane) 
1970 USA City LPG (propane) 
1971 USA Rail yard Vinyl chloride  
1974 USA Railway LPG (propane) 
1975 USA Railway LPG (propane) 
1976 USA City Benzene  
1977 USA Railway Isobutene 
1977 USA Depot LPG (propane) 
1978 USA Engineering-works Butadiene 
1978 USA Railway LPG (propane) 
1978 USA Railway LPG (propane) 
1979 Netherlands Railway Methane  
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Table A3. Continued 
1979 Canada Level crossing LPG (propane) 
1979 USA Railway Butadiene 
1982 Canada Railway Ammonium phosphate 
1982 USA Railway Vinyl chloride  
1982 Canada Level crossing Sodium sulphide 
1983 USA Railway Ammonia 
1985 USA Engineering-works Butyl acrylate 
1985 Denmark Railway Benzene 
1986 Sudan Railway Benzene 
1989 Russia Railway station LPG (propane) 
1990 Belgium Railway station Dimethyl ether 
1983 USA Railway Sulphuric acid 
1996 USA Railway LPG (propane) 
1996 USA Rail yard LPG (propane) 
1999 Canada Railway Ammonia 
1999 USA Factory Diesel oil/Fuel 
1999 Canada Railway Benzene 
1999 Finland Rail yard Crude oil 
2000 Netherlands Railway station LPG (propane) 
2000 USA Engineering-works Acrylic acid 
2001 USA Tunnel Acetic acid  
2002 Ethiopia Railway Butane 
2003 Canada Railway Ammonia 
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Annex B. Kinematic characteristics of fragments 
 
The departure velocity of the generated fragnment can be derived from its kinet-
ic energy, Ec and its mass, mp: 
 
p
c
p
m
E⋅
=
2
ν  (B1) 
where total energy, E, that causes the expansion, the rupture and the vessel ex-
plosion can be calculated by comparing the pressures onside and outside the 
vessel, (Baum1988): 
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where V is the vessel volume; p0  is the failure pressure; pe is the atmospheric 
pressure (i.e. the external pressure); γ is the specific heat ratio. 
Table B1. Probability density of fragment velocity 
 
No. Interval Number of test Experimental frenquency  
Theoretical 
frequency 
1 [0.00, 0.02] 23 0.1966 0.2272 
2 [0.02, 0.04] 34 0.2906 0.2336 
3 [0.04, 0.06] 22 0.1880 0.1812 
4 [0.06, 0.08] 12 0.1026 0.1293 
5 [0.08, 0.10] 7 0.0598 0.0886 
6 [0.10, 0.12] 6 0.0513 0.0592 
7 [0.12, 0.14] 3 0.0256 0.0389 
8 [0.14, 0.16] 2 0.0171 0.0253 
9 [0.16, 0.18] 2 0.0171 0.0163 
10 [0.18, 0.20] 2 0.0171 0.0105 
11 [0.20, 0.22] 3 0.0256 0.0067 
12 [0.22, 0.24] 1 0.0085 0.0047 
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The fragment kinematic energy, Ec, is then derived from the total energy, E 
(Hauptmanns, 2001b): 
 EEc ⋅= α  (B3) 
where α is a multiplying factor. 
One the base of the available data (Baum 1988, 1995, 2001), the experi-
mental values for the factor, α, derived from equations B1–B2, are summarized 
in Table B1. 
Mébarki et al. (2009) investigate,an adequate probabilistic distribution for 
the multiplying factor, α. Actually, considering this factor asa random variable, 
its adequate p.d.f. can be derived from the maximum entropy principle (Kapur 
1989; Mébarki et al. 2008): 
 ( ) ( ) ( )ααααα ln; 2 == gp  (B4) 
where ( )ααp   is the p.d.f. of thr factor α). 
The available information used herein is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )αααα lng;g == 21  (B5) 
Their mean values can be, therefore expressed as mathematical expectation 
value of order 1 (the mean value), E1: 
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with ( ) 01.0102.0 +−= iα  and 02.0=∆α . 
Mathematical expectation value for the logarithm of ,α ( )( )αlnE : 
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with ( ) 0101020 .i. +−=α and 020.=α∆ . 
The multipliers values are therefore obtained by solving the following 
system: 
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 4793094312488694 210 .and.,. −==−=⇒ λλλ  (B12) 
The good acoordance between theoretical and experimental histograms for 
the factor α. Therefore, the multiplying factor α is assumed to follow continuous 
exponential distribution.  
As discussed in Mébarki et al. (2007; 2008; 2009ab); and Nguyen et al. 
(2009), the total energy E can be calculated using eq. B12 from Baum (1988) 
when the explosion of a tank occurs. Afterward, the kinetic energy Ek of the 
fragments can be derived using Eq. B14. the initial velocity of general fragments 
v0, can be derived from their kinetic energy Ek and mass m Eq. B13. 
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 cEEk =  (B14) 
 
m
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2
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where pe is the atmosheric pressure, p0 is the failure pressure of the source ves-
sel, γ is the specific heat ratio, f is the degree of filling of the source vessel, V is 
the volume of source vessel, c is a multipliecative factor relating total expansion 
energy in the vessel and kinetic energy of the fragment. 
The generated fragments may impact potential targets on their trajectory, 
being therefore a mechanical threat for these targets, as it may damage them 
seriously. The trajectory of the projectiles has then to be exactly known. This 
kind of problem has already been studied in order to investigate the possible 
collision between a fragments (the projectile) and tank (the target) in its vicinity 
(Hauptmanns 2011 ab). The movement of the fragment has been analysed in 
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bidimensional (2D). The simplified form of the possible impct analysis supposes 
that the fragment trajectory can be described by trajectory of a point (its 
barycentre). For this purpose Gubinneli et al. (2004) presents also the model 
known as "minimal distances". The simplified forms are the following: 
rectangular from in xy plane and circular form on xz plane. 
The present study details with the possible impact and requires also the 
detailed information in order to evaluate the mechanical damage caused to the 
target by the impact. A three dimensional analysis is therefore considered. 
However, for simplification purposes at the step, the rotation effect of the 
fragment during the movement is neglected. The equations of motion for 
fragment centre are as follows: 
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where q = 1 at descending part; q = 2 at ascending part; g is gravity; mp is frag-
ment mass; AD is drag area and AL is lift area. 
The detailed equation are described in the Appendix A where the analytical 
solution of the nonlinear differential equations system of fragment a presented. 
With the coordinates, the size and dimensions of a given target, Nguyen et al. 
2009develop an additional equation system in order to modelize target shape. 
The impact occurs when it exists a possible intersection between the fragment 
and the considered target , i.e. any point on the  fragment trajectory meets the 
target. If an impact is possible, the coordinates of the intersection point (I), the 
velocities and the angles at the impact are calculated. The probability of impact 
Pimp might then be defined: 
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where Nsim the number of Monte Carlo simulations; 
( )( )( )kfragmentett tvv φ≠∩arg1 : the indicator function that indicates whether the 
projectile meets and impacts the target under study or not; Vtarget: the volume of 
target with a given location, dimensions and shape; Vfragment (t): the volume of 
fragment at hte kth simulation depending on the dimensions, the shape and the 
location on trajectory that depends on the time t (with t >0). 
The trajectory of fragments projected from the exploded vessels results 
from the combined effects of inertia, gravitation and aerodynamics (drag and 
lift). Let (O, X, Y, Z) be the set of system axes used for the trajectory description 
and let O be the departure point for a generated fragment. The fragment 
trajectory can be described as as shown in Mébarki et al. (2009b). After the 
fragment has been projected, an impact is possible with any potential target that 
crosses its trajectory. 
For fragments, the complete movement approach is used (Mébarki et al. 
(2007; 2008; 2009ab and Nguyen et al. 2009): 
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where q = 1 at descending part; q = 2 at ascending part; g is gravity; x, y, z  are 
the fragment center coordinates; kD is the drag factor 
p
DDair
D
m
ACk ⋅⋅= ρ
2
1 (Eq. 
B16), kL is the lift factor 
p
LLair
L
m
ACk ⋅⋅= ρ
2
1 (Eq. B16), ρair is the dencity of air.  
The solution of the fragment motion equations can be derived under the 
following set of hypotheses porposed by Mébarki et al. (2007; 2008; 2009ab) 
and Nguyen et al. (2009): 
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- Initial conditions: at departure, the fragment is located at the system 
origin (poit O). The pulse produced by the blast (vessel explosion) 
produces the initial velocity of fragment (vOx, vOy vOz). 
- When the projectile reaches its trajectory upper position (top point), its 
vertical velocity becomes zero. 
- Final conditions: when the fragment craches on the ground , in the de-
scending part of its trajectory, its vertical coordinate becomes zero. 
Hereafter, the distribution of the fragments craching on the ground will be 
evaluated by means of Monte – Carlo simulation using the complete movement 
approach. 
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Annex C. Information on the road tanker considered 
in the case study 
 
The case study presented in Sec. 2.2.4 includes prediction an impact of frag-
ments (projectiles) on a potential safety barrier. The impact can be caused by a 
fragmentation of pressure vessel in the course of a BLEVE. The vessel is a part 
of a HLQ 3-axle LPG tank semi-trailer (Fig. C1). It is produced by the Hubei 
Heli Special Automobile Manufacturing Company (http://hltruck.en.china.cn/). 
This vessel was chosen only as an example. If the safety barrier considered 
in Sec. 2.2.4 will be threatened by a BLEVE of a pressure vessel of another type 
or a vessel having another characterisics, the prediction of impact effects should 
be done anew. 
 
Fig. C1. HQL LPG tank 3-axe semi trailer 
The tank volume of the HLQ 3-axle LPG tank semi-trailer shown in Fig. C1 
are 52 m3. The tank material is Q345R (Chinese standard). The semi-tailer was 
designed to ship LPG only. The nominal pressure of the safety valve are 
2.5 MPa. The main specifications of the semi trailer are given in Table C1. 
The case study presented in Sec. 2.2.4 describes a simulation-based 
prediction of fragmentation, trajectories and impact characteristics of the tank 
semi-trailer shown in Fig. C1. Mathematical models used for this prediction are 
presented in Sec. 2.2.4 and Annex B. Some input variables of these models are 
eterministic and some are random. Values of deterministic input variables 
related to the tank trailer are listed in Table C2, wereas probability distributions 
of the random input variables are given in Table C3. 
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Table C1. The main specification of the HLQ LPG tank semi trailer 
LPG TANK SEMI TRAILER SPECIFICATION 
Product model HLQ LPG tank 3 
axle semi trailer 
Design the 
limited ve-
lovity 
Straight road 80 
km/h 
G.V.W. Approx 40000 kg Turning 20 km/h 
Net weght Approx 17600 kg F/R track base -/ 1840/ 1840/ 1840 
Axle 12 T BPW *3 pcs Wheel base 6800+1310+1310 
mm 
Axle load 15200/ 24800 kg 
(triaxle) 
Overall Di-
mensions 
12740*2500*3950 
mm 
Tire specification 12.00-20*12 pcs Max vehicle 
roll angle 
> 35 o 
LPG TANK  SPECIFICATION EMERGENCY CUT OFF DEVICE 
Tank dimensions  
(diameter*thickness*L) 
DN 2320*14*12360 
mm 
Type QGJ43F-2.5 or 
FISHER internal 
valve C427-16-25 / 
C427-24-50 
Net weight Approx 13000 kg  Nominal pres-
sure 
PN2.5 MPa 
Vessel type III Nominal di-
ameter 
Gas Valve: DN 25 
Liquid valve: 
DN50 
Designing pressure 1.77 MPa Control  meth-
od 
Manual machinery  
Working pressure  ≤1.61 MPa Closing time ≤ 10 s 
Melting switch temper-
ature 
70± 5 0 C Melting close 
temperature 
70± 5 0 C 
Designing temperature -19 ~+ 50 0 C Emergency cut 
off type 
Emergemcy shut-
off valve and valve 
combination of 
over-current limit 
Loading material Liquified petroleum 
gas (propane) 
LIQUID INDICATOR 
Corrosion margin 1.00 mm Model  UHZ- 518C14 
Volume (water capaci-
ty) 
52 m3 Nomial  pres-
sure 
PN 2.5 MPA 
Tank &Pressure mate-
rial 
Q345R Precision 2.5 Grade 
Hydraulic pressure test 2.22 MPa SAFETY VALVE 
Gas tight pressure test 1.77 MPa Model A42F-2.5-80 
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Table C1. Continued 
Cylinder thickness 13.56 mm Version Inner full lift 
Head thickness 13.53 mm Nominal pres-
sure 
2.5 MPa 
Service life 10 years Nominal radi-
us 
DN 80 
LOADING AND UNLOADING Opening pres-
sure 
1.68~1.76 MPa 
Valve type Q41F-2.5 P/ 
CQA41F-25 P 
Reseating 
pressure 
≥ 0.8 MPa 
Model Qiuck tie -in Closing pres-
sure 
> 1.54 MPa 
Nominal Diameter Gas phase DN25 mm Complete 
opening pres-
sure 
< 2.19 MPa 
Liquid phase 
DN50 mm 
Design standart meet ASME, SGS, 
etc 
Table C2. Deterministic input variables used for the simulation of LPG tank 
fragmentation 
Variable Symbol Value 
The length mass of the cylindrical part lcyl 10.94 m 
The linear (1 m) mass of the cylindrical part mcyl, 1 882 kg 
Mass of front end-cap me–c, front 1103 kg 
Mass of rear end-cap me–c, rear 681 kg 
Volume of the tank V 52 m3 
The specific heat ratio for propane at 15 °C γ 1.13 
Table C3. Random input variables used for the simulation of LPG tank fragmentation 
Variable Symbol Probability distribution 
Length of the cylindrical part between the 
end-cap and circumferential crack 
ξcyl Uniform over [0, lcyl] 
The length of the cylindrical part of the 
front oblong end-cap  
ξfront Beta Be(2, 4) adjusted to the half-
length lcyl/2 
The length of the cylindrical part of the rear 
oblong end-cap 
ξrear Beta Be(4, 2) adjusted to the half-
length lcyl/2 
The failure pressure p0 Normal N(2.5 MPa, 0.125 MPa) 
The atmospheric (external) pressure pe Normal N(0.1013 MPa, 
0.0051 MPa) 
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Table C3. Continued 
The degree of filling of the source vessel f Uniform over [0.2 %, 0.8 %] 
The factor relating the expansion energy in 
the vessel and kinetic energy of a fragment 
c Exponential with the mean of 0.04 
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Annex D. Results of fragment impact simulation in 
the case study 
 
Two models were used to predict characteristics of road tanker vessel fragmen-
tation: 
 The model of vessel fragmentation presented in Sec. 2.2.3 and used for 
predicting the masses of the front and rear fragments, ξfrg, front and ξfrg, rear. 
 The model described and used for an assessment of fragment departure 
velocities vdep, front and vdep, rear. 
A stochastic simulation was carried out by applying the models just listed 
and the input data given in Tables C2 and C3. A total of 10 000 simulations 
were carried out to assess the variability of the fragment masses and departure 
velocities. The simulation yielded four samples of the simulated values ξfrg, front, j, 
ξfrg, rear, j, vdep, front, j and vdep, rear, j (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000). Desciptive statistics and 
correlation matrix of these values is presented in Tables D1 and D2.  
Table D1. Descriptive statistics of the simulated characterising of the road tanker vessel 
fragmentation, ξfrg, front, j, ξfrg, rear, j, vdep, front, j and vdep, rear, j (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
Departure characteristic Mean Min. Max. Std. dev. Skew. Kurt. 
Front fragment mass (kg) 4230 1103 10713 2579 1.01 –0.167 
Rear fragment mass (kg) 3804 685.2 10294 2569 1.03 –0.108 
Departure velocity (front) 
(km/h) 193.4 1.47 931 124.37 1.21 1.84 
Departure velocity (rear) 
(km/h) 211.2 1.74 1141 141.98 1.41 2.86 
Table D2. The correlation matrix of the simulated characterising of the road tanker 
vessel fragmentation, ξfrg, front, j, ξfrg, rear, j, vdep, front, j and vdep, rear, j (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Front fragment mass (kg) 1 –0.17 –0.40 0.06 
2. Rear fragment mass (kg) –0.17 1 0.06 –0.43 
3. Departure velocity (front) 
(km/h) –0.40 0.06 1 0.72 
4. Departure velocity (rear) 
(km/h) 0.06 –0.43 0.72 1 
* All correlations are significant at p < 0.05 
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The histograms of ξfrg, front, j, ξfrg, rear, j, vdep, front, j and vdep, rear, j are given in 
Fig. D.1 and D2. The scaterplots of the pairs of ξfrg, front, j, ξfrg, rear, j, vdep, front, j are 
presented in Fig. D3, Fig. D4 and D5. 
Histograms of the simulated values ξfrg, front, j, ξfrg, rear, j, vdep, front, j and vdep, rear, j 
(j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) are shown in Fig. D1 and D2. The scatter diagrams of the 
pairs (ξfrg, front, j, ξfrg, rear, j), (ξfrg, front, j, vdep, front, j), (ξfrg, front, j, vdep, rear, j), (ξfrg, rear, j, vdep,  
front, j), (ξfrg, rear, j, vdep, rear, j) and (vdep, front, j, vdep, rear, j) are presented in Fig. D3, 
Fig. D4 and D5. 
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Fig. D1. Histograms of the simulated values ξfrg, front, j, ξfrg, rear, j (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D.2. Histograms of the simulated values vdep, front, j and vdep, rear, j (j = 1, 2, … , 
10 000) 
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Fig. D3. Scatter diagrams of the pairs (ξfrg, front, j, ξfrg, rear, j) and (ξfrg, front, j, vdep, front, j) (j = 
1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D4. Scatter diagrams of the pairs (ξfrg, front, j, vdep, rear, j) and (ξfrg, rear, j, vdep, front, j) (j = 
1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D5. Scatter diagrams of the pairs (ξfrg, rear, j, vdep, rear, j) and (vdep, front, j, vdep, rear, j) (j = 
1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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The simulated impact characterisitcs were obtained by means of three 
simulation runs with different simulation numbers: 
1. 1×106 of simulations were were used to calculate frequencies of 
fragment impacts on four individual barrier segments B1 – B2, 
B2 – B3, B3 – B4 and B4 – B5 (Fig. 2.29); these frequencies are 
presented in Table 2.12. 
2. 100 000 simulations were used to compute descriptive measures 
of samples consisting of the simulated impact characteristics 
ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j; the samples were obtained for each of the 
barrier segments B1 – B2, B2 – B3, B3 – B4 and B4 – B5; in total 
16 samples of individual impact characteristics were analysed; 
frequencies of fragment impacts into the segments at 100 000 
simuations are presented in Table D3. 
3. 10 000 simulations were applied to visualise 16 samples consist-
ing of the characteristics ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j and related to the 
aforementioned barrier segments. 
Table D3. Absolute and relative frequencies of fragment impacts on the segment of the 
barrier (results were obtained with 1×105 simulations of vessel fragmentation and flights 
of fragments) 
Freaquency 
    The whole 
barrier B1–B2 B2–B3 B3–B4 B4–B5 
Absolute 5014 5423 16 796 20 899 48 132 
Relative  0.05014 0.05423 0,16796 0.20899 0.48132 
 
The present section contains results of processing the simulated impact 
characterisitcs of the tanker vessel fragments which crossed the vertical plane 
running along the barrier segment B1–B2. The numerical results consists of the 
descriptive measures of the samples formed from the values ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and 
harv,j (Table D4). In addition, coefficients of correlation between these four 
samples were computed (Table D5). 
The properties of samples consisting of the values ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j 
were visualised using three types of graphs: the scatterplot of the points, where 
fragments crossed the vertical plane of the barrier segment B1–B2 (Fig. D6); the 
histograms of the four individual samples of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j (Fig. D7 and 
D8); and the scatterplots of pairs of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j (Fig. D9, Fig. D10 and 
D11). 
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Table D.4. Characteristics of impact on the barrier segment B1–B2 
Component of the simulated sample Mean Min Max Std.dev. 
Ricochet angle φj (degs) 49.3 0.741 90.0 18.5 
Angle of obliquity θj (degs) 40.7 0.004 89.3 18.5 
Horizontal flight distance dhor, j (m) 23.4 0.026 95.0 17.3 
Impact altitude himp, j (m) 13.1 0.002 66.1 11.3 
Fragment mass ξfrg, j(kg) 3930.9 698.0 10714.2 2584.8 
Impact velocity varv, j (km/h) 208.1 0.835 973.0 139.0 
Table D5. Correlation matrix of the simulated samples of fragment impact 
charakteristics related to barrier segment B1–B2 (see Fig. 2.29)* 
 φ himp ξfrg varv 
φ 1.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
himp 0.01 1.00 0.02 0.00 
ξfrg 0.01 0.02 1.00 -0.43 
varv -0.01 0.00 -0.43 1.00 
* The bold numbers indicate statisticaly significant correlation coeficients 
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Fig. D6. Scatter diagrams of the points where fragments crossed the vertical plane of the 
barrier segments B1–B2 (10 000 simulated values) 
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Fig. D7. Histograms of the simulated values of ξfrg,j, varv,j, related to the barrier seg-
ments B1–B2 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D8. Histograms of the simulated values of φj and harv,j related to the barrier seg-
ments B1–B2 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D9 The scatterplots of pairs of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j related to the barrier seg-
ments B1–B2 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D10. The scatterplots of pairs of varv,j, φj and harv,j related to the barrier segments 
B1–B2 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D11. The scatterplots of pairs of ξfrg,j, φj and harv,j related to the barrier segments 
B1–B2 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
The present section contains results of processing the simulated impact 
characterisitcs of the tanker vessel fragments which crossed the vertical plane 
running along the barrier segment B2–B3. The numerical results consists of the 
descriptive measures of the samples formed from the values ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and 
harv,j (Table D6). In addition, coefficients of correlation between these four 
samples were computed (Table D7). 
The properties of samples consisting of the values ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j 
were visualised using three types of graphs: the scatterplot of the points, where 
fragments crossed the vertical plane of the barrier segment B2–B3 (Fig. D12); the 
histograms of the four individual samples of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j (Fig. D13 and 
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D14); and the scatterplots of pairs of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j (Fig. D15, Fig. D16 
and 17). 
Table D6. Characteristics of impact on the barrier segment B2–B3 (see Fig. 2.29) 
Component of the simulated sample Mean Min Max Std.dev. 
Ricochet angle φj (degs) 24.1 0.20 89.9 15.96 
Angle of obliquity θj (degs) 65.9 0.09 89.8 15.96 
Horizontal flight distance dhor, j (m) 16.3 1.82 98.6 10.38 
Impact altitude himp, j (m) 2.2 0.00 17.6 2.53 
Fragment mass ξfrg, j(kg) 4072.9 689.29 10705.7 2585.94 
Impact velocity varv, j (km/h) 201.7 1.75 1362.9 134.73 
Table D7. Correlation matrix of the simulated samples of fragment impact 
charakteristics related to barrier segment B2–B3 (see Fig. 2.29)* 
 φ himp ξfrg varv 
φ 1.00 0.06 -0.02 0.00 
himp 0.06 1.00 -0.02 0.01 
ξfrg -0.02 -0.02 1.00 -0.42 
varv 0.00 0.01 -0.42 1.00 
* The bold numbers indicate statisticaly significant correlation coeficients 
 
Fig. D12. Scatter diagrams of the points where fragments crossed the vertical plane of 
the barrier segments B2–B3 (10 000 simulated values) 
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Fig. D13. Histograms of the simulated values of ξfrg,j, varv,j, related to the barrier seg-
ments B2–B3 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D14. Histograms of the simulated values of φj and harv,j  related to the barrier seg-
ments B2–B3 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D15 The scatterplots of pairs of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj related to the barrier segments B2–B3 
(j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D16 The scatterplots of pairs of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j related to the barrier seg-
ments B2–B3 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D17 The scatterplots of pairs of varv,j, φj and harv,j related to the barrier segments 
B2–B3 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
The present section contains results of processing the simulated impact 
characterisitcs of the tanker vessel fragments which crossed the vertical plane 
running along the barrier segment B3–B4. The numerical results consists of the 
descriptive measures of the samples formed from the values ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and 
harv,j (Table D8). In addition, coefficients of correlation between these four 
samples were computed (Table D9). 
The properties of samples consisting of the values ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j 
were visualised using three types of graphs: the scatterplot of the points, where 
fragments crossed the vertical plane of the barrier segment B3–B4 (Fig. D18); the 
histograms of the four individual samples of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j (Fig. D19 and 
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D20); and the scatterplots of pairs of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j (Fig. D21, Fig. D22 
and D23). 
Table D8. Characteristics of impact on the barrier segment B3–B4 (see Fig. 2.29) 
Component of the simulated sample Mean Min Max Std.dev. 
Ricochet angle φj (degs) 30.4 1.24 135.6 14.83 
Angle of obliquity θj (degs) 59.6 -45.64 88.8 14.83 
Horizontal flight distance dhor, j (m) 46.7 2.92 177.1 49.45 
Impact altitude himp, j (m) 3.17 0.00 27.0 3.70 
Fragment mass ξfrg, j(kg) 4136.5 683.81 10716.3 2591.7 
Impact velocity varv, j (km/h) 200.3 1.61 1071.1 132.24 
Table D9. Correlation matrix of the simulated samples of fragment impact 
charakteristics related to barrier segment B3–B4 (see Fig. 2.29)* 
 φ himp ξfrg varv 
φ 1.00 0.08 -0.01 -0.00 
himp 0.08 1.00 -0.01 0.00 
ξfrg -0.01 -0.01 1.00 -0.41 
varv -0.00 0.00 -0.41 1.00 
* The bold numbers indicate statisticaly significant correlation coeficients 
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Fig. D18. Scatter diagrams of the points where fragments crossed the vertical plane of 
the barrier segments B3–B4 (10 000 simulated values) 
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Fig. D19. Histograms of the simulated values of ξfrg,j, varv,j, related to the barrier seg-
ments B3–B4 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D20. Histograms of the simulated values of φj and harv,j related to the barrier seg-
ments B3–B4 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D21. The scatterplots of pairs of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and related to the barrier segments 
B3–B4 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D22. The scatterplots of pairs of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j related to the barrier seg-
ments B3–B4 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D23. The scatterplots of pairs of varv,j, φj and harv,j related to the barrier segments 
B3–B4 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
The present section contains results of processing the simulated impact 
characterisitcs of the tanker vessel fragments which crossed the vertical plane 
running along the barrier segment B4–B5. The numerical results consists of the 
descriptive measures of the samples formed from the values ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and 
harv,j (Table D10). In addition, coefficients of correlation between these four 
samples were computed (Table D11). 
The properties of samples consisting of the values ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j 
were visualised using three types of graphs: the scatterplot of the points, where 
fragments crossed the vertical plane of the barrier segment B4–B5 (Fig. D24); the 
histograms of the four individual samples of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j (Fig. D25 and 
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26); and the scatterplots of pairs of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j (Fig. D27, Fig. D28 
and D29). 
Table D10. Characteristics of impact on the barrier segment B4–B5 (see Fig. 2.29) 
Component of the simulated sample Mean Min Max Std.dev. 
Ricochet angle φj (degs) 38.0 0.446 90.0 17.46 
Angle of obliquity θj (degs) 52.0 0.0280 89.6 17.46 
Horizontal flight distance dhor, j (m) 75.0 6.76 184.7 29.6 
Impact altitude himp, j (m) 9.00 0.0 104.2 10.99 
Fragment mass ξfrg, j(kg) 4116.9 681.6 10714.9 2596 
Impact velocity varv, j (km/h) 198.9 1.044 1261.5 130.3 
Table D11. Correlation matrix of the simulated samples of fragment impact 
charakteristics related to barrier segment B4–B5 (see Fig. 2.29)* 
 φ himp ξfrg varv 
φ 1.00 0.17 0.02 -0.01 
himp 0.17 1.00 -0.01 -0.01 
ξfrg 0.02 -0.01 1.00 -0.41 
varv -0.01 -0.01 -0.41 1.00 
* The bold numbers indicate statisticaly significant correlation coeficients 
 
Fig. D24. Scatter diagrams of the points where fragments crossed the vertical plane of 
the barrier segments B4–B5 (10 000 simulated values) 
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Fig. D25. Histograms of the simulated values of ξfrg,j, varv,j, related to the barrier seg-
ments B4–B5 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D26. Histograms of the simulated values of φj and harv,j related to the barrier seg-
ments B4–B5 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D27. The scatterplots of pairs of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj related to the barrier segments B4–B5 
(j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
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Fig. D28. The scatterplots of pairs of ξfrg,j, varv,j, φj and harv,j related to the barrier seg-
ments B4–B5 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
222 ANNEXES 
 
 
Fig. D29. The scatterplots of pairs of varv,j, φj and harv,j related to the barrier segments 
B4–B5 (j = 1, 2, … , 10 000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lina KISEŽAUSKIENĖ 
EPLORING THE POSSIBILITY TO ASSESS AND REDUCE THE RISK  
DUE TO HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION  
BY DEPLOYING ROADSIDE SAFETY BARRIERS 
Doctoral Dissertation 
Technological Sciences,  
Civil Engineering (02T) 
 
TRANSPORTUOJAMŲ PAVOJINGŲJŲ MEDŽIAGŲ KELIAMOS  
RIZIKOS TYRIMAS TYRIMAS IR MAŽINIMAS  
ĮRENGIANT SAUGOS BARJERUS 
Daktaro disertacija 
Technologijos mokslai,  
statybos inžinerija (02T) 
 
2014 11 10. 15,0 sp. l. Tiražas 20 egz. 
Vilniaus Gedimino technikos universiteto  
leidykla „Technika“,  
Saulėtekio al. 11, 10223 Vilnius,  
http://leidykla.vgtu.lt 
Spausdino UAB „Baltijos kopija“ 
Kareivių g. 13B, 09109 Vilnius 
